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ABSTRACT 
The desire to enhance the thinking skills of learners has 
become a worldwide phenomenon. This desire has been 
further reinforced by programmes developed specifically 
for this purpose. Developers of these thinking skills 
programmes have made various claims about the 
effectiveness of their programmes in teaching learners 
general skills of thinking that can be applied to any 
field of study. The thesis presents a comprehensive 
examination of the four most prominent programmes. The 
basis of the thesis is a critical discussion of the 
assumptions underpinning these programmes and the 
coherence of their claims. At the core of these 
assumptions is the idea that thinking can be taught and 
learned free from any context. The idea raises important 
conceptual and practical issues that demand attention if 
improvements in pupils' thinking are to be addressed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The desire to improve pupils' thinking has become a 
worldwide phenomenon. In the USA, for example, the 
Secretary's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills 
(SCANS) framework is part of an official nation-wide 
effort to link education to the world at large (Marginson 
and O'Hanlon,1993). The Commission created a list 
consisting of five workplace competencies and three 
foundation skills called 'Workplace know-how' which 
includes thinking skills. The Commission recommended that 
these workplace competencies and skills be made explicit 
at all levels of the nation's school system. 
Similarly, in Australia the Finn Committee 
(Mayer,1992) concluded that there are certain essential 
things which they termed 'employment-related key 
competencies' that all young people need to learn in 
their preparation for employment. In other words, these 
generic skills are seen to be at the crux of life-long 
learning to enhance pupils' flexibility and adaptability 
for effective participation in the changing patterns of 
work and work organisation. The Committee identified 
seven key competencies including thinking skills. 
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In the Chinese special region of Hong Kong the 
promotion of thinking skills has become a key factor in 
the development of their new curriculum framework. 
The growing interest in teaching thinking skills in 
England has led to its inclusion in the new National 
Curriculum handbook for teachers (QCA,1999). It states 
that thinking skills are embedded in the curriculum, and 
presents the following as examples of such thinking 
skills: 
Information-processing skills. It claims that these skills 
allow pupils to locate and collect relevant information, 
to sort, classify, sequence, compare and contrast, and to 
analyse part/whole relationships. 
Reasoning skills. It states that these skills permit 
pupils to give reasons for opinions and actions, to draw 
inferences and make deductions, to use precise language 
to explain what they think, and to make judgments and 
decisions. 
Enquiry skills. It highlights the importance of these 
skills in allowing pupils to ask relevant questions, to 
pose and define problems, to plan what to do and how to 
research, to predict outcomes and anticipate 
consequences, and to test conclusions and improve ideas. 
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Creative thinking skills. It maintains that with these 
skills pupils are able to generate and extend ideas, to 
suggest hypotheses, to apply imagination, and to look for 
alternative innovative outcomes. 
Evaluation skills. According to the handbook these skills 
help pupils to evaluate information, judge the value of 
what they read, hear and do, develop criteria for judging 
the value of their own and others' work or ideas, and 
have confidence in their judgments. 
The intention on the part of national governments to 
improve the thinking skills of their citizens has been 
supported by programmes developed specifically for the 
promotion of pupils' general thinking skills. Currently, 
there is a very large number of programmes claiming to 
improve learners' general thinking skills. These include 
the following: 
• From the U.S.A - Structure of Intellect (SOI), 
Odyssey, Problem Solving and Comprehension, Logic, 
'Strong' Critical Thinking, Philosophy for Children. 
• From England - Somerset Thinking Skills Course, The 
Oxfordshire Skills Programme, LOGO, Cognitive 
Acceleration through Science Education (CASE), 
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Cognitive Acceleration through Mathematics Education 
(CAME). 
• From Malta (but with English influence) - Cognitive 
Research Trust (CoRT), 
• From Israel - Instrumental Enrichment. 
• From Ireland - Activating Children's Thinking Skills 
(ACTS). 
Policy makers often turn to these thinking skills 
programmes as a result of their keenness to improve the 
educational experience of learners. In England, for 
example, the McGuinness Report (1999) has played an 
influential role in the inclusion of thinking skills in 
the new National Curriculum. In 1998 the Department for 
Education and Employment (now known as the Department for 
Education and Skills) commissioned the report in order to 
review and evaluate research into thinking skills and 
related areas. The report specifically aimed to (1) 
analyse what is currently understood by the term 
"thinking skills" and their role in the learning process; 
(2) identify current approaches to developing children's 
thinking and to evaluate their effectiveness; 
(3) consider how teachers might be able to integrate 
thinking skills into their teaching both within subject 
areas and across the curriculum; (4) identify the role of 
ICT in promoting a positive approach to thinking skills; 
and (5) evaluate the general trend of current and future 
12 
research and how it might translate into classroom 
practice. 
In the main the report recognised general thinking 
skills as a model for delivering thinking skills and 
highlighted a number of programmes, including Philosophy 
for Children (PfC), Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT), 
Instrumental Enrichment (FIE) and Cognitive Acceleration 
through Science Education (CASE) as examples of 
programmes delivering general thinking skills. The CASE 
programme, for instance, was highlighted as providing 
benefits to learners that could extend beyond academic 
attainment. 
In view of the increasing recognition and use of 
these programmes in shaping educational policy there is a 
need for their critical review. It is the central aim of 
this thesis to provide this. It will concentrate on four 
of the most prominent programmes developed for teaching 
general thinking skills, as follows: 
Philosophy for Children (PfC) 
Matthew Lipman developed this programme in the early 
1970s to address some of the problems (as he saw them) in 
the American educational system. The original idea for 
the creation of the programme resulted from Lipman's 
concern about the low level of thinking skills that 
students brought to his philosophy classes. For Lipman 
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the educational system produced so many unthinking people 
because it fails to address the conceptual needs of the 
child in a number of ways. For example, children are not 
taught to reason. Similarly, children are not shown how 
to apply logical skills to diverse subject matters. The 
alarming level of the American child's lack of reasoning, 
as Lipman observed, is a result of the child not being 
sufficiently encouraged to think for him or herself, be 
proud of his or her personal insights, and have a point 
of view that he or she can call his or her own. Lipman 
argues that the best way to resolve such an unproductive 
educational system is to be found in teaching children 
philosophy, as it is the best discipline to connect the 
various specific subjects. For Lipman, to engage children 
in philosophical discussions is, therefore, an aid in 
healing the 'general fragmentation' of their educational 
experience. 
Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT) 
Edward DeBono developed CoRT in the middle of the 1970s 
in order to address the inadequacies in teaching thinking 
within the British educational system. For DeBono, our 
productive thinking ability is based on the way that the 
brain and its various thought processes operate. DeBono's 
description of the unique way in which the brain works 
with working models and not by words forms the bedrock 
for the justification of his curriculum proposal as 
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presented in his CoRT programme. DeBono defends the need 
for his programme by arguing that the teaching of 
thinking is the teaching of perception. According to 
DeBono, a great deal can be accomplished in most ordinary 
thinking by 'directing attention' (i.e perception) before 
applying the processing stage of thinking which then 
involves logic. According to DeBono the teaching of logic 
has been wrongly taken for granted as the main approach 
to teaching thinking as a result of tradition based on 
the classics. So for DeBono, the ineffectiveness of the 
traditional subject matter of logic and other content 
subjects in teaching thinking forms an important part of 
his rationale for recommending his programme as the best 
way to teach thinking. 
Instrumental Enrichment (FIE) 
Reuven Feuerstein began work on this programme in the 
late 1940s as a result of his concern for the integration 
of young Jewish people from many deprived and often 
traumatised cultures in Europe, Asia and Africa into 
Israel. FIE is presented as a strategy for the 
restoration of cognitive structure in the retarded 
performer. At the core of this conception of a retarded 
cognitive performance, according to Feuerstein, is the 
phenomenon of cultural deprivation, defined as a "state 
of reduced cognitive modifiability of the individual in 
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response to direct exposure to sources of stimulation". 
Feuerstein's notion of cultural deprivation is directly 
determined by the lack of a mediated learning experience. 
This may arise as a result of parents not providing it in 
the early years of the child's cognitive development. 
Feuerstein believes that his Instrumental Enrichment 
programme based on the theory of mediated learning 
experience is capable of reversing the conditions of 
retarded cognitive performance as experienced by the 
culturally deprived. The programme is based on the 
fundamental idea that it is the learner rather than the 
material to be learned that should be modified. 
Feuerstein's belief that the human intellect is highly 
adaptable and modifiable at all ages and stages of 
development underpinned his entire approach to the 
development of the programme, which emerged from his 
theory of the relationship of early mediated learning 
experience and later cognitive competence. 
Cognitive Acceleration for Science Education (CASE) 
Philip Adey and Michael Shayer developed this programme 
at Kings College London in the middle of the 1980s. The 
need to address issues concerning the low academic 
standards in schools and colleges formed the basis for 
the development of CASE. It is a cognitive intervention 
programme based on a Piagetian approach. Its aim is to 
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accelerate pupils' cognitive development to the level of 
formal operational thinking such that they can engage 
successfully with the instructional objectives of the 
traditional curriculum. The intervention is set in the 
science curriculum and the materials are directed towards 
scientific-type thinking. 
The thesis is arranged in three parts and Part Two 
focuses on the critical review of the four programmes. In 
this part each of the programmes is examined in turn, 
with a focus on their conceptual coherence and the 
evidence of their effectiveness (Chapters 5 to 8). 
Underpinning the critical discussions of the four 
programmes is the fundamental issue of the existence of 
general thinking skills and their transferability from 
one domain to another (Chapter 10). The thesis argues 
that the transfer of thinking skills is possible (or is 
to be expected) where the domains in question are closely 
related. For example, it is highly likely that 
mathematical thinking skills can be easily transferred to 
solving problems in physics or economics, but the same 
cannot be simply said about the use of such thinking 
skills in solving problems to do with personal 
relationships, for example, or in playing and winning a 
game of tennis. In spite of the fact that the existence 
of general thinking skills across the board is not 
logically impossible, there is no sufficient or good 
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empirical evidence for them. The thesis proposes that in 
order to alleviate the ongoing confusion as a result of 
the simplistic way in which the phrase 'general thinking 
skills' is often used, we resist the temptation to refer 
to thinking skills as being 'general'. 
Other studies have also raised issues regarding the 
four programmes, but these studies have not provided such 
a comprehensive examination of all four programmes 
together as is presented in this thesis. It does so by 
offering a fuller and more fundamental account of the 
problems associated with these programmes. A central 
problem common to these programmes is their failure to 
take proper account of the nature of thinking in all its 
complexity. The thesis claims that one cannot properly 
evaluate arguments about thinking skills without the 
detailed consideration of the concept of thinking and its 
importance in education. It is to these issues that Part 
One of the thesis is devoted. 
In describing thinking it is necessary that a 
general account be first provided. Any definition of 
thinking must highlight the fact that it involves 
intentionality and attention and the need for some 
relevant context. Such contexts play a part in the 
importance of the different types of thinking and hence 
in its complexity. 
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There are many types of thinking, as already 
indicated, and although these are not mutually exclusive 
they can be categorised as follows: 
Reasoning 
In this type of thinking the focus is essentially on 
calculation and judgement. It involves trying to find 
what may produce the desired result based on largely 
trial and error. This type of thinking is subdivided into 
practical or theoretical reasoning. The practical in the 
main involves means and ends, in other words our ability 
to manage ourselves in the world of action. The 
theoretical is concerned with truth seeking, in other 
words it involves our ability to work with propositions. 
Imagining 
This type of thinking highlights the varied ways in which 
the term 'imagination' can be used. The term is used in a 
popular way to refer to our capacity to conceive of what 
is not actually happening here and now. However, 
different uses of the term can be distinguished in 
imaging, imagining and imaginativeness. The different 
senses in which the term can be applied draw further 
attention to the complexity of thinking. 
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Contemplation 
The motivation in contemplating is not concerned with 
solving problems as in reasoning or with the generating 
of new ways of viewing things as in imagining. 
Contemplation is concerned with the intrinsic 
appreciation of what is under consideration. 
Sign-cognition 
This type of thinking is different from reasoning, 
imagining or contemplation in the sense that it is pre-
verbal and pre-imaginal. The essence of sign-cognition is 
that it is a type of cognition by which something not 
immediately experienced is brought to the attention of 
the agent by means of a sign. 
The notion of thinking is also complicated by the 
fact that it can be applied to activities involving overt 
physical action as well as to instances where only covert 
mental activity is sufficient. Thus appreciation of a 
piece of music is a covert mental activity since there is 
no way of observing what the thinker is thinking without 
the thinker's assistance. On the other hand thinking 
occurring in a physical activity such as the behaviour of 
a tennis player is arguably open to observation by an 
external agent. 
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The diverse ways in which the manifestations of 
thinking can occur draw attention to the fact that 
thinking involves the focusing of attention in ways that 
require references to particular contexts. Since it is 
not possible to know when and which specific types of 
thinking will be deployed, individual learners must be 
given the opportunities whenever possible to develop the 
various types of thinking and in various contexts. 
The arguments in Part One demonstrate the complexity 
of thinking in its varied forms, and provide a backdrop 
against which it is not difficult to observe how the 
programmes present a simplistic and partial view of 
thinking and its promotion in education. 
Notwithstanding the discussions in Part One and Part 
Two the thesis does not merely aim at critique. In Part 
Three the thesis also explores what positively is 
necessary to develop pupils' thinking. It does so by 
presenting factors that should be considered in the 
development of thinking. In this part of the thesis it is 
argued that because of the prerequisite of specific 
contexts in thinking, knowledge plays a clear and 
necessary role. For example, being able to think 
effectively in solving mathematical problems involves 
some knowledge of mathematics, and similarly, being able 
to play tennis involves some knowledge of how to play the 
game. 
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Having knowledge alone does not guarantee the 
effective application of thinking when the need arises 
and in such situations courage is of particular 
importance. To be able to think clearly and effectively 
where there are no easy or straightforward guidelines 
involves effort, determination, patience, and in most 
cases the willingness to take intellectual risks since 
there are no guarantees that one's thinking will 
necessarily end in some kind of effectiveness. 
In education we are mainly interested in thinking 
that is generally understood in terms of thinking as an 
activity, that is, it is largely directed towards 
learning, problem solving and understanding. 
Thinking can be said to be effective when it results 
in learning new things. In these situations the element 
of courage (which may be of different types) is 
important, for example, as in the determination and 
patience often demanded by the process of learning and 
understanding. In the case where knowledge and 
understanding come with ease courage may still be 
necessary when it comes to applying them. For example, 
the very well informed and clever scientist who is 
capable of constructing weapons of mass destruction needs 
some kind of courage, in order to resist coercion by 
individuals or governments to aid the manufacture of such 
products. Similarly, the politician who lacks no 
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knowledge and understanding of the right decisions that 
must be made and makes them in the face of personal cost 
requires some sort of courage. 
In the context of the classroom, pupils may need to 
call upon courage of various kinds as they struggle to 
understand their work, challenge their peer groups, and 
try to overcome intimidation by their teachers. If pupils 
are to be supported to learn to think well, the promotion 
of courage in education must be seriously considered. In 
the literature on teaching general thinking skills the 
importance of courage and its allied dispositions in the 
promotion of thinking is largely neglected. For example, 
the four programmes presented in the thesis make no 
mention of them. 
The last chapter in Part Three reinforces the 
arguments raised in Part One by its insistence that we 
cannot discuss the teaching of thinking simply in general 
terms but must be more specific in accordance with the 
type of thinking concerned. For example, if we are 
interested in developing the football playing skills of 
pupils then this may require that attention is paid to 
the enhancement of their sign-cognition among other 
things. Similarly, if we are interested in developing 
their artistic skills we focus on the development of 
their imagination (in more than one sense of the term) 
among other things. Providing favourable conditions for 
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such enhancement will involve a change in the culture of 
how teaching and learning are carried out as well as how 
teachers are viewed. Bringing about this change depends 
on our understanding of what thinking involves. 
The final conclusion to the thesis highlights some 
of the broader issues associated with thinking and 
outlines from a non-simplistic position the arguments for 
its development in education. The conclusion brings to 
light reasons why policy-makers concerned with thinking 
skills in education must not be persuaded to settle for 
readymade solutions, which are often ill founded. 
Policies should be considered against the kind of broader 
background presented in this thesis. To this we now turn. 
PART ONE  
ON TEACHING THINKING 
The ability to think is central to most of what we do and as 
a result generations of eminent philosophers have been 
interested in investigating its nature. The aim in Part One 
of the thesis is to provide the background for discussions of 
thinking skills programmes in Part Two. 
The writings of Dewey and Ryle on thinking are of 
particular interest in this part of the thesis for two 
reasons. The first is that Dewey's conception of thinking has 
played an influential role in the discussion of thinking, 
with particular emphasis on its teaching in education. The 
second reason is that Ryle's conceptions of thinking 
highlight the complex nature of thinking and the difficulties 
in presenting a general model of it. Some of the ideas 
regarding thinking will be applied in the discussion of the 
justifications for its promotion in education in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 1 
WHAT IS THINKING? 
1.1. What constitutes thinking? 
We are interested in determining what constitutes thinking so 
that we can be in a better position to discuss the current 
interest in the teaching of thinking as a subject. Some 
supporters of the teaching of thinking claim that there are 
certain general skills of thinking that can be taught in 
their own right. In order to discuss this claim it is 
essential that we begin by exploring what thinking entails. 
In our daily lives we apply the notion of thinking 
mainly to say something about the kinds of mental activities 
that we engage in. Thinking about a dear one, about a 
mathematical problem, about life on Mars, about the existence 
of God, about a dream one has had, about what meal to cook 
for supper, about how to mend a leaking tap provide some 
examples of our day-to-day use of the notion. Although these 
examples are by no means complete they can serve as a 
starting point for our discussion of what thinking is. These 
examples highlight some features of thinking. Firstly, in all 
the different examples stated above thinking is about some X, 
secondly, thinking involves attention being focused on some 
X, thirdly, there seem to be different ways in which 
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attention is focused on the different X's. 
If thinking as claimed above is an activity that 
involves the focusing of attention on some X then what is it 
that we focus on, in other words, what is it that engages our 
attention? Does thinking require an intentional object in 
every instance? 
To intend an object is an abstract relation between a 
mental state and the object that is thought about (Searle, 
1983). By this notion thoughts can be directed towards an 
intended object or objects. When I daydream about a pleasant 
holiday on an island paradise my thought is about an island 
paradise and the object of my intention is the island 
paradise. When I am engaged in solving a mathematical problem 
my object of intention is the mathematical problem. When I am 
thinking about the right train for my journey, my intentional 
object is the train. 
An important idea regarding intentional objects is that 
they need not necessarily exist. We can believe in and search 
for a round square in which case our thought is about the 
non-existent round square. We can knowingly and deliberately 
imagine non-existent objects when we are day-dreaming in the 
same way as when we are trying to solve a real life problem. 
The ability to think and imagine whatever we like and project 
existent or non-existent intended objects for consideration 
distinguishes the thinking agent from mere mechanical things. 
To intend an object presupposes the use of concepts in 
thinking. To think about something involves having an idea 
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(or some ideas) about that something. These ideas may be 
right or wrong, true or false, real or imaginary. When I 
think about how crowded the 7.55am London Bridge bound train 
may be as I walk to the railway station, I must have the 
notion of what a crowd is. When I think about a mathematical 
problem, I must have an idea what a mathematical problem is. 
One cannot think about a round table without knowing how to 
recognise roundness or table. The connection between concepts 
and having thoughts is that the acquisition of concepts is 
important in thinking. 
The ability to use concepts and the directedness of 
thinking indicate some kind of awareness as already 
mentioned. To be aware is to be conscious of something. To 
think about X involves being conscious of that X. For 
example, to think about a memorable childhood experience 
involves being conscious of the experience. However, there 
are occasions when past experiences impress themselves on our 
thoughts with little effort on our part to recall such 
experiences. Nevertheless we become immediately conscious of 
such episodes when they enter our thoughts. 
We cannot refuse to grant the strong links between 
consciousness, concepts and thinking. Does this mean that 
when we are thinking about something it is solely by the use 
of language? Are there other means by which thinking may be 
carried out? 
Clearly, the use of language is important for thought 
because of the way in which it allows us to anchor the 
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extension of concepts (McGinn, 1982). For example, with 
regard to the concept of blueness, we have a good idea what 
range of the colour spectrum constitutes the extension of the 
concept of blueness. We may disagree on borderline cases, 
that is, whether violet embodies blueness. This is one way in 
which the concept gains much focus. Language allows us to 
agree on which cases are instances of blueness and which are 
not, and on what it is that makes the difference between 
being blue and not being blue. It also allows us to form 
complex and detailed logical links between concepts, for 
example, forming hierarchies of conceptual relationships. It 
is clear that the need for language is crucial for the 
efficient use and clarification of concepts and the 
communicating of our thoughts. 
The argument in favour of the notion that thinking is 
possible in the absence of language was put forward by 
Price(1969) in his book Thinking and Experience. Price called 
this kind of thinking Sign-Cognition. For Price Sign-
Cognition is a type of cognition in which something not 
immediately experienced is brought to the agent's awareness 
by means of a sign. Price argued that although Sign-Cognition 
is a pre-verbal and pre-imaginal form of cognition, it 
possesses the distinctive features of thinking as it is 
cognition in the absence of the object thought about, and is 
also liable to error. This form of thinking is very closely 
connected to feelings and practical behaviour. For example, 
when a footballer jumps in a certain way to make contact with 
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the ball when a corner-kick is taken and scores by heading 
the ball over the goalkeeper the footballer's instant 
movement is tied to the movement of the ball. Similarly, the 
pedestrian's excellent judgment in crossing a very busy road 
without a marked pedestrian crossing is wholly pre-verbal. 
Sign-cognition is closely bound up with action but in a sense 
different from mere reaction such as a knee-jerk. Whereas a 
knee-jerk does not refer to an intentional object but is 
purely a reflex action, sign-cognition on the other hand is 
an activity that involves an object upon which attention is 
focused. For example, the football player's instant movement 
involves focusing his attention on the movement of the ball. 
So far what is beginning to emerge from our discussions 
is the complexity of the nature of thinking, which is often 
highlighted by philosophers in their considerations of the 
concept and what it involves. Kenny(1982) for example 
considers that the two essential properties of any act of 
thought or thinking are that it involves the possession of 
some content and a possessor of that content. In other words, 
for one to think of, say, the education secretary involves 
firstly, that what one is thinking of is the education 
secretary and not a basket of fruits, and secondly, that the 
thought is possessed by no other person but oneself. Hence in 
spite of the various properties that thoughts may have it is 
essential that not only should they be somebody's thoughts 
but they should also be thoughts of something. Kenny's 
analysis at once highlights some important points about the 
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concept. It underlines the subjective nature of thinking as 
it is predicated upon individual and personal experience. It 
also suggests that thinking involves something specific. 
These points will again be discussed later. Kenny provided 
further distinctions of the notion by arguing that we employ 
the word to 'think' in two different but related ways, that 
is, we sometimes talk of thinking about X and at other times 
as thinking that X. Thus in the first instance one may be 
thinking about traffic congestion in London and in the second 
instance one may be thinking that philosophy is a difficult 
subject. For Kenny thinking that philosophy is difficult 
presupposes thinking about philosophy, hence the two ways of 
viewing the notion are not mutually exclusive. The variety of 
ways in which the concept can be used is an important 
attribute in highlighting the complex nature of the concept. 
White's(1967) analysis on the other hand tries to 
highlight two important characteristics of the concept of 
thinking. The first is the variety of different uses of the 
word 'think' and the second concerns the polymorphous nature 
of these different uses. The ambiguity of the word 'think' as 
observed by White can be drawn from the fact that it 
successfully covers several aspects of the workings of our 
intellect. For White, thinking can be used to: 
i) Signify an activity. To think may be used to signify the 
engagement in one of several kinds of activities such as 
thinking over some past event, or dwelling in anticipation on 
something in the future or daydreaming about possibilities. 
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Equally, one's attention can be focused on one's actions or 
on some aspects of it. In yet another way one may be thinking 
about how to solve a problem and the solution may be 
something one is trying to remember, create or discover. 
ii) Signify a result. Thinking in this case may not be to 
engage in any activity but to get hold of or receive a 
specific thought at a specific time. White puts it simply 
that for one to hit upon or be struck by a thought is for one 
to think of it. On the other hand to search for it is to be 
thinking. In this case no matter how little or long one takes 
thinking before one thinks of a result, to think of it does 
not itself take time. 
iii) Signify the possession of an opinion. For White thinking 
as the possession of an opinion is different from thinking as 
an activity or as the reception of a specific thought. This 
difference becomes clearer when for instance we ask what 
someone thinks about a particular topic or issue. What we 
are asking for in this case is the opinions currently held by 
that person on the topic or issue being discussed. 
iv) Signify the possession of a concept. Related to the use 
of 'think' in (iii) is its use to signify the possession of a 
concept. To possess the concept of a chair is to think of an 
item designed or arranged in a way that allows one to sit on 
it without falling over. To use this concept is to think of a 
particular example of a chair. 
The last two related examples in which thinking 
signifies the possession of an opinion and of a concept 
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clearly overlap with Kenny's analysis of thinking discussed 
earlier. White's analysis demonstrates the numerous senses 
in which the word 'think' can be applied and in doing this 
White draws inspiration from Ryle. That is to say, the notion 
of thinking does not mark out some specific result, activity, 
state, possession or disposition of the thinker but instead 
it qualifies any one of these by relating it in certain ways 
to its circumstances. Further discussions of the 
polymorphousness of thinking will be considered later. 
However, what is clear from both Kenny and White's analysis 
is that thinking is an ambiguous and complicated concept. 
Thinking is a highly complex phenomenon because it can 
be applied to activities involving overt physical action as 
well as to instances where only mental activity is 
sufficient. For example, thinking about God does not 
necessarily involve any physical action but instead it 
involves some sort of mental activity. Thinking involves the 
focusing of attention on some X, which can occur as a covert 
mental activity or as an overt physical activity. The point 
being made in maintaining that thinking in one sense could be 
understood as a covert mental activity is that in thinking 
silently, for example, much goes on that cannot be got at or 
explained by external observers. Thus appreciation of a piece 
of music is a covert mental activity since there is no way of 
observing what the thinker is thinking without the thinker's 
assistance. On the other hand thinking occurring as a 
physical activity such as the movement of the footballer in 
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the earlier example is in a sense open to observation by an 
external agent. 
The clarification of what is meant by thinking has been 
of interest to other key philosophers. The work of John Dewey 
and Gilbert Ryle is of interest to our discussions 
particularly in connection with the debate on teaching 
general skills of thinking. 
1.2. Dewey on thinking. 
In his book How We Think, Dewey begins by discussing what 
thinking is and in doing so identified three different senses 
in which thinking could be understood. 
In the first sense, thinking could be understood as a 
stream or flow of uncontrolled ideas. The uncontrolled stream 
of ideas is automatic and unregulated. This kind of thinking 
may either be in the form of dreaming when we are asleep or 
in the form of day-dreams, reveries, castles built in the air 
when we are awake and attending to our day-to-day routines. 
In the second sense, it could be understood as a 
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succession of mental pictures or imaginative episodes that 
have some coherence but are only flights of fancy and lead to 
no conclusion that can be substantiated outside the course of 
the images. In this case, thinking is the succession of such 
pictures. 
In the third sense, thinking is practically synonymous 
with belief. For example, to say that 'I think it is going 
to rain this evening' or 'I think Denmark is colder than 
England' is equivalent to saying 'I believe so-and-so.' 
Thinking in this sense was discussed earlier in section 1.1 
Dewey used these different senses in which thinking 
could be understood to highlight what he called 'reflective 
thinking'. This kind of thinking involves an intellectual and 
practical commitment to seeking evidence and justification 
for belief. He distinguished reflective thinking from the 
other kinds of thinking on a number of points as follows : 
a) Unlike thinking in the first sense, reflective thinking is 
a chain of thoughts that grow out of one another. They do not 
come and go in a 'medley'. They are linked together for a 
sustained movement to a common goal. 
b) Unlike thinking in the second sense, reflective thinking 
has a purpose beyond that afforded by agreeable mental 
pictures and images. It must tend to a conclusion that can be 
substantiated outside the course of the images. 
c) Unlike thinking in the third sense which is susceptible to 
prejudices, reflective thinking must involve an active, 
persistent and careful consideration of any belief in the 
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light of the grounds that support it and the further 
conclusions to which it tends. 
Dewey summed up what he termed 'reflective thinking' as 
follows: 
Reflective thinking, in distinction from other operations to which we apply the 
name of thought, involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental 
difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, hunting, 
inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of 
the perplexity (p.12). 
What is suggested by Dewey's remarks on reflective thinking 
is the high regard in which he held it. But how are we to 
view his conception of it? Having claimed that the origin of 
reflective thinking is some perplexity, confusion, doubt or 
difficulty, Dewey then went on to provide some way of 
tackling such perplexity, confusion, doubt or difficulty. 
Dewey wrote: 
Given a difficulty, the next step is suggestion of some way out — the formation 
of some tentative plan or project, the entertaining of some theory that will 
account for the peculiarities in question, the consideration of some solution 
to the problem (p.15). 
Dewey's conception helped to provide a fertile ground upon 
which the present view that general skills of thinking can be 
taught has taken root. This point was clearly stated and 
endorsed by Lipman(1991) when he concluded that to many 
36 
supporters of thinking skills it was Dewey's emphasis on 
reflective thinking that provided the true foundation to the 
idea of thinking skills. In spite of Lipman's positive 
promotion it is still not clear to what extent Dewey's notion 
of thinking can be taken as the basis upon which the idea of 
general thinking skills can be built. There are difficulties 
with Dewey's analysis of thinking, some of which were 
highlighted by Bonnett(1995). For example, Bonnett argues 
that Dewey's five 'logically distinct steps' in 'the process 
of thinking' listed in How We Think as follows: 
1) a felt difficulty; 
2) its location and definition; 
3) suggestion of possible solution; 
4) development by reason of the bearings of the 
suggestions; 
5) further observation or experiment leading to its 
acceptance or rejection; 
present some degree of ambiguity since it is not clear 
whether Dewey is attempting to map out a logical pathway for 
the generation of ideas and solutions or is setting out a 
criterion for their justification. Bonnett points to a 
difficulty with the first of these. The degree of 
systematisation involved in thinking that Dewey seems to 
suppose is problematic because thinking does not necessarily 
proceed in such a systematic manner. This brings us back to 
the point about the complexity of thinking which will be 
discussed later. 
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As already indicated in section 1.1, thinking can be 
understood in terms of either a mental or physical activity. 
In other words, admiring a beautiful painting, trying to 
solve a difficult mathematical problem or playing tennis all 
involve thinking, but in each of these examples thinking 
takes on different characteristics. 
In the case of admiring a beautiful painting this does 
not necessarily involve any state of doubt, hesitation or 
perplexity for which some sort of resolution is needed as 
suggested by Dewey. On the whole, admiring a beautiful 
painting invokes some sort of pleasantness, enjoyment or 
respect. Even if we consider the case where focusing 
attention on the painting invoke a sense of sadness, pity, 
bitterness, fear, anger. and so on, this does not greatly 
affect the claim that the kind of thinking involved in 
admiring (or not admiring) a painting has little to do with 
problem solving. 
The kind of thinking involved in playing tennis, as 
discussed earlier, is closely tied to timing and action in 
ways that do not involve the presence of hesitation, doubt or 
perplexity. A tennis player returning a service must judge 
within split seconds the most likely direction which the ball 
is going to take and whether to stay rooted to the same spot 
and wait or move quickly towards the incoming ball while at 
the same time deciding on the appropriate technique (such as 
a backhand technique or any other) for returning the ball. 
In such circumstances being hesitant, or being in any doubt 
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or perplexity on the contrary can result in the 
ineffectiveness of the action being taken. The sort of 
thinking involved in playing tennis, as already indicated, 
does involve problem solving but a different sort of problem 
solving from the kind presented in Dewey's conception of 
thinking. This difference becomes clear as the thinking 
involved in tennis playing is brought into sharp focus with 
the kind of thinking involved in solving a troublesome 
mathematical problem. 
The thinking involved in solving a difficult 
mathematical problem satisfies the conditions in Dewey's 
conception of reflective thinking which demands that: 
1. A state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity and/or mental 
difficult must exist. 
2. There must exist an act of searching, hunting or inquiring 
that will resolve or settle the difficulty or perplexity. 
It is not difficult to show that a troublesome mathematical 
problem clearly presents some perplexity, and in order to 
solve such a problem this would require a sustained search 
for the right solution. Tackling mathematical problems in the 
main involve dealing with propositions and solving problems, 
and since mathematical thinking satisfies the conditions of 
Dewey's conception of thinking, this suggests that 
'reflective thinking' involves considering propositions. 
Whereas mathematical thinking involves this, the 
thinking in playing tennis as indicated earlier does not, 
consequently Dewey's conception fails to account for such 
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thinking just as it fails to account for the thinking 
involved in admiring a painting. By not addressing the 
different kinds of thinking involved in these different kinds 
of activities, it is not clear whether Dewey was being 
selective on purpose. What is clear though is that Dewey 
focused on a particular kind of thinking which involves 
problem solving, and which he deemed to be the most important 
kind of thinking. 
In order for us to gain some insight into Dewey's 
thinking about thinking we need to bear in mind that one of 
the key reasons for his distinctive conception of thinking 
was connected to his interest in providing a justification 
for teaching thinking, which, as already indicated, has 
undoubtedly influenced much of the effort that has gone into 
the recent attempts to teach thinking as a subject. It must 
be acknowledged that Dewey's conception of thinking provides 
an important framework for defining the kind of thinking that 
involves problem solving. It is not clear how Dewey's 
justification of reflective thinking as an educational aim 
takes into account the other types of thinking under 
discussion earlier. These different ways of thinking are all 
essential in different ways precisely because they play vital 
roles in different ways in our daily lives and as such are 
also of educational significance. Further discussion of the 
different ways of thinking will be undertaken in Chapter 2. 
We now turn to Gilbert Ryle's conceptions of thinking. 
1.3. Ryle's conceptions of thinking. 
Ryle's work is relevant for our discussion on the development 
of thinking in education. Ryle's various formulations of 
thinking evolved over many years of sustained investigations. 
Ryle not only showed that thinking can be exhibited in overt 
behaviour, in other words, thinking is not necessarily done 
silently, but he also highlighted the very complex nature of 
thinking. 
Ryle's main reason for developing his conceptions of 
thinking was to challenge the Cartesian view of thinking. 
This view held that thinking is primarily an activity of mind 
which is intrinsically a private, silent or internal 
operation. For Ryle, it is a mistaken idea that non-habitual, 
intelligent human behaviour is always guided by silent 
thought whose presence explains why the behaviour occurs and 
why it is intelligent. In Ryle's opinion this idea is 
untenable and leads to a vicious regress which occurs 
precisely because thinking is itself an activity that is done 
well or badly, intelligently or stupidly. Consequently, this 
would imply that the intelligent character of thinking 
requires explanation by further thinking, which in turn 
guides the first thinking and explains why it occurs, why it 
is intelligent, etc. Since this further thinking will itself 
be done intelligently or stupidly, it will also require 
explanation by a third line of thinking resulting in an 
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infinite regress. 
Ryle produced some vivid examples to show that there is 
no need for any reference to interior or anterior acts of 
thinking as part of the explanation for most intellectual 
behaviour. For Ryle, what distinguishes sensible behaviour 
from silly behaviour "is not their parentage but their 
procedure", regardless of the performance being intellectual 
or practical. In his view, a performance may be regarded as 
intelligent, thoughtful or rational if it has a special 
procedure or manner. This procedure involves thinking what 
one is doing, and to think what one is doing means doing one 
thing and not two i.e thinking what one is doing and doing 
it. According to Ryle, in judging the quality of someone's 
performance we consider the abilities and leanings of which 
the performance was the person's overt actions. In doing so, 
we direct our inquiry into the capabilities, habits, skills, 
etc of the person. By far the most important clues by which 
we can reach a reasonable judgment of a person's performance 
are dependent on their sayings and doings. 
In order to elucidate his point, Ryle used the example 
of a marksman scoring a bull's eye. In his attempt to score a 
bull's eye, the successive adjustments after each shot that 
the marksman makes as a result of wind conditions, target 
movement etc reveals the care, self-control, attention, etc. 
with which the shots are aimed and fired. Ryle maintained 
that the thinking of the marksman is contained in his 
actions. Similarly, he insisted that the boxer, the surgeon, 
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the poet, the salesman, etc. exhibit their thinking in the 
ways in which they conduct their performances themselves and 
not in the ways in which they consider prescriptions for 
conducting their performances. 
By these illustrations, Ryle set the scene to introduce 
his idea of the concept of thinking. He argued that thinking 
is not something that is necessarily done silently since a 
purely overt calculation or deliberation can be viewed as a 
process of thinking and is just as useful as any other mode 
of thinking. Consequently, there is no point in always 
searching for hidden acts of thought. Ryle concluded that: 
To say something significant, in awareness of its significance, is not to do 
two things, namely to say something aloud or in one's head and at the same 
time, or shortly before, to go through some other shadowy move. It is to do one 
thing with a certain drill and in a certain frame of mind, not by rote, 
chattily, reckless, histrionically, absent-mindedly, or deliriously, but on 
purpose, with a method, carefully, seriously and on the qui vive. Saying 
something in this specific frame of mind, whether aloud or in one's head, is 
thinking the thought (p.297). 
In the above passage is presented the essence of Ryle's 
formulation of what thinking is. In general, Ryle argued in 
The Concept of Mind that thinking is doing something in a 
certain frame of mind, that is, with care, with a method, 
with seriousness, with attention, on purpose etc. This frame 
of mind for Ryle is not a second occurrence linked to some 
covert or mysterious goings on in the mind but a disposition 
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or propensity which has been activated and is displayed in 
the activity which one is engaged in. 
Some of Ryle's account of thinking has some common 
characteristics with that presented by Price (discussed in 
section 1.1). In both cases Ryle and Price showed that 
thinking is closely tied to actions, However, Ryle differed 
in an important way from Price. Ryle used his example to 
argue the case that thinking is not purely a covert activity, 
whereas Price's main focus was that other animals do have the 
capacity to think and therefore thinking is not exclusive to 
human beings. In a similar way Ryle and Dewey (whose 
conception of thinking was discussed in section 1.2) were 
both keen to define general conceptions of thinking but 
differ in their views regarding what the constituents of 
thinking are. Although Dewey acknowledges the various ways in 
which the notion of thinking could be understood, his writing 
in How We Think suggests his commitment to the particular 
kind of thinking which he called reflective thinking. But 
Ryle on the other hand viewed thinking as a polymorphous 
concept that can be characterised in a variety of ways. 
Ryle's account of thinking explains that Z is an example 
of thinking solely because Z stems from a disposition to do Z 
in a thoughtful way. But this explanation is not entirely 
convincing, for how does one know that the Z, say someone's 
humming a tune, stems from a disposition to hum that tune 
thoughtfully rather than from a disposition to hum the tune 
without any thought about it? One possible way that Ryle 
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could reply to this criticism is that the difference between 
a person X humming thoughtfully and a person Y humming 
thoughtlessly is revealed in the occurrent humming itself. In 
the case of X, the humming will show care, attention, 
seriousness, etc, by not being done while X is doing 
something else, or would include repetitions until the 
humming accurately follows some known tune. For Y this will 
not be the case. 
Ryle's answer will still not silence his opponents for 
the one reason that if doing Z in a certain way is the 
thinking, then it is possible that a person, could be trained 
to do Z accurately and methodically, say, packing beer 
bottles into containers in such a way that the person now 
does it without thought. Nonetheless, on Ryle's account, if 
the packing is done in a manner which still reveals that it 
is done carefully, seriously, on purpose and with care 
although now automatically, it is still a case of thinking. 
But how can this be possible? 
In general, it must be granted that not all thinking is 
done in an overt manner. A large proportion of one's 
pondering or deliberation is done covertly and consequently 
reference to silent thought is constantly made in order to 
account for activities that would otherwise remain 
inexplicable. For example, a mathematics student may answer a 
mathematical question after remaining in silent anguish for a 
short period; and the thinking behind the given answer may 
remain a stubborn question mark until the student outlines 
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the logic behind it. The same is true in countless other 
cases. A chess player may sit in silence for a long time 
before making a move and the intelligence of this move cannot 
be known until the player outlines the strategy behind it. 
These examples clearly weigh in favour of some sort of 
Cartesian conception of thinking. There are difficulties with 
Ryle's account as noted above. Further discussions of these 
difficulties across all the various conceptions of thinking 
put forward by Ryle are discussed by Sibley(1971). 
The key point, however, that has evolved out of Ryle's 
struggle to clarify what thinking involves is the idea that 
the concept of thinking is polymorphous. Ryle wrote: 
There is no general answer to the question 'What does thinking consist of?' 
There are hosts of widely different sorts of toilings and idlings, engaging in 
any one of which is thinking (p.261.Collected Papers Vol.2). 
He then went on to say: 
The word 'thinking' covers some activities which are attempts to reach the 
answers to questions, as well as others which are not; some activities in which 
there is scope for originality and insight, as well as others where there is 
not; some activities which incorporate ratiocination, as well as others which 
do not; some activities, like multiplication and translation, which require 
special training, as well as others, like reverie, which do not. To look for 
some common and peculiar ingredients of all thinking is like looking for an 
ingredient common and peculiar to cat's-cradle, hide-and-seek, billiards, snap 
and all other things which we call 'games' (p.297-298.Collected Papers Vol.2). 
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The nature of thinking is polymorphous because it encompasses 
both covert and overt activities as indicated in section 1.1. 
Although Ryle acknowledged the tendency for thinking to be 
covert he was determined to banish any hints or references to 
the Cartesian conception of thinking, which he called the 
'official doctrine' originating mainly from Descartes's view 
that every human being has a body and mind. Ryle's 
determination to dismiss this doctrine was the motivating 
factor in his search to find a way to formulate his concept 
of thinking. 
Our discussions in section 1.1 and in the earlier part 
of the present section suggest that not all thinking can be 
explained in terms of overt behaviour or in terms of 
dispositions that can be activated. For example, how is it 
possible for an external agent X to explain what is going on 
when agent Y is silently thinking about God or about the 
geometric properties of circles? Ryle tried to answer such 
questions by reformulating his notion of thinking as an 
adverbial verb. 
For Ryle thinking as an adverbial verb covers doing 
practically anything provided it is done with care, patience, 
initiative, attention, interest and so on. According to Ryle, 
different kinds of thinking can be distinguished by observing 
whether what one is doing with care, patience, initiative, 
attention, interest and so on is dependent or detached from 
its surrounding circumstances. In the case of circumstance- 
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dependent thinking the thinking is closely linked to the 
circumstances in which one is immediately involved, as in 
many practical situations. For example, a tennis player, as 
in our example in section 1.1, is thinking implicitly within 
the actions that he performs such as his strokes, eye 
movement, arms and general body movement etc. By contrast, a 
person pondering, deliberating, reflecting, meditating, 
musing, or being pensive is also thinking in a typical 
detached manner as characterised by Rodin's le Penseur. For 
Ryle, to think should really be understood in all its senses 
as to do X attentively, carefully, vigilantly, and so on. 
Hence the X that the tennis player does intelligently is play 
tennis, and the X that le Penseur does intelligently is 
reflect. On the basis of Ryle's account, it is not difficult 
to observe the intelligence that the tennis player displays 
in playing tennis, but this is not the case with regard to le 
Penseur. In fact Ryle could not explain what le Penseur was 
doing fully in terms of an adverbial verb. Ryle wrote: 
But now we come to what le Penseur is engaged in doing. For brevity I label 
what he is doing as 'reflecting', though the label does not naturally cover a 
good many of the things that le Penseur might be doing...(p.470 Collected 
Papers Vol.2). 
Ryle is unable to say anything useful about what 1e Penseur 
is doing precisely because thinking in this case is covert. 
Although Ryle is fully aware of the covertness of le 
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Penseur's thinking, he was concerned about committing what 
he expressed as "the category—howler of Cartesianism or the 
category-howler of behaviourism". 
Ryle's new formulation carries with it some 
difficulties, for example, a person under hypnosis playing 
piano with attention, intention and control would be thinking 
in Ryle's view, but this is certainly at odds with our 
intuition about the nature of thinking. Ryle might reply that 
in so far as the person under hypnosis is being commanded by 
an external agent this cannot be considered as a good 
example. But this answer will not be adequate since it does 
not indicate that the piano player is not playing with 
attention, intention and control. Another example might be 
that of a person who at night sleep walks to the kitchen, 
opens a cupboard to get a glass then goes to the refrigerator 
and brings out a bottle of milk and then carefully arranges 
these items on the dining table before going back to sleep. 
According to Ryle's formulation since this person is X-ing 
with attention, intention and control, he is thinking. But 
this example too is in sharp disagreement with our instincts 
about what thinking involves. 
What is clear from the preceding discussion is the 
complexity of the notion of thinking. This is highlighted by 
the fact that Dewey's conception and Ryle's complex accounts 
of thinking do not completely explain what thinking is. 
In contrast to Dewey, Ryle makes no value judgment on 
the different kinds of thinking although he also suggests an 
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active search by the agent. In the main the conceptions of 
thinking put forward by the two philosophers involve a mental 
or physical activity. These properties of thinking can be 
accounted for as indicated in section 1.1 if thinking is 
viewed as encompassing both mental and physical activities 
without necessarily accepting the whole of Cartesian 
metaphysics or the whole of behaviourism. 
1.4. Comments on Thinking 
The discussions in the earlier sections have tried to present 
some of the important arguments that help our understanding 
of thinking. For example, Dewey's formulation highlights the 
close connection between thinking and problem solving but in 
spite of this, not all thinking is problem solving. Ryle's 
sophisticated considerations of thinking clearly demonstrate 
the many-sidedness of thinking. As already indicated, the 
work of the above philosophers demonstrates some of the 
difficulties in the conceptualisation of thinking. 
What is it that makes thinking difficult to 
characterise? Is it possible to completely explain it in a 
general way? How should thinking be viewed in terms of its 
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teaching? Finding answers to these questions will be useful 
in illuminating further our view of thinking. Outlines of 
answers to these questions will be attempted in this 
concluding section. 
Thinking is difficult to formulate because it is 
embedded in the diverse aspects of our existence. For 
example, it is central in our endeavour to find solutions to 
the vast number of problems that we encounter, and on the 
other hand it is key to the wonder we experience at the 
existence of the world. The kind of thinking that will be 
involved in contemplation is likely to be different in some 
way from that involved in solving problems. These examples 
highlight the multifacetedness of thinking. Thinking is 
multifaceted because it is the means by which we experience 
the world in all its diversity. All the activities that we 
engage in involve thinking in one form or another. These 
activities differ in ways that require different formulations 
of thinking. For example, playing football is a very 
different activity from reading a book but both involve 
thinking. 
In view of the diverse ways in which the manifestations 
of thinking can occur is it possible to explain it in a 
general way? The earlier discussions indicated attention and 
intentionality as important features of thinking. Although 
these features appear to be general they do not get us very 
far in saying what thinking is without reference to the 
particular ways in which thinking occurs. What is becoming 
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clear is that beyond the importance of intentionality and 
attention in thinking further qualifications are needed in 
order to establish the type of thinking at issue. In view of 
the above discussion a definition of thinking can be provided 
as follows: Thinking is a complex phenomenon that can occur 
as a mental or physical act, it involves intentionality and 
attention and requires particular contexts for its full 
description. 
If thinking is best explained by references to 
particular instances then this raises issues about how it can 
be taught as a subject. To teach and successfully learn a 
subject requires the acquisition of some specific skill(s) 
important in learning that subject. For example, the 
acquisition of mathematical skills involves knowing how to 
write and use mathematical symbols. At the very basic level a 
skill can be regarded as knowing how to perform some tasks 
proficiently, and such performances can be repeated and 
improved upon through training and practice. The ability to 
plane a piece of wood, juggle a number of balls, speak a 
language, play a musical instrument are all examples of the 
applications of skills that is, knowing how to do something 
through training and practice. On the other hand the ability 
to blink is not a skill, as this is not acquired through 
training and practice. 
Skills differ from one context to another context 
(Barrow,1987) because what is involved in knowing how to do 
something differs in different contexts. For example, the 
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dribbling skills of a footballer are very different from the 
reading skills of a news reader because they involve 
different contexts. 
Clearly having the appropriate mathematical skills, for 
instance, is important in thinking and solving mathematical 
problems. Similarly, having boxing skills is significant in 
thinking and boxing effectively. However, it is possible that 
one can have say mathematical skills but be unable to think 
highly effectively in solving mathematical problems and in a 
similar way have boxing skills but not be able to think and 
box effectively. What this indicates is that skills are 
important in thinking but the two are not necessarily the 
same. If thinking is not necessarily a skill then the 
question that needs to be answered is why are there 
differences among individuals with regard to the quality of 
their thinking? A possible answer to this question would 
involve the role of the personal qualities that individuals 
bring to bear on their thinking. 
Thinking can be revealed in the performances of a skill 
as pointed out by Ryle and Price, but in addition to skills 
the ability to think effectively involves other factors such 
as perseverance, fortitude, dedication, patience and courage. 
These factors are in the main dispositional and will be 
discussed further in a later chapter. If thinking involves 
dispositions then it is not clear how it can be taught purely 
as a skill. The definition of thinking provided above 
suggests that since thinking requires particular contexts for 
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its full description, there are different types of thinking 
and this presents further difficulties about seeking to teach 
thinking as a subject. 
Finally, a brief summary of this chapter. Section 1.1 
focused on what constitutes thinking. The discussion showed 
that thinking generally involves intentionality and attention 
and the use of concepts. The discussion also indicated that 
although the use of language plays a key role in thinking, it 
is not a necessary condition for thinking. In section 1.2 the 
conception of thinking provided by Dewey, which is in the 
main formulated in terms of problem solving, was discussed. 
In section 1.3 Ryle's various notions of thinking were 
considered. Ryle's arguments highlighted the many-sidedness 
of thinking, thus making possible the consideration of 
thinking in the absence of verbal language. In the present 
section a definition of thinking independent of that 
presented by Dewey and Ryle is stated. This definition 
stresses the complexity of thinking and the need for specific 
contexts. We now turn to the discussion of the different 
types of thinking in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 2 
TYPES OF THINKING 
2.1. The complexity of thinking 
In Chapter 1 the discussion focused mainly on exploring what 
thinking involves and its inherent complexities. In this 
chapter further discussions of the complexities of thinking 
will be undertaken. Thinking can take place under two main 
guises, that is, as a controlled occurrence or as an 
uncontrolled occurrence. In the first case one's thinking is 
consciously directed and held in focus on whatever it is that 
one is thinking about, as for example, working on a 
mathematical problem. Thinking in this case generally occurs 
while we are awake and going about our daily matters. In the 
second case, one's thinking occurs beyond one's control or 
direction, in either a conscious or unconscious state, as for 
example in a day-dream while one is awake or in dreams while 
one is asleep. In both cases attention is directed as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 1 on to certain intentional 
objects, which are conceptualised in some way. Education 
generally is concerned with the promotion of the first type, 
so the second will be ignored henceforth. 
Clearly there are different types of thinking, as 
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indicated in the earlier discussion in Chapter 1. We engage 
in these various types of thinking while we are awake and 
going about our daily affairs. For example we may be in deep 
contemplation or we may be engaged in intellectual reasoning 
or we may equally be making practical decisions and acting 
upon them. These various types of thinking will be described 
and discussed as contemplation, imagination, reasoning and 
sign-cognition (considering Price's argument). These 
different types of thinking are by no means mutually 
exclusive. 
2.2. Thinking by Signs 
Price's theory of sign-cognition as discussed in Chapter 1 
suggests that this kind of pre-verbal and pre-imaginal form 
of cognition is indeed a particular type of thinking. 
Although viewed as a primitive form of thinking that is 
mostly associated with animal behaviour, it is also present 
in some ways in human thinking and actions. Although Ryle did 
not explicitly refer to sign-cognition he may at least be 
sympathetic to Price's notion. Ryle's example of the fine 
adjustments that a marksman makes in scoring a bull's eye by 
taking into account certain signs such as wind direction 
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brings to mind Price's notion. If Ryle is right that thinking 
is in a sense contained in our actions and practical 
behaviour then sign-cognition forms an important kind of 
thinking not only in the field of sports but in the vital 
area of human communication. 
2.3. Reasoning 
One source of confusion in our understanding of thinking is 
in the way in which 'thinking' is so readily substituted for 
'reasoning'. In the broad sense reason comprises a great 
variety of procedures (Pole,1975), hence much of what we do 
in our daily lives and in education involves reasoning. 
Reasoning primarily aims at problem solving and this 
essentially involves finding ways to arrive at the truth or a 
solution. It is possible that this type of thinking is what 
Dewey's conception of thinking aims to capture. Reasoning in 
general can be viewed in two ways, practical and theoretical. 
However, this distinction does not imply that these are 
mutually exclusive because the answer to a practical question 
'X or Y ought to be done' can also be represented as the 
answer to a theoretical problem in the form 'it is the case 
that X and Y ought to be done' (Edgley,1975). 
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2.3.1. Practical Reasoning 
Practical reasoning deals with our ability to conduct 
ourselves in the world of action. This type of reasoning 
seeks to answer questions such as 'what is to be done?' For 
example, the life of any human being involves a constant 
process of adjustment and readjustment to the world that they 
find themselves surrounded by. 
In the course of our passage through life we come across 
various things in the world, some of which we consume, some 
we build into other things, some we try to avoid, while 
others we simply ignore. Most of our reactions in dealing 
with the world around us in part are habitual. As a result 
our responses are almost automatic. However, situations often 
arise that require some deliberation and an appropriate 
response or decision. In such circumstances, one is engaged 
in practical reasoning. Sometimes the need for practical 
reasoning arises because a situation calls into operation two 
conflicting desires or persuasions. Let us take the example 
of a conscientious student settling down to complete a long 
overdue assignment. No sooner does she settle down to work 
then a friend unexpectedly arrives offering her a free ticket 
to a one-off musical performance by her most favourite 
composer. The desire to perform these distinct acts arises; 
yet the two are such that performing one will inevitably 
prevent the performance of the other. Nevertheless, some 
decision will have to be made regarding what to do. In this 
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case, to arrive at any decision will involve practical 
reasoning. 
Similarly, finding one's way around unfamiliar places 
depends on how well one plans and follows what one must do in 
order not to get lost. Practical thinking in the main is 
about means and ends, and it in this way that it differs from 
theoretical thinking. 
2.3.2. Theoretical Reasoning 
Theoretical reasoning involves our capacity to operate from 
and with propositions. Theoretical reasoning seeks to answer 
the question 'what is the case?' For example, suppose we were 
on an expedition in a country where it has been reported that 
highly poisonous chemicals escaping from local industrial 
plants have contaminated lakes and other waterways, and we 
only discovered much too late that we had no water as thirst 
made its presence felt. Suppose we came upon a stream; 
instinctively, our thirst might urge us to drink. However, 
the recent accident regarding the contamination in the area 
might prompt us not to do so. On the other hand, we may 
believe that no other source of water is likely to be found. 
What should we do? It is easy to see that we might be able to 
solve that practical problem if we could find out whether the 
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stream is indeed polluted. Accordingly, we can 'translate' 
that practical problem into a different problem, at which 
point we might ask — 'is the stream before us polluted?' 
Here, the practical question concerning 'How shall we attain 
so and so?' has led to the theoretical question 'By what 
means shall we understand so and so?' By moving from a 
practical question to a truth seeking question, the problem 
then becomes a problem concerning the character or nature of 
some item in the world about us and the kind of reasoning 
that is involved in arriving at a conclusion is theoretical 
since the problem no longer concerns what we do, although 
solving it may help us solve the practical problem. 
In both cases of reasoning, the focus is essentially on 
calculation and judgement. The general idea involves trying 
to 'fit together' what may yield the desired result based 
largely on trial and error. In this case, the motivation is 
generally guided by 'does it follow?' questions, or 'what is 
to be done?' questions. Reasoning, as we shall observe in the 
next sub-section diverges, in some important ways from 
imagining. 
2.4. Imagining 
The word 'imagination' originates from the Latin word 'imago' 
meaning an image or representation. It is through this Latin 
meaning that the term imagination is generally held to be the 
power of forming mental images or considering things which 
are not present to the senses. For example, imagining oneself 
enjoying a lovely sunny day at the seaside, imagining the 
powdery sand-dunes of the Sahara desert, imagining the 
delicious smell of Sunday roast with potatoes and gravy, 
imagining the wonderful smell of lavender in the fields of 
Provence, imagining the music of John Coltrane, imagining the 
noise of a barking dog. The usage of the term in these and 
similar examples refers only to the capacity of the person in 
question to conceive of what is not actually happening here 
and now. 
The popular usage of the term as a faculty or distinct 
part of the mind formed the basis for the traditional 
conception of imagination as articulated in the philosophical 
writings of David Hume(1711-76) and Immanuel Kant(1724-1804). 
Hume's view on the imagination had its greatest development 
in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. But, in spite of the 
importance Kant gave to the imagination his view of it still 
remained as a faculty for forming images. 
In view of the varied ways in which the term has been 
accounted for by modern philosophers such as Sartre, 
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Wittgenstein and Ryle, Scruton(1974) suggested that as a 
starting point for a more positive account of the imagination 
we could begin by separating two strands in the use of the 
notion. The first strand is predicative, in the sense that 
the way the notion is used for example, when we talk of A 
imagining X, or A seeing X as Y, or A forming an image of X 
and so on, predicate an activity of A. The second strand is 
adverbial and this comes out in the way we talk of A doing Y 
imaginatively. The popular phrase 'use your imagination' 
captures the adverbial sense of imagination whereby one is 
urged to apply one's imagination in accomplishing a practical 
task or gaining a particular piece of information or 
knowledge and in this sense the imagination qualifies a 
further activity. In doing Y imaginatively the 
imaginativeness of A is highlighted by the novelty or 
originality involved in A's consideration or approach. 
Scruton's suggestion highlights an important point about the 
different senses in which the word can be used. 
The ambiguity of the term formed a significant point in 
Passmore's (1980) discussion on the cultivation of the 
imagination. Passmore's consideration is very similar to 
Scruton's since Passmore also brings out the different uses 
of the word by distinguishing between imaging, imagining and 
imaginativeness. 
Imaging involves the capacity to form images, in other 
words it is the ability to summon an image of an object or 
experience in the absence of the object or experience that 
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one is imaging. A number of examples of this kind of imaging 
were given at the beginning of this section and as indicated 
it is by far the most popular usage of the word. 
We often recall or conjure up images when we visualise 
but this, argues Passmore, is different from supposing 
(imagining) because it is the minimum requirement for 
supposing that we go beyond anything that we have actually 
observed or experienced. Supposing involves the consideration 
of alternatives as, for example, considering what it would be 
like to live in a world without conflict. Considering the 
various possibilities that such a world might hold requires 
much more than say merely having a picture or an image of the 
globe. 
To use the word in the sense of imaginativeness refers 
to the way in which we use our imagination. By exercising our 
imaginativeness, says Passmore, we may discover that how we 
ordinarily consider things to be is not how they actually 
are, and in order to be imaginative primarily requires an 
original or new manner of considering things. On this point 
Barrow(1988) argued that the essence of imaginativeness lies 
neither in one's tendency to think the abstract nor in one's 
preoccupation with imaginary things, but rather in the 
quality of one's conceiving whether about real or imaginary 
ideas or situations. 
The different senses in which the word can be applied 
highlight the complexity of the notion of thinking. 
Imaginativeness, for example, differs from sign-cognition and 
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reasoning in the sense that it is not entirely concerned with 
problem solving, although the solving of a problem may result 
from it. What is of significance is that not only should one 
focus on the object under consideration but one should 
attempt to go beyond the obvious or come up with a new way of 
approaching the object under consideration. The significance 
of imaginativeness in education will be discussed further, 
but as we shall observe in the next section this type of 
thinking differs in some ways from contemplation. 
2.5. Contemplating 
In the Concise Oxford Dictionary 'to contemplate' is defined 
as to gaze upon, or view mentally. Gazing upon or viewing 
something mentally requires attention and focus on the object 
of contemplation whatever that may be. In order to illuminate 
this particular type of thinking, let us contrast it with 
reasoning. 
Reasoning, as indicated earlier, fundamentally aims at 
problem solving for it is concerned mainly with finding 
solutions. The motivation in contemplating on the other hand 
is largely intrinsic, that is, it is not particularly 
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concerned with problem-solving but rather with the 
appreciation of beauty, of the sublime, of the universe, of 
God, of evil etc. In art, for example, appreciating say, 
Leonado Da Vinci's Madonna or Pablo Picasso's nude figures 
involves the understanding and acknowledgement of a number of 
aspects presented within the paintings such as: 
a) The harmonic precision of the paintings 
b) The genius of the painters as exhibited in their work 
c) The struggle and perseverance of the painters in 
producing such masterpieces. 
Similarly, in mathematics, contemplation is not a matter of 
finding a proof to a mathematical theorem but instead, it 
dwells on the beauty of the proof itself. In philosophy, 
contemplation can be thought of as a goal of analysis as 
indicated with particular reference to Wittgenstein(1998) 
that: 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear 
view of the use of our words (Part1,122). 
Therefore, in philosophy one aim is to establish an order in 
our knowledge of the use of language which will produce 
absolute clarity regarding its use, and the contemplative 
here will be the person who commands a clear overall view of 
the use of language. 
In his writings Aristotle regards the activity of 
thinking which is contemplative(theoretike) as the highest 
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kind of human excellence and in this respect it is firmly 
connected to things divine. Hardie(1980) notes that there is 
an explicit religious flavour in the language in which 
Aristotle speaks of the contemplative life and the worship of 
God. 
One of the most famous discussions of the contemplative 
life is in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. For Aquinas, 
the contemplative life is the contemplation of God's truth. 
It is in essence a life of mental activity that can be 
identified with the love of God, moving us to gaze on his 
beauty. Aquinas considers beauty (as consisting in clarity 
and due proportion) as an essential feature of the 
contemplative life 
In discussing the actual nature of contemplation, 
Aquinas asks whether there are many acts or only one single 
act of contemplation. His answer is that there is only one 
culminating act of contemplating and that is the 
contemplation of God's truth. However, there are several 
activities such as the grasp of axioms and the deduction of 
conclusions which prepare the way. From our discussion above 
the act of contemplating involves a particular way of 
thinking which is different from imagining. Whereas in 
imagining one tries, for example, to generate new ways of 
approaching the object of one's attention and in reasoning or 
sign-cognition one seeks solutions to problems, in 
contemplating on the other hand one only seeks to understand 
and acknowledge what is understood. 
2.6. Notes on the complexity of thinking 
In order to present an adequate view of the notion of 
thinking, the complex nature of thinking must be 
acknowledged. The discussions in the previous sections have 
highlighted the various types of thinking in order to 
demonstrate the complexity of the notion. These different 
types of thinking do not, however, in any way suggest that 
thinking can only occur as one of these types. In fact to 
think in any manner involves various combinations of these 
different types of thinking. Trying to solve a problem 
involves reasoning but this can be in combination with 
imaginativeness to produce the desired result, for example, 
breaking the German secret communication code during the 
second world war required a concentrated effort in reasoning 
but the success of the mission also depended on 
imaginativeness of the code-breakers in the process of 
breaking the code. 
Similarly, the imaginativeness of the architect in 
designing a building depends on some reasoning to do with 
finding solutions to problems associated with the design of 
the building. The football player may depend on sign-
cognition to score goals but needs reasoning to be at the 
right spot for the ball. The contemplation of the philosopher 
may well depend on being able to reason and suppose. These 
examples indicate the very close connections between the 
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various types of thinking, which are in the main due to the 
dependency of the various types of thinking on intentional 
objects. 
In this present chapter the discussion has focused on 
the different types of thinking in order to further support 
the argument made in Chapter 1 that the nature of thinking is 
complex. In section 2.2 the focus was on sign-cognition as a 
type of thinking that is pre-verbal and pre-imaginal. It is 
tied to timing and involves the appropriate response to 
signs. In section 2.3 reasoning as a particular type of 
thinking was discussed. This type of thinking can be 
subdivided into practical and theoretical reasoning but this 
does not imply that the two are mutually exclusive. In 
section 2.4 the different uses of the word "imagination" were 
discussed, which further highlighted the complexity of 
thinking in general. In section 2.5 the discussion considered 
contemplation as a type of thinking that is not necessarily 
concerned with problem solving. Let us now turn to Chapter 3 
for a consideration of the justifications for promoting 
thinking. 
CHAPTER 3 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROMOTING THINKING 
3.1. Promoting thinking 
As human beings we are constantly engaged in thinking in 
diverse ways. Our need for survival and well-being and our 
desire to protect and guide our children provide prime 
examples. However, it is not uncommon that our thinking at 
times is less than effective. We all calculate, but not all 
with equal accuracy; we all imagine, but not all with equal 
clarity or originality; we all contemplate but not all with 
equal depth. Thus the challenge is to find reasons to support 
the need for improving the effectiveness of our thinking. 
The discussion in this chapter will therefore focus on 
the justifications for promoting thinking, beginning with 
those presented by John Dewey and Harvey Siegel. The 
justifications provided by the two philosophers have been 
selected for consideration because of their significance in 
supporting the promotion of thinking in education. 
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3.2. Dewey on why teach thinking 
The view that the teaching of thinking can be developed 
without reference to any specific subject content received 
its classic expression in the work of John Dewey. In his 
book 'How we think' Dewey explained why reflective thinking 
must be made an educational aim. He began by stating three 
reasons, which in his view form the fundamental justification 
for teaching thinking. 
Firstly, he declared that thinking frees us from 
impulsive and routine activity and enables us to plan and 
direct our activities with a conscious aim. In other words 
thinking enables us to act in a deliberate and intentional 
manner. Dewey argued that: 
By putting the consequences of different ways and lines of action before the 
mind, it enables us to know what we are about when we act. It converts action 
that is merely appetitive, blind, and impulsive into intelligent action (p.17). 
Secondly, thinking, according to Dewey, makes possible 
systematic inventions and preparations towards any future 
eventualities. That is, by thought man is able to develop and 
set up artificial signs and inventions to alert him in 
advance of any unpleasantness and help him find dependable 
ways to avoid such mishaps. 
Thirdly, Dewey regards the value inherent in thinking as 
the richness and depth that it adds to meanings. These values 
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according to Dewey: 
make the difference between a truly human and rational life and the existence 
lived by those animals that are immersed in sensation and appetite. Beyond a 
somewhat narrow limit, enforced by the necessities of life, the values that 
have been described do not, however, automatically realize themselves. For 
anything approaching their adequate realization, thought needs careful and 
attentive educational direction (p22). 
For Dewey, the ability to engage in reflective thinking 
grants physical events and objects a deeply meaningful 
character and value. 
Dewey's justification is very relevant for promoting 
thinking but what remains problematic is the adequacy of the 
kind of thinking that the justification is meant to support. 
As already discussed in Chapter 1, to be an effective thinker 
for Dewey is to engage predominantly in reflective thinking, 
which in general involves an intellectual commitment to the 
search for evidence for belief. Dewey maintained that: 
The two limits of every unit of thinking are a perplexed, troubled, or 
confused situation at the beginning and a cleared-up, unified resolved 
situation at the close (p106). 
Thus the central point in Dewey's view of the development of 
a person's thinking is that the mind should be sensitive to 
finding appropriate methods or solutions to resolve problems 
encountered by the person. The difficulty with this 
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formulation, as already pointed out earlier, is that it is 
not clear how it accounts for the other types of thinking, if 
at all, as it focuses mainly on problem solving. For 
instance, it excludes such thinking as contemplation. But as 
indicated in Chapter 2, to talk about thinking as Dewey does 
purely in terms of problem solving can only lead to a very 
narrow characterisation of thinking which is inadequate with 
regard to the generality of the justification being sought. 
It is a fact that much of our everyday existence is dominated 
by problem solving but there are certain activities we engage 
in that have nothing to do with problem solving but do 
however contribute to the enhancement of our existence. For 
instance, listening to the uplifting music of Charlie Parker 
or Tchaikovsky, or meditating on the beauty of the human 
figure or on the wisdom in the New Testament Bible. 
Dewey could argue that he is aware of the importance of 
the various types of thinking but he is particularly 
interested in the promotion of problem solving. This 
clarification however will still not do because it overlooks 
the connectedness of the various types of thinking as already 
highlighted in the earlier part of this chapter and in 
Chapter 1. Solving problems involves reasoning to a large 
degree but it can also involve the other types of thinking, 
for example imaginativeness. 
In spite of this limitation of Dewey's notion of 
thinking (since he views thinking as always beginning with a 
perplexed or troubled situation and terminating with a 
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solution), his reasons for the justification of teaching 
thinking appear to embrace the various types of thinking. The 
first reason, which is about the conversion of our action 
from being blind, appetitive and impulsive to being 
intelligent action, depends on the use of the various types 
of thinking including imagining and contemplation. The second 
reason concerns the importance of thinking in finding 
solutions to the numerous problems that besiege us and this 
reason, like the first, again highlights the use of the 
different types of thinking in solving problems. The third 
reason brings to light the importance of contemplation in 
deepening our understanding of ourselves, and the world 
around us. In giving these reasons it is not clear whether 
Dewey is seeking a justification specifically of problem 
solving or of thinking in general. If it is problem solving, 
then it is problematic how Dewey's third reason supports 
this. 
The justification provided by Dewey, as already 
indicated, is highly relevant to the promotion of thinking as 
a whole but what is problematic is the type of thinking that 
Dewey presents as a model of what thinking generally is. It 
is important that any justification for teaching thinking 
acknowledges the various types of thinking. Thus it is 
essential that an adequate conception of thinking which 
involves the various types of thinking is provided and this 
brings us back to the notion of thinking considered earlier 
in Chapter 1 as a complex mental phenomenon, which can be 
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manifested as a mental or physical act and more importantly 
requires specific contexts. Whereas Dewey's justification is 
mainly in terms of problem solving, Siegel's justification 
considers the moral, political and economic aspects of 
teaching thinking. To these reasons we now turn. 
3.3. Siegel's justification 
The argument that reasoning is fundamental to our thinking 
and therefore must form the basis for the promotion of 
thinking in education has been argued by some philosophers 
(Ennis,1964) but has received its finest presentation in 
Siegel's(1988) book Educating Reason. Siegel's justification 
is mainly in terms of critical thinking, which he defined as 
"the reasoned assessment of statements". Siegel gives four 
major reasons why teaching thinking should be an educational 
ideal. 
The first reason is grounded in the Kantian principle of 
respect for persons. Siegel argues that according to Kant, in 
all our actions and dealings with persons we must take care to 
treat them as ends and not as means. That is, we must not grant 
our interests and concerns any higher priority than the 
interests and concerns of other persons. Siegel draws strength 
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from Kant to point out that, as teachers it is our moral duty 
to treat students as well as others with respect. Since 
students have the right to question, and seek reasons, 
explanations and justifications, teachers must teach in such a 
way as to treat students with respect by recognising and 
honouring these rights. 
The second reason is to do with preparing students for 
self-sufficiency and adulthood. Siegel argues this is a 
fundamental obligation to children for without proper 
education, children could not competently manage their lives as 
many opportunities would be closed to them due to lack of 
education. Consequently we must strive to educate and empower 
them by organising their educational activities towards the 
development of their critical thinking. Thus this justification 
is in accordance with our obligation to prepare children for 
adult life by educating them in a manner that maximises their 
independence and self-sufficiency. 
Initiation into rational traditions provides a third 
reason for the justification of critical thinking as an 
educational ideal. According to Siegel, critical thinking 
acknowledges two important factors; the first is fostering in 
students the attitudes and dispositions that encourage the 
seeking of well-grounded reasons for judgement, belief or 
action, and the second is the understanding and appreciation of 
the role of reasons in rational endeavour. Siegel argues that 
if education involves initiation into rational traditions then 
teaching critical thinking should be an educational ideal as it 
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provides opportunities for the evaluation of reason which is 
considered important to the successful initiation into these 
traditions. 
Finally, Siegel believes that critical thinking cannot be 
separated from democratic living, for a true democratic society 
requires a critical thinker. He pointed out that: 
If the democratic citizen is not a critical thinker, she is significantly 
hampered in her ability to contribute helpfully to public life. Democracies rely 
for their health and well-being on the intelligence of their citizens (p.60). 
The political implications for teaching critical thinking, 
according to Siegel, cannot be withheld insofar as we are 
committed to the democratic ideal. 
Implicit in Siegel's justification, which is 
predominantly in terms of critical thinking, is the notion that 
firstly thinking is all to do with reasoning, and secondly that 
there are certain general principles that can be applied across 
different contexts. Siegel's notion of thinking is very close 
to Dewey's in the sense that they both focus on reasoning in 
their discussions and justifications of thinking. But, as 
already discussed in the previous section, the connectedness of 
the various types of thinking needs to be adequately accounted 
for in any discussion of thinking. In other words, focussing 
predominantly on a particular type of thinking as the basis for 
the justification of teaching thinking may lead to inadequate 
provision for the promotion of thinking. 
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Siegel's 'reasons conception of critical thinking' 
states that "to be a critical thinker is to be appropriately 
moved by reasons". For Siegel the term 'critical thinking' 
must be understood to include both a set of 'principles' and 
the inclination to use these 'principles' in other words, the 
inclination to be 'appropriately moved by reason'. 
Furthermore, Siegel argues that both components of critical 
thinking are equally important. 
Let us consider the set of 'principles' that Siegel 
claims to be of importance for the engagement in critical 
thinking. For Siegel, 
the critical thinker must have a gcod understanding of, and the ability to 
utilize, principles governing the assessment of reason. There are at least two 
types of such principles: subject-specific principles which govern the 
assessment of particular sorts of reasons in particular contexts; and subject-
neutral, general principles which apply across a wide variety of contexts and 
types of reason (p.34). 
It is not too difficult to ascertain what Siegel means here by 
"subject-specific principles". On the other hand, however, it 
is difficult to account for "subject-neutral principles". 
Although Siegel makes the effort to show that these include 
"virtually all" that is presented in informal logic texts and 
in Ennis's list of proficiencies (and these will be discussed 
in the next chapter), still this is not enough to claim the 
truth of the complete generality of such principles. It is 
precisely the existence of these putative principles that is 
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the central issue in the ongoing debate on the subject of 
teaching general thinking skills to be discussed in Chapter 10. 
Siegel's claim that critical thinking manifests itself in both 
subject-specific and subject-neutral ways is an attempt to 
resolve the difficulty presented by the idea that there are 
such general principles. But this claim does not in any 
significant way resolve these difficulties. Let us for now 
leave these issues and very briefly state the second component 
of the conception. 
The second component involves 'the critical attitude or 
critical spirit'. This aspect according to Siegel is to do with 
having the willingness, the desire and the disposition (to be 
discussed later) to base one's judgement and action on reason; 
i.e, "to do reason assessment" and be guided by the outcome of 
such assessment. This outline of Siegel's conception provides 
the basis for his justifications. 
In view of the relevance of the different types of 
thinking discussed in the previous chapters it is not clear how 
Siegel accounts for these in his conception of critical 
thinking. True, they do have sane relevance in the 
justifications provided by Siegel. For example, the ability to 
consider alternative situations is relevant in the first major 
reason, which is tied to the Kantian principle of respect for 
persons. We are more likely to treat other persons as ends and 
not merely as means if we are able to imagine ourselves in 
their situation. 
Preparing pupils for self-sufficiency and adulthood, as 
78 
Siegel rightly argues, is fundamental in their education but 
focusing primarily on critical thinking may not yield the 
desired results. Preparing to be a self-sufficient adult 
requires a vast array of skills, which embraces not only 
critical thinking but also some of the various types of 
thinking already discussed. 
Being able to think critically and clearly can be 
considered necessary in the initiation of pupil into rational 
traditions. But the initiation of pupils into rational 
traditions also involves thinking such as imagining and 
contemplation for example, but it is not clear how Siegel 
accounts for these types of thinking. 
Similarly, our commitment to the democratic ideal 
requires that pupils learn to think in various ways that 
enable them to fully participate in the democratic process 
within the society. In this case as in the previous cases 
pupils will need to rely on an array of skills and ways of 
thinking and communicating that enriches their being able to 
think critically in the manner expressed by Siegel. For 
instance sign-cognition can be useful in reading body 
language, which is an important part of communication and 
social participation. 
In spite of the difficulties in Siegel's conception of 
thinking his justification highlights the importance of 
thinking and its promotion in education. 
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3.4. An inclusive justification 
The justifications provided by Dewey and Siegel are important 
arguments for the promotion of thinking but the conceptions 
of thinking (and the ensuing methods for their promotion) 
that their justifications appear to support are problematic. 
What is required is a justification that takes into account 
all the various types of thinking. Therefore, the reasons 
that will be offered for promoting thinking will be in terms 
of the importance of the various types of thinking in our 
daily existence. 
In Chapter 1 a definition of thinking was provided as 
involving intentionality and attention and requiring 
particular contexts. In view of this definition, the 
promotion of thinking in education must be pursued because it 
provides an important means by which we focus attention on 
the things that matter in our lives, for example, in problem 
solving, communicating, appreciating and valuing not only our 
lives but that of others and the things that we engage in as 
well as others that we do not. The importance of thinking in 
our understanding of a problem, finding a suitable solution 
to a problem, developing excellent listening skills, taking 
care of our lives and showing consideration for others is 
clearly undeniable. 
Both Dewey and Siegel have already highlighted the 
importance of thinking in problem solving. However, in 
addition to reasoning, the importance and relevance of the 
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various types of thinking which Dewey and Siegel did not 
specifically refer to cannot be discounted. For example, the 
use of sign-cognition can result in the resolution of some 
practical problems, that is, it could form part of the basis 
for avoiding or resolving a conflict or deciding whom to 
trust. Imaginativeness, as already indicated, is an important 
type of thinking in problem solving however, it may not be 
required where the problem to be solved requires the 
application of a well defined method to reach a solution as 
in the case of changing a flat car tyre. The importance of 
imaginativeness becomes clear where a novel method or 
solution to a problem is needed, as in the case of finding a 
solution to the current crisis in the National Health 
Service. Although contemplation has little to do directly 
with the resolution of a problem, it can be a source from 
which guidance and direction can be drawn for seeking a 
solution. 
Being able to communicate plays a large role in our 
lives and thinking is central to how we engage in it. We are 
able to communicate with others by sharing our thoughts in 
various ways. Wittgenstein's argument on private language 
highlights the important connection between thinking and the 
shared concepts that bind a community together. The key 
point in Wittgenstein's argument is that our thinking is 
dependent on the use of concepts that are publicly accessible 
by members of our community and not by the use of 
inaccessible private language. If thinking is accessible and 
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shared by members of a community, this underlines its 
significance in how the community develops and thrives. In 
what ways do the various types of thinking aid communication? 
Reasoning is clearly important in learning, understanding and 
applying concepts that are vital for the flourishing of the 
community. Using a language, for example, requires reasoning 
but it also requires the ability to imagine. Spoken and 
written languages are very important means of communicating 
but equally important is body language, which does not 
necessarily depend on either speech or text as a means for 
communicating. It is possible that sign-cognition is 
important in the understanding of body language. Although 
contemplation is not directly involved in communicating, it 
can be a source of guidance in how we engage in it, and this 
brings us to the importance of contemplation. 
In the case where thinking is directed towards finding 
solutions to problems, the description of the kind of 
thinking involved will include some kind of searching or 
trying to resolve the problem in question. On the other hand 
the thinking involved in wonder does not focus on searching 
for, or trying to find solutions to problems but instead it 
focuses on the acknowledgement of some idea(s) or object(s), 
which one does not yet fully understand (Hepburn,1984). For 
example, to think of creation, the vastness of the universe 
and the possibility of beings living on another planet is 
very different from thinking about ways to build a spacecraft 
since the former is not concerned with solving a problem but 
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the latter is so directed. Contemplation is not directly 
involved in either finding solutions to problems or 
communicating but it is a vital source from which we can 
appreciate and value ourselves and others and the things that 
engage us. The rapid technological, scientific and cultural 
developments and their corresponding issues concerning how we 
live and cope in the new millennium continue to pose a threat 
to the meaning and value of our lives. For example, the 
effects of globalisation and the cycle of economic growth and 
ruin, developments in human cloning and the recent terrorist 
attacks on democracy bring to the forefront the need for the 
promotion of contemplation. It is the point where activity 
comes to rest and provides the spring from which the meaning 
and increasing worth of many actions and directions originate 
(Buchmann and Floden, 1993). In his Summa Theologiae Aquinas 
maintains that the contemplative life guides the active life, 
therefore when detached from contemplation the active life 
would be severed from its source of value. However, in spite 
of its potential value in guiding the decisions that we make, 
contemplation is valuable above all for its own sake as in 
the contemplation of nature or beauty. 
The interconnectedness of the various types of thinking 
and their importance in assisting us to maintain our material 
and spiritual well-being provide adequate justification for 
their promotion in education. 
83 
SUMMARY OF PART ONE 
In bringing Part One of the thesis to a conclusion it is 
important to restate some of the key points. In Chapter 1 an 
attempt was made to highlight the main constituents of 
thinking. Views put forward by Dewey and Ryle concerning the 
nature of thinking were discussed and the conclusion drawn 
from these discussions was that the nature of thinking is 
highly complex and for that reason it can occur in either a 
mental or physical activity. 
In Chapter 2 the different types of thinking formed the 
basis for the discussion in order to further support the 
claim about the complexity of the nature of thinking. These 
different types of thinking all contribute in different ways 
to the effectiveness of our thoughts and therefore it is 
essential that they are all valued. 
Chapter 3 considered the justification for the promotion 
of thinking, which involved the discussion of arguments 
presented by Dewey and Siegel. The fact that thinking can be 
understood in a variety of ways as well as in terms of both 
mental and physical activity means that any justification for 
the teaching of thinking must take these complexities into 
account. The justifications provided by Dewey and Siegel lay 
important foundations in terms of the reasons why thinking 
must be promoted in education, and if we consider thinking as 
having a highly complicated and diverse nature then this may 
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lead to a firmer foundation upon which the teaching and 
learning of thinking can be promoted. 
The discussion in Part Two of the thesis to which we now 
turn will focus on some of the methods proposed for the 
teaching of thinking as a general skill and on whether these 
methods yield satisfactory results. 
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PART TWO 
ON TEACHING THINKING PROGRAMMES  
The notion that there are general skills of thinking that can 
be taught as a curriculum subject has led to the development 
of a variety of special programmes to teach such skills 
popularly known as General Thinking Skills (GTS). 
The explosion of interest in the idea of teaching 
general thinking skills is world-wide. In America alone there 
are over one hundred programmes engaged in the teaching of 
thinking (Nisbet,1991). Programmes from around the world 
include Structure of Intellect (SOI), Odyssey, Problem 
Solving and Comprehension (Sternberg and Bhana,1986); Logic, 
'Strong' Critical Thinking, Philosophy for Children, 
Instrumental Enrichment, Somerset Thinking Skills Course, The 
Oxfordshire Skills Programme (Coles and Robinson,1991); LOGO, 
Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT), Cognitive Acceleration 
through Science Education (CASE), Cognitive Acceleration 
through Mathematics Education (CAME), Activating Children's 
Thinking Skills(ACTS) (McGuinness,1999; Wilson,2000). 
These programmes have been developed specifically to put 
into practice the idea that thinking can be taught as a 
subject across the entire age and ability range. In this part 
of the thesis the following four programmes will be examined 
in detail: 
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1.Philosophy for children 
2.CoRT Thinking Programme 
3.Instrumental Enrichment 
4.CASE 
As will become clear in the proceeding chapters these four 
programmes have been chosen for two reasons. 
a) Their recognition in various discussions pertaining to the 
teaching of thinking. Over the past two decades these 
programmes in various ways have dominated the discussions on 
thinking skills programmes. Writers such as McPeck (1981), 
Baron and Sternberg (1987), Coles and Robinson (1991), Fisher 
(1992) McGuiness (1999), Wilson (2000) have provided 
discussions at various levels on all or some of these 
programmes. On the other hand the programmes outside the 
above four appear to have very little attention focused on 
them in the discussions of writers (other than originators of 
programmes) on the topic. Current or comprehensive 
discussions of programmes not included in the above four are 
not readily available (if at all they exist), as for example, 
Structure of Intelligence (SOI). 
b) The evidence that has been provided for the effectiveness 
of these programmes in enhancing the thinking skills of 
participants. These four programmes have well documented and 
easily available studies regarding their effectiveness and 
some of these will be examined in Chapters 5,6,7 and 8. 
However the same cannot be easily said about programmes 
outside these four. 
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The influence of the four programmes is clear in a 
number of ways. For example, the Philosophy for Children 
programme is highly regarded in North and South America, 
Europe and Australia (McGuinness, 1999). Similarly, 
programmes such as Somerset Thinking Skills Course and 
Oxfordshire Skills programme have emerged from Instrumental 
Enrichment (Coles and Robinson,1991). The CoRT programme is 
well established in the area of creative thinking. In Britain 
CASE is admired as a programme that enhances pupils' thinking 
skills. 
As society changes and our body of knowledge increases 
it becomes necessary for our educational system to take into 
account the growing body of knowledge by finding the most 
productive methods to disseminate it. These programmes in 
their various ways claim to offer novel insights particularly 
in getting learners to improve their thinking. If this is 
true, then education in general stands to gain. However, the 
situation is far from conclusive as we look at what each of 
these programmes has to offer. 
In this part of the thesis the basic structure of these 
four programmes will be highlighted after the theoretical 
frameworks for teaching thinking have been discussed in 
Chapter 4. The last two chapters in this part will focus on 
arguments for and against teaching thinking skills. 
CHAPTER 4 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORKS FOR TEACHING THINKING 
4.1. Ennis's framework for teaching thinking. 
The proposal to teach the 'correct assessment of statements' 
or 'critical thinking' as a body of general thinking 
skills(GTS) has been considered by some philosophers to be 
the best way forward if education for the promotion of 
thinking is to be pursued as a desired goal. In contributing 
to the attempts to achieve this goal, Robert Ennis proposed a 
working definition to clarify and strengthen the theoretical 
framework for further development of the teaching of 
thinking. 
In his celebrated paper 'A concept of Critical Thinking' 
published in 1962, Ennis took up the challenge to develop a 
conceptual framework for teaching how to think critically. In 
the introduction to the paper, Ennis noted that although 
there have been a number of efforts aimed at the teaching of 
critical thinking, a major improvement was still needed. 
Ennis wrote: 
But even in education such efforts have for the most part been deficient in an 
important respect: they have not been based on a comprehensive and detailed 
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examination of what is involved in making judgement about the worth of 
statements or answers to problems (p.82). 
For Ennis the efforts in the field of education concerned 
with teaching critical thinking have not produced an explicit 
and comprehensive consideration of what is involved in 
judging statements to a desirable degree. For this reason 
Ennis suggested a theoretical framework in the form of a 
concept as a basis for research in the teaching and testing 
for critical thinking. He provided this concept by arguing 
that: 
As a root notion critical thinking is taken to be the correct assessing of 
statements. Since there are various kinds of statements, various relations 
between statements and their grounds, and various stages in the process of 
assessment, we can expect that there will be various ways of going wrong when 
one attempts to think critically (p.83). 
In order to avoid what he expressed as "pitfalls" in 
assessment, Ennis suggested a list of the following twelve 
specific aspects of thinking critically: 
1)Grasping the meaning of a statement 
2)Judging whether there is ambiguity in a line of 
reasoning. 
3)Judging whether certain statements contradict each other. 
4)Judging whether a conclusion follows necessarily. 
5)Judging whether a statement is specific enough. 
6)Judging whether a statement is actually the application of 
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a certain principle. 
7)Judging whether an observation statement is reliable. 
8)Judging whether an inductive conclusion is warranted. 
9)Judging whether the problem has been identified. 
10)Judging whether something is an assumption. 
11)Judging whether a definition is adequate. 
12)Judging whether a statement made by an alleged authority 
is acceptable. 
Ennis hoped that by the provision of the above list future 
development based on a sound theoretical framework could be 
established for teaching and testing critical thinking as a 
general skill. 
The influence of Ennis's work in the realm of teaching 
thinking cannot be denied however the conception as proposed 
by Ennis presents difficulties since it focuses strictly on 
one's ability to correctly evaluate certain kinds of 
statements. If thinking critically merely involves the 
evaluation of statements then it is difficult to understand 
how it can be related to the critical thinking involved, for 
example, in playing football or in producing a piece of 
painting. In these as well as in other kinds of activities 
knowledge plays a key role, but Ennis says nothing explicit 
about the place of knowledge in thinking critically. The 
importance of appropriate knowledge in painting or playing 
football means that successful engagement in these activities 
involves much more than the mere assessment or judgment of 
statements. It is arguable that implicit in Ennis's 
conception is the assumption that his list offers all the 
essential knowledge that one would need to think critically: 
in other words by merely knowing how to apply his list it is 
possible to think critically in any subject. But this leaves 
out, for example, the kind of thinking that is tied to 
action. 
It is not clear why Ennis gives no substantial 
justification for the view that critical thinking is of such 
great importance, though a possible reason could be linked 
back to Dewey. Dewey's views on thinking have been 
influential in shaping Ennis's conception since both can be 
said to view thinking mainly as problem solving, but whereas 
Dewey's writing is suggestive of some list of skills Ennis 
goes further in providing such a list. Another problem with 
Ennis's list is that there is no guarantee that learning 
these skills will necessarily lead to the higher development 
of one's critical thinking abilities since knowledge and 
dispositions are also involved in thinking critically as 
already indicated. 
However, according to Ennis's view, one is a critical 
thinker if one has the necessary skills or proficiencies as 
laid out above for the proper evaluation of statements. What 
Ennis failed to take into account is the manner by which a 
particular outcome is pursued. For Ennis, critical thinking 
purely involves the imparting of the essential skill as 
formulated. Ennis makes this very clear by referring to the 
named twelve aspects as specific ways to avoid "pitfalls" in 
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one's assessment of statements. However, this attempt to list 
all the ways to avoid "pitfalls", as indicated by 
McPeck(1981), is akin to a hypothetical attempt to list all 
the possible ways to avoid an accident. Given that in such 
situations there is an infinite number of ways of getting 
things wrong, such lists are destined to fail. As already 
discussed in Chapter 1, the complex nature of thinking means 
that any attempt to define it in any manner that does not 
acknowledge its multifacetedness is condemned to fail. 
Consequently to talk about thinking purely in terms of 
statements as offered by Ennis is bound to lead to an 
undesirable result. 
Ever since the conception under consideration appeared, 
Ennis has become aware of the inherent difficulties and in 
his later work has attempted to revise and strengthen his 
original conception to include a set of dispositional 
conditions for critical thinking. By this revised conception, 
a critical thinker, then, has both the skills necessary for 
the correct assessment of statements and also the 
dispositions to put those skills into action in statement 
assessing activities. 
Although Ennis's addition to the original conception is 
an improvement, this addition does not overcome the difficult 
problem of providing an unproblematic conception of thinking 
critically. In fact what Ennis yet again provides is a list 
to follow. On this issue, Siegel(1988) observed that: 
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What Ennis's conception amounts to is actually a highly complex list of 
proficiencies coupled with the simple admonition to exercise the proficiencies. 
In this way, while Ennis's view is to be praised for its recognition of the 
importance of utilization of skills, the tendency to utilize critical thinking 
skills is under-analyzed and under-attended to in Ennis's work (p7). 
The flaw in Ennis's conception as already mentioned could be 
related to the fact that the multifacetedness of thinking, 
which is a crucial aspect to be considered in any notion of 
thinking, remains unaccounted for by Ennis. Nevertheless 
Ennis's effort to provide a framework has contributed to a 
vigorous debate on what form, if any, the conception of 
critical thinking should take. 
We now turn to John McPeck, whose work provided an 
important and challenging contribution to the debate on the 
teaching of critical thinking. 
4.2. McPeck's framework for teaching thinking 
The most systematic and challenging critique of the general 
skills of critical thinking tradition was put forward by John 
McPeck in his two books Critical Thinking and Education 
(1981) and Teaching Critical Thinking (1990). 
John McPeck presented his major ideas on the theoretical 
structures of critical thinking in Critical Thinking and 
Education. In this book McPeck clearly argued that thinking 
is always thinking about X (meaning something - for example, 
some problem, activity or subject area). Adding the adjective 
'critical' to the phrase 'thinking about X' results in the 
description of how something is thought about without 
describing that something. Therefore in isolation from a 
particular subject it makes no sense to talk about critical 
thinking as a subject. For McPeck, critical thinking is 
subject specific and what counts as critical thinking differs 
from subject to subject, consequently there are no general 
thinking skills(GTS) that can be applied across different 
fields of study. It is not difficult to observe the major 
difference between McPeck and Ennis in the sense that Ennis 
views critical thinking as solely to do with statements, but 
for McPeck on the other hand critical thinking is not always 
about statements but is involved in phenomena more generally. 
The claim of the subject specificity of critical thinking 
draws McPeck closer to Ryle's position on thinking in that 
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similarities can be drawn between McPeck and Ryle about the 
idea that thinking is a polymorphous notion. That is, it 
cannot be acquired as a set of skills divorced from specific 
activities. But this is precisely the opposite of what Ennis 
is seeking to establish in the sense that thinking can be 
taught as a set of skills independent of any specific 
activity. This distinction is instrumental in creating a 
divide between Ryle and McPeck on the one hand and Dewey and 
Ennis on the other. This divide as will become clearer runs 
through much of the discussion on the teaching of thinking. 
McPeck maintained that critical thinking always 
manifests itself in connection with some identifiable 
activity or subject area and never in isolation, and that 
learning to think critically to a large extent involves 
learning to know when to question something, and what sort of 
questions to ask. McPeck expressed his conception of what 
critical thinking is, in the following paragraph: 
In short, critical thinking does not consist in merely raising questions, as 
many questions are straightforward request for information. Nor does it involve 
indiscriminate scepticism, for that would ultimately be self-defeating, since 
it leads to an infinite regress. Rather, it is the appropriate use of 
reflective scepticism within the problem area under consideration. And knowing 
how and when to apply this reflective scepticism effectively requires, among 
other things, knowing something about the field in question. Thus we may say of 
someone that he is a critical thinker about X if he has the propensity and 
skill to engage in X (be it mathematics, politics or mountain climbing) with 
reflective scepticism. There is, moreover, no reason to believe that a person 
96 
who thinks critically in one area will be able to do so in another area. The 
transfer of training skills cannot be assumed of critical thinking but must be 
established in each case by empirical tests. Calling to witness such notorious 
cases as distinguished logicians with no idea for whom to vote, nor why, it is 
fair to postulate that no one can think critically about everything, as there 
are no Renaissance men in this age of specialised knowledge (p7). 
The core meaning, then, of critical thinking put forward 
above is to do with the skills to engage in an activity with 
reflective scepticism; however, the purpose of this 
scepticism according to McPeck is not to be disagreeable, but 
to advance progress towards the resolution of a problem. For 
McPeck this notion of reflective scepticism is necessarily 
linked with specific areas of expertise and knowledge. For it 
is knowledge and information from within the field or problem 
area that provides the main ingredient that renders any 
putative solutions possible. So for example, critical 
thinking about an historical question requires the skills of 
an historian; similarly, critical thinking about a scientific 
question requires the knowledge and skills of a scientist. An 
important conclusion that can be drawn is that since there 
are no general skills that can be applied in all fields there 
is no reason to expect transfer of critical thinking from one 
domain to another domain. In arguing against teaching 
critical thinking as a separate subject from such a 
standpoint, many would agree with McPeck that the real issue 
with uncritical students is rather a lack of general 
education in the broad traditional sense. 
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A key point that McPeck clearly makes is that he does 
not wish to be understood as being entirely against the 
development of critical thinkers. Indeed, he is very much in 
favour of improving critical thinking, but his disagreement 
is largely concerned with how to teach it. McPeck's interest 
in developing critical thinkers is evident in his keenness to 
find a solution to the problem concerning what kind of 
knowledge will have the most transfer. The solution to this 
problem has always been the desire of all who are concerned 
with developing critical thinkers. 
For McPeck a rich and powerful way to develop critical 
thinking is through a liberal education. That is, through the 
rational perspective which comes from a well-informed study 
of natural and social sciences, together with mathematics, 
history, literature and art. In defence of the liberal 
educational system in his book Teaching Critical Thinking, 
McPeck argued that the shortcomings of our liberal 
educational system must not blind us to its potential role in 
the development of critical thinking. However, he 
acknowledged the need for some improvement of the system. He 
expressed his position as follows: 
One of the most pervasive shortcomings of the way that the traditional 
disciplines are taught is that they present their material in such a way that 
its facts and methods are regarded as nonproblematic. It is as though the 
foundation of these disciplines was chiselled out of epistemic bedrock, and all 
one needs is what the so-called facts are, and how to use its methods for 
finding more of them. Mastery of these disciplines is often measured in terms 
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of how many "facts" one has learned, and how proficient one has become in using 
its "method." Both of these are regarded by teachers and students alike as more 
or less sacrosanct. The all-too-frequent result of such teaching is that we 
produce technicians at X and specialists of Y with hardly an educated soul 
among them. A plausible solution to this problem is to make the philosophy of X 
and the philosophy of Y an integral part of what it means to "learn X" or to 
"learn Y." Thus, the philosophy of natural science would be as much a part of 
science education as Newton's laws. And the insights of the philosophy of 
history should be as much a part of learning history as the details of the 
Monroe Doctrine. If I may use a few personal examples, individuals like 
R.G.Collingwood, Michael Oakeshott, and William Dray might be said to have 
contributed as much to the study of history as did Samuel Eliot Morrison or 
Henry Steele Commager. Similarly, points could be made about the philosophy of 
art, mathematics, and social science. It should be clear that the philosophy-of 
approach should not be considered a mere topping-up exercise for the otherwise 
well-socialized specialist in these disciplines. Rather, the problematic nature 
of the putative facts and methods should be consciously woven into the fabric 
of its courses, even at the undergraduate level. In doing so, we would be 
providing students with the major prerequisites for being critical thinkers 
(p16-17). 
The philosophy-of approach clearly forms the hub of McPeck's 
framework for teaching critical thinking. 
The economy of this approach can be easily understood in 
that it seeks to build on the best of what we already have 
within the liberal education system. This highlights further 
differences between McPeck and Ennis. Whereas Ennis bases his 
idea of teaching critical thinking on a list of 
proficiencies, McPeck on the other hand rejects this idea by 
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arguing that teaching such thinking can only be done through 
specific subjects and activities. However, there are issues 
in seeking to teach exclusively for critical thinking through 
the traditional subjects. These issues will be discussed 
later. 
McPeck's contribution to the debate on teaching 
generalised thinking skills is important because until 
McPeck's objections, the putative reasons given in support of 
critical thinking in particular and thinking in general were 
not subjected to such detailed analysis. 
A possible cause of the lack of thorough analysis of the 
general notion of teaching thinking could be traced back to 
Dewey's work on the subject in 'How we think'. Dewey's ideas 
formed the conceptual cornerstone for the present 
proliferation of work in support of teaching thinking. 
However, as discussed earlier in Chapter 1, Dewey's 
conception of thinking is by no means unproblematic. 
Consequently, the confusion generated in Dewey's notion 
continues to plague the present, spreading through the work 
of proponents of generalisable thinking skills. As we shall 
see, problematic issues surrounding this notion have been 
neglected by proponents of general thinking skills. 
McPeck deserves acknowledgement for challenging the 
notion of teaching general thinking skills. However, is he 
entirely right in the approach that he adopts? Does his 
approach deal adequately with the issues concerning the 
enhancement of thinking? 
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One of the problems inherent in McPeck's argument that 
"Thinking is always thinking about X" is, as indicated by 
Andrews(1990), that McPeck is not very clear about what he 
means by the "X" in his claim. For Andrews, McPeck's 
vagueness and lack of clarity can be detected in the various 
statements that he makes. For example, when McPeck states 
that: 
Thinking is always thinking about X, and that X can never be 'everything in 
general' but must always be something in particular (p4). 
The in-built vagueness here is that McPeck offers no criteria 
for identifying that "something in particular" in the 
statement above. Although McPeck offers a number of ways of 
characterising "X", that is, sometimes as a problem, other 
times as an activity or a subject area, for Andrews this is 
unsatisfactory: McPeck's claim can only be successful if he 
is able to provide the criteria for the application of the 
phrase "something in particular". Andrews argues further that 
what McPeck takes for granted as unproblematic in referring 
to "X" in his claim by various terms such as 'problem', 
'pertinent field', 'problem area', 'activity' and so on, is 
in fact problematic. The point Andrews is making is that 
McPeck's view is hard to pin down as soon as he tries to cash 
out that abstract schema. Consequently McPeck's ambiguity 
leaves one without any clear standards to identify the 
'activities' (etc) that he refers to. 
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Another problem concerns McPeck's argument that there 
are no general thinking skills and as such (critical) 
thinking must be established on the "appropriate use of 
reflective scepticism" within specific contexts. McPeck's 
framework is presented in terms of the philosophy of specific 
subjects but to apply philosophical thinking to all subjects 
as suggested by McPeck is to be committed to the generality 
of such thinking. Philosophical thinking generally involves 
the acquisition of certain skills such as the ability to 
consider alternative views and the presentation of logical 
arguments. As a result, to consider any philosophical 
discussion must include the deployment of such thinking 
skills. If McPeck views such thinking skills (which he does) 
as an important part of studying the curriculum subjects 
offered in liberal education then he must be admitting the 
generality of such thinking skills. But McPeck's opposition 
to any kind of generality of thinking brings the 
contradiction in his approach into sharp focus. 
Although McPeck makes no mention of sports, they are a 
valuable part of any broad-based liberal system of education, 
and as such the kinds of thinking involved in science, 
literature, history and so on may not necessarily be the same 
as those involved in sports, considering the importance of 
sign-cognition in sports. It is therefore not clear how the 
philosophy-of approach can be applied in the context of 
sports activities. It is difficult to account for how the 
ability to present logical arguments, for example, can 
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enhance the effectiveness of thought required in the 
practical performances that define most sporting activities. 
To think philosophically involves the combination of the 
various types of thinking discussed in Chapter 1 such as 
reasoning, imagining and contemplating, and these types of 
thinking in important ways involve certain kinds of 
dispositions such as patience, persistence and courage for 
example (to be discussed in Part Three). In spite of the 
importance of such dispositions McPeck does not sufficiently 
draw attention to them. 
Given the difficulties highlighted in the various 
conceptual frameworks discussed so far how are we to proceed? 
4.3. Which way for teaching thinking? 
In the light of the problems highlighted in the preceding 
discussions, what is the best possible way forward? It is 
obvious firstly, that there are opposing conceptions and 
theoretical frameworks for what thinking is and how it can be 
taught, and secondly, that these conceptions and frameworks 
are by no means unproblematic. It cannot be denied that the 
body of work generated by the debate on the existence of 
general thinking skills and how these skills (if they do 
indeed exist) might be taught is valuable in deepening our 
general understanding of what teaching thinking might 
involve. 
It is wrong to assume that the only way to improve and 
sharpen the way we think is by creating special courses to 
teach general thinking skills. The view that will be argued 
for in this thesis is that the improvement of students' 
thinking does not necessarily require a new subject but 
rather an improvement in the teaching and learning of the 
curriculum subjects. These improvements can be made by 
searching for the major factors that influence effective 
thinking and incorporating these in innovative methods to 
enhance the teaching and learning of the curriculum subjects. 
These factors influencing effective thinking will be 
discussed later. 
What makes the idea of teaching thinking skills so 
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bewitching is the promise of the transferability of assumed 
general thinking skills across all the different subjects. 
Without this the argument for teaching thinking is 
effectively redundant. The main case against teaching and 
learning thinking through the curriculum subjects is that 
they fail to yield maximum transferability from one 
curriculum subject to another and for that reason students 
fail to think more effectively. Yet there is no conclusive 
evidence to show that thinking skills programmes yield 
maximum transferability for participants. 
In order to provide a detailed view of what is involved 
in the teaching of thinking we now turn to some of the major 
programmes that have been specially developed for teaching 
skills thought to be general to thinking. 
CHAPTER 5 
PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN 
5.1. Why teach children philosophy? 
Philosophy for Children was developed in America by Matthew 
Lipman to address some of the congenital problems in the 
American educational system, as he believed it to be the 
case. 
The original idea for the creation of the programme 
resulted from Lipman's concern for the low level of thinking 
skills that students brought to the college where he taught 
philosophy. For Lipman the educational system produces so 
many unthinking people because it fails to address the 
conceptual needs of the child in a number of ways. For 
example, children are not taught to reason similarly, 
children are not shown how to apply logical skills to diverse 
subject matters. For Lipman the alarming level of the 
American child's lack of reasoning is a direct result of the 
child's not being sufficiently encouraged to think for him or 
herself, to be able to form independent judgements and be 
proud of his or her personal insights and a point of view 
that he or she can call his or her own. 
According to Lipman(1977), one of the main causes for 
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the production of unthinking people is to be found in the 
American educational system as it is. He explained it as 
follows: 
One of the major problems in the practice of education today is the lack of 
unification of the child's educational experience. What the child encounters is 
a series of disconnected, specialized presentations. If it is language arts 
that follows mathematics in the morning program, the child can see no 
connection between them, nor can he or she see a connection between language 
arts and the social studies that follow, or a connection between social studies 
and physical science. 
This splintering of the school day reflects the general fragmentation of 
experience, whether in school or out, which characterizes modern life. However, 
it is also due to the enormous increase in the factual dimension of human 
knowledge, for insofar as education involves a transmission of information to 
the child, it must be simplified and schematized by specialists. The result is 
that each discipline tends to become self-contained, and loses track of its 
connection with the totality of human knowledge, in an effort simply to present 
a bare outline of that particular field (p6,7). 
Lipman argues that the surest way to resolve such an 
unproductive educational system is to be found in teaching 
children philosophy. According to Lipman philosophy is the 
natural discipline to reconnect the various specific subjects 
(as it is traditionally concerned with the inter-
relationships among the different intellectual disciplines). 
So to engage children in philosophical discussions is, in a 
sense, an aid in healing the 'general fragmentation' of their 
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experience. Consequently, the best approach is to teach 
thinking through the rigours of philosophical discussions. 
For Lipman, if education is about teaching young people 
to improve their thinking then it should be offered as a 
course of study and the child should begin early, as soon as 
he or she enters school. 
In setting out how thinking is to be taught, Lipman 
listed over thirty skills which children should learn. A key 
skill and the first on this list is entitled 'Formulating 
concepts precisely'. For example, to explore the concept of 
friendship, Lipman suggested a host of questions to generate 
discussions these included the following 
a) Do people have to be the same age to be friends? 
b)Can people be friends and still not like each other very 
much? 
cgs it ever possible for friends to lie for one 
another? 
Lipman believes that children who are encouraged to think and 
speak logically are most likely to develop into more 
thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate and reasonable 
individuals. Consequently, the aim of his program is to 
provide conceptual enrichment through the improvement of 
skills in comprehension, analysis and problem-solving. 
According to Lipman, most of these skills and the disposition 
to use them are learned best through language in a sort of 
'community of inquiry' where children engage in dialogue as a 
cooperative venture. 
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Lipman concluded that the best way to teach children to 
think is to engage them in philosophical discussions based on 
stories. For Lipman, the fictional form is the best way to 
acquaint them with the complex facts of the world. Thus began 
the very first production of a special short novel for 
children by Lipman(1974) entitled 'Harry Stotlemeier's 
Discovery'. The story draws upon Aristotelian logic in areas 
such as contradiction and categorical syllogisms in addition 
to relational and propositional logics. These logics however, 
are dealt with in an informal way. 
5.2. Guiding children to philosophise 
The primary aim of the programme is to bring about the 
development of reflective and reasonable American citizens by 
means of the novel as text. The second is by discussion 
method to aim at transforming the classroom into a community 
of inquiry. All this involves the use of comprehensive 
instructional manuals and the establishment of rigorous 
teacher education seminars flexible enough to be used by any 
target group. 
Lipman's novel Harry Stotlemeier's Discovery formed the 
cornerstone of the entire programme. It begins with the story 
of a thoughtful little boy Harry making a mistake in class 
one day. Through that mistake various discoveries unfold as 
he ponders over the reasons for his mistake. The novel 
comprises seventeen chapters and as the story develops other 
characters are introduced and more questions of logic are 
raised. Harry, Lisa and the rest of the characters begin to 
think about various logical statements and begin to apply 
their findings to situations both inside and outside the 
classroom, coming to realise the importance of defining their 
words in precise ways. 
The novel and other such stories form the foundation not 
only for the engagement of children in philosophical 
discussion but also for training and preparing potential 
teachers of the programme. In addition to the novel there is 
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an instructional manual for establishing connections between 
philosophy and other school subjects that children study. The 
instructional manual is designed to introduce and then 
provide a gloss on the main concepts as they emerge in the 
course of the discussions. 
The method for teaching children philosophy is based 
predominantly on discussion, that is, on talking and thinking 
things out. According to Lipman, the conditions for a 
productive philosophical discussion within the programme 
require first of all that the teacher must not only be 
knowledgeable in philosophy, but also must know how to 
introduce this knowledge at the appropriate times in ways 
that support the child's own struggle for understanding. 
Secondly, the prevailing condition in the classroom must 
demonstrate a commitment to philosophical inquiry, avoidance 
of the indoctrination of children, respect for children's 
opinion etc. 
The teacher, whilst making sure that the conditions 
stated above exist in the classroom, must at the same time 
assist the child to master the rules of logical inference, 
and the necessary etiquette of classroom discussion in order 
to develop philosophically. The teacher is urged to 
a) maintain relevance by steering the discussions in the 
appropriate direction; 
b) help the child learn to ask questions and maintain 
interest by being a questioning teacher; 
c) help the child to develop an openness such that they are 
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eager to replace ineffective answers with more effective 
ones; 
e) develop the ability to listen to the child 
verbally and non-verbally. 
These conditions and many others form the underlying ideas 
guiding how children are to be taught philosophy. Since the 
introduction of the programme, Lipman and his followers have 
produced a large body of evidence in support of the 
effectiveness of the programme in improving the child's 
reasoning ability. The evidence will be examined in the next 
section. 
5.3. Issues in teaching children philosophy 
It is clear from the preceding section that proponents of the 
Philosophy for Children programme present a forceful case for 
teaching children thinking through philosophy. It is their 
belief that through this programme children can be taught 
critical thinking in its rudimentary form, hence critical 
thinking ought to be introduced to children as early as 
possible. Although the literature on philosophy for children 
provides numerous claims of children successfully engaging in 
philosophising, this position is by no means unproblematic as 
there are difficulties to be accounted for by the programme. 
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The arguments against teaching philosophy to children 
can indeed be traced back to some of the writings of Plato. 
In Book 7 of the Republic, Plato points out the dangers of 
introducing philosophy to the young. He wrote: 
And there is one great precaution you can take, which is to stop their getting 
a taste of them too young. You must have noticed how young men, after their 
first taste of argument, are contradicting people just for the fun of it; they 
imitate those whom they hear cross-examining each other, and themselves cross-
examine other people, like puppies who love to pull and tear at anyone within 
reach(p352-353). 
He then goes on to state the consequences as follows: 
So when they've proved a lot of people wrong and been proved wrong often 
themselves, they soon slip into the belief that nothing they believed before 
was true; with the result that they discredit themselves and the whole business 
of philosophy in the eyes of the world (p353). 
For Plato, the whole business of philosophy is of such great 
importance that it requires persons of steady and disciplined 
characters to engage in its discussion. Plato's writing thus 
suggests that the practice of philosophy depends on resources 
that youth do not yet have but can come to have through the 
development of their conceptual sophistication among other 
things. 
Attempts by commentators to locate Lipman's programme 
within a theoretical framework tend to refer to the 
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intellectual development of children as suggested by Jean 
Piaget in his theory of developmental stages. The central 
point in Piaget's model is that children before the age of 12 
years do not yet possess the mental capacity for the kind of 
abstract thinking that philosophy demands. 
In the main Piaget's notion of 'development' is defined 
in terms of biological organisms and their ability to 
flourish under favourable conditions. The notion of 
biological development carries with it the idea of some 
predetermined beginning and final limiting state towards 
which an organism advances. This notion can easily be applied 
to the physical growth of plants from a seed to a fully grown 
specimen but it is difficult to ascertain how it can be 
applied, for example, to reasoning since ideas of what counts 
as maturity of reasoning are very different. As pointed out 
by White(1992), some of the difficulties with the application 
of Piagetian notion to intellectual development suggest that 
the notion of stages of philosophical development is not 
wholly unproblematic. All the same the power of Piaget's 
ideas about the intellectual development of the child 
continues to persist. 
The implication of Piaget's theory that a child is not 
capable of abstract hypothetical thinking until he/she has 
reached the stage of formal operational thought at around 12 
years of age constituted a huge obstacle for the Philosophy 
for Children programme, in the sense that the main target 
group of the programme falls below Piaget's recommended age 
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of the children to be engaged in such studies. The influence 
of Piaget's work in the world of education has led proponents 
of the programme to attempt to secure its credibility by 
providing what they consider to be compelling arguments 
backed by evidence for teaching children philosophy. In 
response to Piaget's formulations, Lipman(1982) and 
Matthews(1980) attempted to identify weaknesses in the theory 
by criticising Piaget's research technique. 
For Lipman, Piaget's model is based mainly on 
descriptive and hardly on pedagogical studies and for that 
reason it is erroneous. Lipman argues that Piaget has not 
provided conclusive evidence to show that children under 12 
years of age cannot generally think in an abstract way. But 
Lipman on the other hand provides very little evidence beyond 
his own experiments to substantiate his claim that children 
below the age of 12 years old can and do engage in 
philosophy. 
Similarly, the weakness in Piaget's model as identified 
by Matthews is that Piaget excluded unusual responses given 
by children from his data, by dismissing them as mere 
fancying. For Matthews, it is precisely these unusual 
responses which are more likely to be the result of honest 
philosophical speculation. Matthews cites examples of 
discussions with children from both Piaget's work and his own 
experiments to support his claim that children do indeed 
philosophise. However, Matthews also provides very little 
evidence beyond his experiments to support his claim. 
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Lipman and Matthews's inability to present conclusive 
evidence in support of their claim that very young children 
do engage in philosophising is clearly one of the 
difficulties facing the philosophy for children programme. 
A further potential source of difficulty for the 
programme is to do with the assumption that children are 
interested in philosophy and therefore should be taught 
philosophy at least in its rudimentary form. We are told by 
Lipman that the programme came into being as a result of the 
poor level of thinking that college students demonstrated in 
his philosophy classes. The initial impulse, then, was to 
find ways to improve the philosophical thinking of students 
before they entered college, presumably to do philosophy. 
Similarly, Matthews's interest in promoting the programme 
originated from his concern about how to teach introductory 
courses in philosophy to his college students. 
It is indeed clear from both cases that the initial 
impetus for the development and promotion of the programme 
was a yearning to improve the philosophical thinking of 
potential pre-college students interested in pursuing the 
subject. If the programme is meant to operate within clearly 
defined boundaries, promoting philosophy among select groups 
of interested students wishing to pursue the subject further, 
then there is no case to be made. But, in its present form, 
what is unclear and problematic about the programme is the 
argument that children do philosophise hence all children 
should be taught philosophy, as well as the subsequent drive 
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to introduce all children of school-going age to the 
programme. Clearly this raises a problem since not all 
children might be interested in pursuing a college education 
in philosophy. 
What can we say about Lipman's objective in seeking to 
teach children philosophy? As already mentioned, Lipman's 
objective in developing his programme was specifically for 
the improvement of the philosophical thinking of new college 
students intending to study philosophy. But much of Lipman's 
writing on the development of his programme makes no mention 
of this initial objective. Instead Lipman writes about 
teaching philosophy to all children of school-going age. This 
lack of consistency between Lipman's initial objective and 
his subsequent writing on teaching children philosophy is 
important in highlighting some of the issues associated with 
the programme. In his writing quoted earlier in section 5.1 
Lipman offers a different objective for the promotion of the 
programme: helping children to reconnect the various specific 
disciplines. Later on Lipman(1986) again claims that the 
programme meets the two objectives of systematically and 
significantly strengthening higher order thinking skills, and 
the building of conceptual skills together with the 
intensification and enrichment of students' awareness of 
their heritage. In view of the diverse objectives that Lipman 
claims Philosophy for Children satisfies what can be said 
about the programme is that it raises questions about what 
exactly Lipman is aiming to achieve. It is clear that 
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Lipman's original goal for the creation of his programme, 
which was to improve the thinking of undergraduate students 
of philosophy, was taken over by other considerations and 
objectives as Lipman embarked on the development of the 
programme. 
Suppose Lipman's aim in teaching children philosophy is 
to produce effective and well-rounded thinkers, that is, 
thinkers who are autonomous, courageous and compassionate, is 
it sufficient to do so by teaching purely reasoning skills as 
suggested by the programme? It is appropriate for such 
thinkers to have skills in reasoning, as this is useful in 
thinking independently and so contributing to the development 
of autonomy. However, reasoning alone does not necessarily 
lead to such thinkers becoming courageous or compassionate as 
well because these are dispositional qualities and therefore 
cannot be gained by mere theoretical considerations as in the 
case of gaining skills in logic (Ryle,1972). As already 
mentioned Philosophy for Children is based on novels written 
by Lipman and these novels are the sole texts for the 
philosophical engagement of children. If Lipman's aim is to 
develop thinkers as indicated above it is not clear how this 
can be done by the use of his texts alone. Thinking, as has 
been repeatedly indicated, is a multifaceted concept and as 
such the ability to think effectively embraces among other 
factors various types of thinking which are not accounted for 
by the programme. 
The lack of agreement or correspondence between the 
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initial motivation for the programme and its development has 
led Lipman and his followers to argue that philosophy is to 
do with reasoning and that since one of the aims of educating 
democratic citizens is to improve their reasoning, philosophy 
should be taught to all as early as possible during their 
education. This however will not do, since in taking such 
position Lipman and his followers conflate reasoning and 
philosophising. As indicated by White(1992), it is indeed 
often the case that a child learning to use a newly acquired 
concept may ask various pertinent and searching questions in 
order to fully understand how to reason around the concept or 
apply the concept. However, this is entirely different from 
the main concerns of philosophers, in the sense that the 
interest of philosophers revolves round the criteria for the 
application of concepts. The crucial difference here is that, 
while the remarks and comments made by children may be 
directed at learning how to use a concept, for example, the 
concept of goodness, philosophers, on the other hand, have no 
difficulty using this concept but are rather interested in 
the higher theoretical implications of the concept. The 
indication in this case is that the children and the 
philosophers are thinking about different things and are 
doing so by using different concepts. In other words the 
intentional objects on which they focus their attention are 
in the main different. 
It is not too difficult to show that only a minority of 
individuals display a deep interest and commitment to the 
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subject of philosophy, and one of the reasons for this is the 
fact that the road to philosophy is undeniably long and 
certainly arduous. In the end, there are no set rules by 
which one can be guided. Consequently, it is important that a 
good and thorough intellectual preparation (although this may 
still not be adequate) is undergone before embarking on a 
philosophical journey. This preparation is meant to include 
the knowledge acquired through liberal education as we know 
it. 
However, according to Lipman(1977), not having adequate 
background knowledge is unimportant for engaging in 
philosophy. He argues that: 
The amount of information or knowledge children acquire is less essential to 
their philosophical education than the development of their intellectual 
judgement (p.83). 
This may well be the case, but it is difficult to envisage 
how far one can go on any philosophical journey without 
adequate background knowledge to inform one's intellectual 
judgement. Furthermore, it is not clear whether Lipman is 
Implying that it is not useful to be acquainted with 
important and relevant knowledge that other philosophers, 
past and present, have contributed to general ongoing 
philosophical debates. In learning to philosophise, surely, 
to be acquainted with the findings of other philosophers must 
contribute in some way to one's own intellectual development. 
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If this is so, then it is not clear why Lipman is playing 
down the amount of knowledge that children learn to acquire. 
One possible clue may be that taking such a position allows 
the Philosophy for Children programme the opportunity to 
assume an important position, since the programme is opposed 
to a content specific teaching method. 
If we are to equip children through education for a 
better future then we should make sure, first of all, that 
they are as much as possible well-informed and well-grounded 
in the traditions offered in liberal education. The 
possession of relevant knowledge is certainly beneficial to 
one's effectiveness in thinking and this implies that some 
time must first be spent on acquiring much basic knowledge 
and information. This position highlights McPeck's point that 
teaching children philosophy should be done at a later stage 
of the child's education. 
Finally, the fact that Lipman and his followers write 
and publish the main journal promoting the programme suggests 
that it is highly likely that their own interest in promoting 
the programme as a successful method for teaching thinking 
may lead to the possibility of bias in the kinds of reports 
that they present in their journal. In other words it is 
difficult to envisage how they can maintain impartiality in 
the publication of reports on the success of the programme 
worldwide. 
Between the period of 1993 and 1994 the Institute for 
the Advancement of Philosophy for Children(IAPC) highlighted 
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seven case studies as demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
programme (published on IAPC website,2002) 
(www.montclair.edu/pages/iapc/home.html) .  All the case 
studies were based on an earlier evaluation by Shipman which 
will be one of the two empirical studies on the effectiveness 
of the programme to be discussed in the next section. 
5.4. The effectiveness of Philosophy for Children 
Proponents of Philosophy for Children have made claims in 
favour of the effectiveness of the programme in improving the 
reasoning skills of pupils. As an important part of 
establishing such claims numerous studies have been conducted 
in support of the programme. Lipman(1986) cited fourteen 
quantitative studies examining the effectiveness of its 
implementation upon various aspects of children's thinking 
ability and academic performance. The Philosophy for Children 
programme views the improvement of reasoning skills as its 
most basic function consequently most of the studies were 
concerned with the programme's impact upon reasoning ability. 
Two of the quantitative studies that will be discussed in 
detail are of particular interest because they are follow-up 
studies on previously conducted studies. 
5.4.1. Shipman's final report 
Shipman's (1983) study attempted to replicate an earlier 
evaluation of the Philosophy for Children programme for 
pupils in two New Jersey (USA) schools. The main aim of the 
study was to establish that the programme improves school 
children's reasoning abilities. The measures used in the 
study included tasks assessing both formal and informal 
reasoning skills developed in cooperation with Lipman. The 
study lasted over one academic year and a large part of the 
tasks employed in the study consisted of reasoning problems 
in a multiple choice format covering over 23 different areas 
of logic such as inference, definition, induction and 
informal fallacies. A crucial part of the study was that 
pretest and posttest were administered and their calculated 
means were used to draw important conclusions about the 
efficacy of the programme. It is upon these test results that 
the Philosophy for Children programme is claimed to be 
effective in improving reasoning skills. But can such 
results be accepted? The study in general raises a number of 
issues such that it is problematic to view it as providing a 
conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of the programme. 
The study assumes that: 
1. Children can and do philosophise. 
2. To philosophise is tantamount to reasoning. 
3. The excellence of one's reasoning can be established 
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purely by administering tests in multiple-choice formats. 
Some of the problems with assumption (1) and assumption (2) 
have already been discussed in the earlier sections of this 
chapter. For instance, the claim that children can and do 
philosophise (assumption (1)) underpins some of the main 
arguments for the programme presented by Lipman and Matthews, 
but what is lacking is substantial evidence to support this 
assumption. 
The difficulty with assumption (2) is that to equate 
philosophising to reasoning is to fail to distinguish the 
subtle differences between the two. The essence of reasoning 
is directed mainly towards finding solutions to practical or 
theoretical problems such as in the following examples: 
(a) Making a final decision to choose one commodity out of 
many by calculating and comparing how much tax one is 
required to pay on the different available commodities; 
(b) Calculating the rise in sea level as a result of global 
warming. 
Although philosophising on the other hand does depend on 
reasoning, it also involves contemplation as it is not 
necessarily concerned with merely seeking solutions to 
problems though solutions to problems may arise in the course 
of philosophising. It is in the main concerned with 
understanding the nature of things by considering and 
meditating on the various alternative points of views by 
which things can be understood. Example (a) given above on 
reasoning can be transformed into an example of 
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philosophising when one begins to consider say the nature of 
the numbers used in the calculation and whether they truly 
exist regardless of how we represent them. 
Assumption (3) raises issues about the appropriateness 
of multiple-choice tests as the basis for determining the 
quality of a person's reasoning. Reasoning, as already 
discussed in Chapter 2, can be viewed as a practical or 
theoretical activity, and it was indicated that practical 
reasoning concerns our ability to conduct ourselves in the 
world of action, which can be distinguished from (theoretical 
reason) our capacity to operate from and with propositions. 
This division, however, does not suggest mutual exclusivity 
therefore any attempt to determine a person's quality of 
reasoning must account for both distinctions. In this case it 
is difficult to ascertain how the use of multiple-choice 
tests can be adequately applied in determining one's 
practical reasoning ability, even though multiple-choice 
tests may be useful in finding out something about 
theoretical reasoning. Indeed it is not at all clear why 
multiple-choice test format was used and how such tests can 
provide generalisable results. 
One possible reason for Shipman's use of a multiple-
choice test is that it provides an unproblematic method for 
the data generated by the study to be subjected to various 
mathematical techniques in order to lend it some level of 
authority. But applying such a format to reasoning may only 
be reliable within highly specific contexts such as in 
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solving mathematical problems. Consequently it is 
inappropriate to generalise such results to cover all kinds 
of reasoning. In fact in this study the reasoning problems 
provided were highly specific since these were tailored to 
the contents of the programme - which in turn leads to 
further issues relating to the effects of researcher interest 
on the study. 
The interest of the researchers raises important issues. 
For example, the fact that Lipman designed most of the test 
materials used in the study means that an element of bias 
cannot be excluded. Before the study began, teachers with 
considerable interest in the programme were selected and 
given special training in how to teach the programme. Thus 
the possibility that these teachers are more likely to behave 
differently as a result of being treated differently cannot 
be ignored, but these issues were not accounted for. The 
study relied on pretest and posttest as the key indicators 
for the success of the programme, but this raises questions 
about the possibility of teachers teaching to the test. The 
study did not address important issues relating to 
fundamental assumptions and the effects of teacher and 
researcher interests. There is thus a major problem in 
generalising the study to a much larger population. 
5.4.2. Iorio, Weinstein and Martin's evalution 
Iorio, Weinstein and Martin's (1984) study is similar to 
Shipman's study in its attempt to demonstrate the efficacy of 
the Philosophy for Children programme by elaborating on an 
earlier study carried out in a number of schools in New York 
City. The study was carried out over one academic year. One 
of the objectives was to measure and compare the gains in 
reasoning skills among elementary school pupils. The main 
findings were based on pretests and posttests administered to 
participants at particular stages of the study. The latter 
involved among others a criterion-referenced reasoning test 
derived from Lipman's test model. The test, according to the 
researchers, is based on "some twenty definable thinking 
skills" covering both formal and informal reasoning skills 
including syllogism, induction, detecting assumption and 
ambiguity, evaluating reasons, etc. Teachers were selected on 
the recommendation of their principals based on guidelines 
supplied by the researchers. The selected teachers were given 
special training in guiding philosophical discussions with 
on-going support during the period of the project. At the end 
of the academic year the researchers produced statistical 
results to support their claim about the efficacy of the 
programme. From these results they concluded that: 
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First, Philosophy for Children has a significant effect on raising pupils' 
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level of critical thinking, where critical thinking is measured by a test that 
includes the performance of abstract inferences and the evaluation of 
arguments. Second, critical thinking skills are generalized from a basis in 
classroom discussion and text readings that are not specifically tailored to 
the cognitive skills tested (p.34). 
The assumptions underpinning Iorio, Weinstein and Martin's 
research are very similar to those upon which Shipman's study 
is based, consequently it is open to the same problems 
highlighted in Shipman's work. Iorio, Weinstein and Martin's 
study highlights, however, further issues in connection with 
the use of criterion-referenced reasoning test. 
Criterion referencing is a way of defining what is 
required prior to testing candidates and then judging the 
performance of the candidates against those criteria. This 
way of defining what a particular test must involve aims to 
achieve the selection of those candidates who deserve to pass 
regardless of the performance of other candidates involved in 
the test. For example, the award of a swimming certificate 
can be viewed as a criterion-referenced testing. To be 
awarded a swimming certificate the criterion might be that 
one is able to swim a certain distance over a given time. 
Similarly the test involved in securing a driving licence can 
also be viewed as criterion-referenced since it defines 
certain actions that have to be competently executed, and in 
this case, too, passing does not depend on how many people 
passed earlier. 
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The difficulty presented by criterion referencing is 
that defining exactly what is required is very problematic. 
For example, if we take the criterion for a successful swim 
as the ability to float from point A to point B without any 
aid, then it is difficult to distinguish what constitutes an 
excellent swim from an average one. Trying to define such 
detail is by no means easy. In view of the difficulties 
associated with criterion referencing it is not clear how 
Iorio, Weinstein and Martin graded the test results in their 
study. In fact they made no mention of such problems but 
instead proceeded to the application of statistical methods 
to their data. Failure to consider problems of such 
importance can only misrepresent the conclusions of the 
study. Before further comments are made about the conclusions 
of the study, it is important to comment on the selection and 
training process of the teachers involved in it. As already 
mentioned, teachers were selected on the recommendations of 
their principals as teachers who have a commitment not only 
to philosophical discussion but also to general scholarship 
and self-improvement. These qualities, however, must not be 
viewed as being only relevant to the Philosophy for Children 
programme; they are in fact useful in any provision of 
quality education. In other words, teachers selected on that 
basis in any educational enterprise are likely to aid pupils' 
learning. The in-service training provided throughout the 
study is also an important element in producing motivational 
effects among those teachers receiving such training, and 
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this also must not be viewed as specific to the programme. In 
view of these observations it is possible that the perceived 
results of the study may not necessarily be due to the 
effectiveness of the programme. To return to the conclusions 
of the study, references to critical thinking were made but 
it is not clear whether the researchers view reasoning as 
identical to critical thinking. No direct answer was given to 
the main objective of the study, which was to compare the 
gains in reasoning among pupils. Instead, the conclusions 
noted by the researchers were expressed in terms of critical 
thinking, but as already indicated this was not previously 
mentioned in the study. Therefore making such claims can only 
lead to confusion about the effectiveness of the programme. 
5.5. Notes on Philosophy for Children 
The two empirical studies discussed in section 5.4 above 
highlight an important point about the Philosophy for 
Children programme. The good educational practice required by 
the programme is not unique to it. In education the effects 
of having highly skilled teachers who are interested and 
dedicated to the promotion of learning among their pupils, 
which is conducted through discussion in highly favourable 
conditions, is more than likely to produce positive results 
regardless of the teaching programme employed. Consequently 
to claim that the programme is effective in raising the 
reasoning skills of pupils due to the good educational 
practice demanded by it is to overlook the positive effects 
of good practice outside the confines of the programme. More 
importantly, these studies do not demonstrate conclusively 
that excluding all other factors the Philosophy for Children 
programme improves pupils' reasoning abilities. 
The Philosophy for Children programme draws heavily on 
reading and discussion of text, but it does not clearly 
highlight the importance of the development of the basic 
prerequisite skills that pupils need in order to engage fully 
in the activities offered by the programme. If the latter 
assumes that pupils already possess the basic prerequisite 
skills in reading, listening, speaking sensibly etc, then it 
is not clear how the programme can be successfully applied 
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across all age and ability ranges. It is precisely these 
prerequisite skills that Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment 
programme, for instance, aims to develop, and these will be 
discussed later. 
While the very essence of Lipman's programme is the 
reading of specific texts, the use of such specified texts is 
restricted in DeBono's CoRT programme to which we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CoRT THINKING PROGRAMME 
6.1. Grounds for the CoRT programme 
The CoRT programme was developed by Edward DeBono to address 
the presumed inadequacies in teaching thinking within the 
British educational system. 
The large number of books written by Edward DeBono on 
the topic of teaching thinking confirms his commitment to 
teaching thinking as a subject in its own right. Throughout 
DeBono's work are various arguments objecting to the 
traditional academic approach to knowledge. DeBono claims 
that, as a result of the insistence on debating skills over 
imaginative skills, the traditional semantic approach to 
thinking has corrupted our productive thinking ability. 
According to DeBono, the semantic approach came about as a 
result of the preoccupation of the medieval ecclesiastical 
authorities with the meanings of words and concepts. In his 
book Teaching Thinking DeBono expressed this as follows: 
Our academic institutions, probably because they were established by the 
ecclesiastical authorities have much too great a respect for semantic thinking. 
There is also a more practical reason for this reverence. A person who directs 
his thinking at words rather than at what they describe always feels in control 
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of the situation. There is no further data that he would like to have, his data 
can never be shown to be wrong or insufficient. So an academic sitting in an 
academic tower never need descend to examine the vagueness of the real world 
where complete data are impossible. Instead he examines the semantic 
consistency of the argument, the words themselves rather than the thoughts 
which the words so imperfectly convey. This leads to logic-chopping, nit-
picking and all the metaphysical gymnastics that result. It is easy and it is 
done (p38). 
Consistent with this treatise is the fact that his learning 
materials consist mainly of diagrams and pictures with brief 
comments where necessary. 
According to DeBono, our productive thinking ability is 
based on the way that the brain and its various thought 
processes operate. DeBono's description of the unique way in 
which the brain works with working models and not by words 
forms the bedrock for the justification of his curriculum 
proposal as presented in his CoRT programme. 
DeBono justifies the need for his programme by arguing 
that the teaching of thinking is the teaching of perception 
(i.e methods of discovery). According to DeBono, a great deal 
can be accomplished in most ordinary thinking by 'directing 
attention' (i.e perception) before going into the processing 
stage of thinking which then involves logic. For DeBono the 
teaching of logic has been erroneously taken for granted as 
the main approach to teaching thinking as a result of the 
classics tradition and in particular, the way St.Thomas 
Aquinas 'repackaged' Aristotle, which then filtered through 
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to the educational system then under the control of the 
church. 
So for DeBono, the ineffectiveness of the traditional 
subject matter of logic in particular and other content 
subjects in general in teaching thinking forms an important 
part of his rationale for recommending the CoRT programme as 
the best way of doing this. 
Another important reason for rejecting content 
subjects as vehicles for the development of thinking is that 
thinking through subjects is incapable of encouraging the 
transferability of thinking across different problem 
situations. DeBono concluded in Teaching Thinking that: 
Learning the rules of thinking does not develop a practical skill in thinking. 
Using thinking in particular situations develops thinking skills in those 
situations, but not a transferable skill in thinking. Skill has to be person-
centre, not situation-centred. The dilemma is that it is usually possible to 
teach only situation-centred skills. You train a person to behave in a certain 
way in a certain situation. The way out of the dilemma is to create situations 
that are themselves transferable. We call such situations tools. A person is 
trained in the tool situation. He learns how to cope with the tool. The tool 
and his skill in using it can now be transferred to new situations. It does not 
in the least matter whether the tool is strictly necessary or not. An 
unnecessary tool can still act as a transfer device (p.108). 
Consequently, the CoRT programme is an attempt to rectify the 
inadequacies in the traditional methods of getting students 
to think. CoRT stands for Cognitive Research Trust. Its 
programme consists of a number of strategies for generating 
ideas that DeBono calls 'attention-directing tools' 
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6.2. The CoRT method 
The CoRT programme is made up of six sections, each of which 
consists of ten lessons. A section is designed to cover one 
term's work. In other words, the programme is designed to be 
completed in one academic year. Each of the sections covers 
one general aspect of thinking as follows: 
1) Breadth 
2) Organisation 
3) Interaction 
4) Creativity 
5) Information and Feeling 
6) Action 
Within this general structure of headings, each lesson covers 
one process, which is crystallized into a definite tool for 
attention directing. Each section is accompanied by a 
distinct handbook for the teacher and notes on each lesson 
for each pupil. According to DeBono, the CoRT lessons are 
used to teach children as young as five and as old as IBM 
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executives. 
DeBono's 'attention directing tools' are the vehicles by 
which a student is taught to see a problem before attempting 
to give an answer or solution. These tools then form the 
basis for the development of general thinking skills. The 
first CoRT tool is called PMI which stands for 
Plus - the good things about an idea, why 
you like it. 
Minus - the bad things about an idea, why you 
don't like it. 
Interesting - what you find interesting about an 
idea. 
The tool is used in such a way that instead of deciding you 
like or dislike an idea or something, you do a PMI. 
To acquire this tool students are first given an artificial 
problem by the teacher, for example, "What do you think of 
the suggestion that everyone should wear a badge showing his 
or her mood?". Three minutes are allowed for the whole PMI 
exercise. One minute is spent considering the plus factors, 
one minute is spent considering the minus factors and the 
final minute is spent considering the interesting factors. 
The point of the exercise is to understand and practice PMI 
as a thinking procedure so that it becomes sufficiently 
crystallised in the mind for transfer to other problem-
solving or thinking situations. 
Other similar thinking tools suggested by DeBono 
include: 
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CAF (consider all factors). This tool is useful when you have 
to choose or make a decision since there are always many 
factors to consider. Unless one is careful, some factors will 
easily escape notice and decisions that seemed right at the 
time eventually turn out to be wrong. This tool simply notes 
all possible factors to be considered in decision-making. For 
example, do a CAF on buying a computer. 
C&S (consequences and sequel). This tool is useful in 
thinking about the consequences of a possible action. For 
example, what might happen if ...schools are closed for a 
year. 
AGO (aims, goals, objectives). We often do things as a 
reaction to a situation or out of habit, because everyone 
else is doing it. This tool helps us to be aware that human 
actions often have a purpose, that the human world is not 
entirely random. For example, do an AGO for a library. 
FIP (first important priorities). This tool helps to decide 
which ideas are the most important once they have been 
generated. For example what do you want from your next 
holiday? 
APC (alternatives, possibilities, choices). There are often 
more alternative possibilities in deciding what to do than 
one first thinks and in many cases the most obvious choice is 
not the best one. This tool then helps us to consider 
alternatives. For example, what alternatives do you have if 
your best friend is a racist? 
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OP/ (other point of view). Everyone thinks differently and 
therefore looks at the same situation from their personal 
points of view. What this tool does is help us to consider 
other viewpoints. 
Throughout the programme, the material is tightly 
structured with detailed teaching notes which teachers are 
instructed to follow. Each pupil is given a leaflet with the 
outline of the process that forms the basis of that 
particular lesson. The process itself is mainly geared 
towards something to do or something to look at, since they 
are all attention-directors of one kind or the other. It is 
suggested in the teacher's handbook that during the lessons 
the visual symbols should be used as often as possible in 
order to emphasise the nature of the process at each stage. 
All of the CoRT thinking tools mentioned earlier form 
the foundation for the entire structure of DeBono's programme 
based on a formula that is designed to emphasis the process 
of thinking. The successful student of this method, according 
to DeBono, should be able to use these crystallised skills on 
nearly all practical problems. 
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6.3. Theoretical difficulties with CoRT 
The basic idea behind the CoRT exercises is to get away from 
content by creating artificial scenarios so that the 
operations can become transferable tools. 
Although the programme appears to have a practical 
appeal, one of its major problems is that it seems to lack a 
coherent theoretical framework. This problem is serious 
especially when DeBono is arguing so strongly for the 
programme to be included as a subject. This should lead one 
to expect a very clear idea of what constitutes thinking to 
emerge in his work. To this end, DeBono attempts to produce a 
theoretical framework to underpin his CoRT programme. 
However, the results of his efforts in his numerous books on 
teaching thinking are pervaded by a variety of vague 
definitions of thinking. In his book, the Mechanism of Mind 
DeBono wrote: 
The brain is a system in which things happen according to the system. What 
happens in the brain is information. And the way it happens is thinking (p17-
18). 
What DeBono seems to suggest is that thinking is essentially 
to do with the way information is processed. This notion of 
thinking is again highlighted further on in the book where 
another definition is given as follows: 
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Attention flow is a very important part of information-processing, and probably 
the basis of learning. Attention flow is also thinking (p155). 
If thinking is equivalent to attention flow and the flow of 
attention is a very important part of information processing, 
then for DeBono thinking is all to do with information 
processing. Explaining what thinking is in terms of 
information processing simply reduces thinking to the 
inputting and outputting of information. The essence of this 
view of thinking can be located in the doctrine of the nature 
of mind sometimes called functionalism. 
The central idea of this doctrine is that mental states 
are individuated by their causal roles, in other words mental 
states can be defined in terms of their typical patterns of 
cause and effect. One of the implications of this doctrine is 
that any system, regardless of what it is made of, can have 
mental states if only it exhibits the right causal 
relationship between its inputs, its internal functioning and 
its outputs. Functionalism basically treats the mind as a 
sort of container in which a variety of causal relationships 
occur, and in doing so it fails to account for some of the 
qualitative aspects of mental states. For example, having a 
pain involves certain qualitative experience that cannot be 
captured by merely describing the pain in terms of its causal 
relationships. The issues facing functionalism are part of 
an ongoing debate on the nature of mind mentioned in Chapter 
1. Searle(1994) outlined some of the persisting 
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misconceptions in a detailed discussion of the nature of 
mind. The arguments presented by Searle however will not be 
pursued in this dissertation since it is specifically 
concerned with the teaching of direct thinking as offered by 
DeBono. 
If DeBono is indeed presenting his view of thinking in 
terms of functionalism then the problems associated with such 
a theory of mind stand to undermine his position. But the 
fact is that DeBono does not provide any substantial argument 
in support of his conception of thinking, and instead 
continued to put forward various definitions of thinking in 
his later writings. In his book Teaching Thinking DeBono 
wrote: 
A microscope is a device to enlarge our vision. Thinking is a device to enlarge 
our perception (p20). 
It is not at all clear in which way DeBono is seeking to 
compare thinking with a microscope. If he is viewing thinking 
merely as a physical tool then he needs to indicate precisely 
how thinking can be viewed as such. On the other hand if he 
is referring to the similarities between thinking and 
physical devices, particularly in how they operate, then it 
is important that he shows how the product of thinking and 
that of physical devices can be compared. DeBono provided no 
detailed discussion of his position but declared instead 
that: 
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In this book thinking will be regarded as a sort of internal vision which we 
direct at experience in order to explore, understand and enlarge it (p32). 
By regarding thinking as an "internal vision" as well as a 
"device" DeBono adds confusion to an already difficult 
situation of getting a clearer idea of what his main view of 
thinking really is. Having some sort of vision can be 
considered as having a sort of image or picture, but this is 
different from having a visual device, which is essentially 
an entity. Whereas a visual device is an entity, vision on 
the other hand cannot be so described. For example, a visual 
device such as a microscope is an entity, but visualising the 
colour blue is not an entity. DeBono yet again provides no 
argument in support of his position but instead further 
confusion ensues after another definition is issued as 
follows: 
The definition which will be used here is this: 'Thinking is the deliberate 
exploration of experience for a purpose' (p32). 
But how are we to view 'thinking' in DeBono's latest 
definition of thinking? Are we to take it as meaning a 
'device' or an 'internal vision'? In spite of the fact that 
some of DeBono's claims can be located within the 
functionalist view of the mind, the lack of clarity in his 
writing highlights the incoherence in his theoretical 
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position, and for this reason DeBono's position differs 
significantly from the positions of both Lipman and 
Feuerstein. 
Although there are problems with Lipman's ideas, 
discussed in Chapter 5, his theoretical position is based on 
the nature of philosophical thinking for which he presented 
supporting arguments. In a similar way Feuerstein's programme 
is based on a distinct and coherent psychological theory, 
which will be discussed later in Chapter 7. The vagueness in 
DeBono's definitions and theoretical position is in a way not 
surprising since DeBono appears to want to distance himself 
from the use of logic. 
As a result of his abandonment of logic for symbols and 
diagrams, DeBono is left with the extremely difficult 
situation of providing a consistent theoretical framework for 
his programme. The inadequacies of his definitions as 
presented in his framework make it very difficult to 
ascertain whether his programme delivers the skills of 
thinking directly when it is not clear what he means by 
thinking. DeBono even undermined his own definitions by 
attempting to avoid the whole issue when he wrote in Teaching 
Thinking that: 
It is best not to have any misconceptions and to let the intangible subject of 
thinking gel into something definite and usable in the course of this book 
(p17). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that DeBono attempts to 
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trivialise the difficulties surrounding the notion of 
thinking, since these difficulties are hard to get to grips 
with and have plagued philosophers such as Dewey and Ryle. 
DeBono's difficulties in providing a tangible definition 
of thinking have some impact on how we are to view the 
effectiveness of the activities that his programme offers. To 
this issue we now turn. 
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6.4. Issues concerning the effectiveness of CoRT 
In spite of the unresolved theoretical difficulties, DeBono 
believes as a result of over 25 years of teaching the method 
in both education and the business world that his CoRT method 
is the most productive method in teaching thinking. 
According to DeBono, all CoRT tools are designed to 
heighten the process of thinking rather than the content of 
thinking. Therefore, the successful student of the programme 
should be able to use the tools on all practical and 
theoretical matters. However, in order to do this, the use of 
the tools must be taught in isolation from any content. 
DeBono believes that the use of specific subject matter 
generally associated with the familiar teaching of 
traditional subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, 
history, literature etc actually hinders the development of 
thinking. DeBono put it as follows in Teaching Thinking: 
If a person is thinking about something then surely he is learning how to 
think.' Unfortunately this is not true. A geography teacher would claim that 
in learning geography a pupil would be forced to think. A history teacher and a 
science teacher would make the same claim. All would be right. The question is 
whether thinking about something develops any transferable skill in thinking. 
In 'content' subjects, the momentum of the subject is usually such that little 
attention can be paid to the actual process. Exhortations to 'think about it 
or to consider 'what these things imply' merely ask the pupil to delve more 
deeply into his knowledge and find the right answer. In a content subject you 
cannot really think ahead of the content, because your speculation must always 
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be inferior to the actual facts. There is comparatively little scope for 
thinking except for the hindsight variety: Now you can see that this happened 
because of that and that...' When teachers appear to lead the thinking of their 
pupils towards a new insight the pupils' responses are usually so tightly 
shaped that it is more a matter of guessing what the teacher wants said next 
than of thinking the matter through. This is no fault of the teacher. It is the 
nature of content subjects that is at fault. Content is much more interesting 
than the thinking process. A pupil knows that with a little knowledge and a lot 
of thinking he will not do as well as the pupil who has a lot of knowledge and 
only a little thinking (p.104). 
It is difficult to ascertain what DeBono means here by 'There 
is comparatively little scope for thinking'. In spite of 
this, it is clear that in promoting the CoRT programme as the 
best method for the direct teaching of thinking, DeBono 
regards traditional 'content subjects' as not necessary in 
developing the ability to think. However the discussions in 
Chapters 1 and 2 show that to disregard the importance of 
context in thinking (as a direct result of the object-
relatedness of thinking) is to deny the necessity of 
intentional objects in thinking. This seems to be involved in 
DeBono's rejection of 'thinking about something' in the 
passage quoted. The main content in DeBono's CoRT programme 
is based on imaginary scenarios so that the operations become 
transferable tools. As far as can be judged, we are to 
understand the thinking involved in the engagement of such 
imaginary scenarios as not requiring intentional objects. 
Although the role of group work and discussions is 
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recognised in this programme, nonetheless the teaching 
approach seems to be more consistent with rote learning of 
prescribed techniques than the exploration of ideas, with the 
teacher acting more as an instructor than a sensitive 
facilitator (Blagg,1991). It is interesting to note that this 
is one of the aspects of the traditional content subjects 
that ironically DeBono criticised. The rigid way in which the 
lessons are presented creates virtually no space within the 
CoRT programme for pupils to learn to take on responsibility 
for their own learning and problem solving. 
The pace at which the CoRT lessons should progress is of 
great importance, and to this end teachers are instructed by 
DeBono(1976) in the handbook for teachers to keep up a very 
brisk pace of presentation and questioning as follows: 
It is extremely important that the lessons be run at a brisk, crisp pace. The 
lessons are not general discussion sessions. They are designed to practise 
specific thinking skills. There is no need to say all there is to say about a 
subject or to follow every interesting idea that emerges. Attention should be 
kept firmly focused on the thinking skill that is being practised and not 
allowed to drift to the 'interest' of the discussion content (p.12B). 
While the reason for the time limitation may be 
understandable, there is a concern that only the quickest 
thinking students can adequately contribute in the CoRT 
lessons. Furthermore, how does the programme based on such 
rigid pace account for students whose personalities are such 
that their thinking is slow but of a high quality? 
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Consideration for students of such personalities is largely 
nonexistent since the CoRT programme is solely concerned with 
the quantity and not the quality of ideas. DeBono(1976) 
explains that it is generative thinking that he wishes to 
encourage because: 
Generative thinking is concerned with bringing things about and solving 
problems. Generative thinking is practical, creative and constructive. 
Generative thinking has to deal with the world and take action even if 
knowledge is incomplete (p.16). 
This then forms the reasoning behind DeBono's insistence on 
the brisk pace at which the lessons should proceed. However 
there is a danger in that seeking merely to generate large 
volumes of possible solutions in the end might only help to 
foster a negative kind of attitude in the students with 
regards to taking due care and attention in tackling the 
problems that they encounter inside or outside the imaginary 
format as presented in the CoRT lessons. Although claims by 
DeBono suggest a much wider scope of effectiveness, the 
evidence suggests that the programme is designed to be 
effective only within narrow margins of generative thinking. 
Until the first independent evaluation was carried out by 
Hunter-Grudin(1985) much of the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the CoRT programme was carried out by DeBono 
himself. To claim that the CoRT programme is the most 
effective method for teaching thinking naturally demanded 
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some form of evidence to that effect, and the difficulty in 
producing such evidence from his series of lessons (given the 
flaws in the theoretical underpinnings of the programme) 
culminated in DeBono's attack on those demanding such proof 
as follows: 
The type of person who makes this request is basically doubtful or suspicious 
of the idea of teaching thinking as a skill. The request for proof and 
evaluation would seem to be a very normal one, except that any proof that is 
offered is always deemed to be insufficient. 
'What is the evaluation which shows that children can be taught to think more 
than they are at the moment?' 
'We would like to think that we are teaching them to think, but instead of 
doing this we may be handing them a pre-package.' 
Hard data are judged to be irrelevant or the result of teaching to the test. 
Soft data in the form of teachers' comments are judged to be biased or 
subjective. These objections are valid. But a request to show that teaching 
thinking has changed the life of a pupil over the succeeding twenty years is a 
form of evaluation that could not be applied to subjects such as literature, 
languages, geography, science or history (p.140). 
What we have above, then, is an attempt by DeBono to minimise 
the impact of any negative outcome of the evaluations of his 
experiments. 
DeBono provided examples of eight experiments in his 
book Teaching Thinking. These experiments were based on 
groups with and without CoRT training who were each tested on 
a problem typical of those in the CoRT programme. The result 
150 
then is, not surprisingly, that in all the cases in the 
experiment the group that completed the CoRT lessons produced 
a higher number of ideas in response to the problem. 
The first experiment consisted of eight groups of 
children who were given the following problem to discuss: 
A schoolgirl wants to train to be a teacher. Her father has 
to live abroad for five years because of his work, and her 
mother is going with him. Should the girl go with them or 
stay with relatives or friends so that she can finish school 
and do the training? 
The discussions were tape-recorded and analysed without any 
indication of who was responsible. DeBono reported that the 
four groups who had not undergone the CoRT training 
considered significantly fewer number of aspects of the 
problem than the four groups who had benefited from the CoRT 
lessons, suggesting that the CoRT lessons had resulted in 
improved skills in generating ideas. 
In spite of the impressiveness of the results, there 
still remain a number of questions to be answered. For 
instance, the fact that the groups were asked to solve the 
problem in a typical 'CoRT fashion' may have meant that the 
non-CoRT group were at a disadvantage. Furthermore, what 
evidence was there to indicate that the two groups were 
matched in terms of abilities, experience in group 
discussions and so on? 
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In all of the experiments virtually no information is 
given about the various groups involved and how they were 
selected. It is not clear whether the researcher was also 
involved in teaching the CoRT lessons. The CoRT method raises 
an important issue to do with truth seeking. In that the 
burden of academic study involves the idea of seeking the 
truth, it is difficult to see how DeBono's programme 
encourages the development of such an attitude. On the 
contrary, it appears to discredit such an attitude by 
degrading quality and depth of thinking for mere quantity of 
ideas generated however shallow they may be. The important 
lesson to be drawn from the experiments is that it is not at 
all conclusive to what extent the performance of the CoRT 
trained children in the experiments is a direct result of 
their engagement in the programme. 
Considering the issues so far raised, it is not enough 
for us to take on trust what we are told by DeBono and those 
in favour of the CoRT programme simply because of its 
widespread use and the number of years that the programme has 
been running. If we are to accept DeBono's programme in our 
schools then we must be sure that there is sufficient 
evidence to do so. This brings us to the issue of transfer. 
With regards to skill transfer, which presumably forms 
the greatest asset of the programme, it is doubtful that this 
does occur as claimed by DeBono. Hunter-Grundin's 
comprehensive independent evaluation of the programme 
suggested no substantial evidence of any transfer of learning 
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to other areas of the children's activities. DeBono disputes 
the results by pointing to the study carried out by 
Edwards(1991) in favour of the programme as showing 
"significant effects on a wide variety of standardised test". 
DeBono's website (2002)(www.edwDeBono.com) presents a large 
collection of unpublished material in support of the 
programme. Let us now turn to Hunter-Grundin's study. 
6.4.1. Hunter-Grundin's evaluation of CoRT 
Hunter-Grundin's (1985) evaluation of DeBono's CoRT programme 
is based on a large and independent study of the 
effectiveness of CoRT materials. The study was carried out in 
Cambridgeshire, England and it involved ten schools over a 
period of two years. The assessment instruments used in the 
evaluation involved six different sets of tests as follows; 
Reading comprehension(Reading for Meaning), Mental 
arithmetic(Problem Solving), Logical reasoning(Reasoning 
Ability), Creativity, CoRT essays I&2, Recorded group 
discussions. The tests were administered at the beginning and 
end of each of the two academic years over which the study 
took place. Instruments such as Reading comprehension, Mental 
arithmetic and Logical reasoning involved multiple choice 
questions, while the rest of the instruments involved written 
responses for which the personal judgement of the marker is 
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required. 
The major difficulty that the study faced was finding 
appropriate tests to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
programme. The use of the tests mentioned above raises issues 
about their validity and reliability in evaluating a thinking 
skills programme. The problem with using multiple choice 
questions was indicated in the discussion of Lipman's 
programme in Chapter 5. The banality of such formats assumes 
that there is only one right answer to a question for which 
pupils have the choice of answering rightly or wrongly. On 
the other hand, using an open-ended written format leads 
inevitably to the production of responses that require the 
assessment to be based on personal judgement. Glover (1989) 
highlighted some of the issues with the assessment of 
creativity in general. One reason for the unlikelihood of 
finding a method of assessment that is free from the problems 
mentioned above is the complex nature of thinking highlighted 
in the first part of the dissertation. 
In spite of these shortcomings, some of which Hunter-
Grundin appears to acknowledge, the study, as already 
indicated, still concluded that the teaching of the CoRT 
programme does not necessarily result in the transfer of 
skills of thinking as envisaged by DeBono. The importance of 
the study is not so much to do with the final conclusions 
that were reached, for the conclusions as discussed above 
were produced by methods that are by no means unproblematic 
in testing creativity. Instead, it exposes some of the major 
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educational problems with the CoRT programme. For example 
giving teachers substantial training is not considered 
extremely vital, teachers are left with no sense of the kind 
of theory underpinning the programme, both teachers and 
pupils are required to strictly follow the programme's 
guidelines and teaching method, thus promoting rote learning 
(Blagg,1991). Let us now turn to the study by Edwards which 
DeBono cited in defence of his programme against Hunter-
Grundin's findings. 
6.4.2. Edwards on the CoRT method. 
According to Edwards (1991), his study is the third and most 
comprehensive in a series of studies undertaken to uncover 
the effects of DeBono's CoRT thinking skills programme. The 
study was carried out over a period of five weeks involving 
seven primary school classes from various schools in North 
Queensland, Australia. The treatment group consisted of four 
classes and each were taught the 10 lessons of the CoRT- 1 
programme by their teachers who were exposed briefly to the 
programme (a total of about three hours) and thereafter were 
left to work on their own from the programme's Teacher's 
Notes. Both treatment and control classes underwent a 
battery of tests in a pre and post-test design. On the basis 
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of these tests Edwards concluded that there is evidence of 
"potential transfer" of CoRT skills to performance in 
academic disciplines. 
Can we take Edwards's study as providing clear evidence 
of "potential transfer" of CoRT skills across academic 
disciplines? Prior to listing the various tests used in his 
study, Edwards highlighted the difficulty of testing for the 
effectiveness of thinking skills programmes. In order to 
overcome such drawbacks new instruments were designed 
specifically to test the programme in addition to well known 
ones such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator ( The Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator is a self-reporting inventory which 
classifies people into dichotomous categories along each of 
four dimensions: extraversion-introversion, sensation-
intuition, thinking-feeling, and judgement-perception. See 
Stricker (1963) for a full description and evaluation of this 
test) and Torrance Tests (verbal form A) (The Torrance test 
is used in the assessment of creative endeavour based on 
three categories: Fluency ( the ability to generate new 
ideas), Flexibility (the ability to represent a variety of 
categories), and Originality (the ability to generate unusual 
ideas. See Glover et al(1989)). The new instruments included 
Self-Concept as a Thinker(SCAT), Student Thinking 
Assessment(STA), Thinking Approaches Questionnaire(TAQ). An 
initial problem in presenting his research findings is that 
Edwards provided very little information on these new 
instruments and it is not clear whether they were designed 
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solely by Edwards or in collaboration with DeBono. More 
importantly it is difficult to ascertain what some of these 
instruments are testing. For example in the Thinking 
Approaches Questionnaire instrument students are asked to 
self-assess their thinking approaches in areas covered 
specifically by CoRT, but this is indeed confusing since one 
of the main aims of the programme is to get away from any 
content specific material. Edwards did not indicate how these 
tests were administered and the kind of scoring procedure 
that was applied. The fact that the responses to questions 
on the questionnaire are open-ended due to the nature of what 
is being tested (i.e divergent thinking) means that 
considerable subjectivity will occur in evaluating how 
creative or original the answers to test problems might be. 
As already highlighted in the discussion of Hunter-Grundin's 
study, the attempt to test for the effectiveness of thinking 
skills programme suggests that it is unlikely that 
unproblematic tests can be devised without any compromise. 
In concluding that the CoRT programme is effective in 
teaching and transferring thinking skills, Edwards overlooked 
some of the difficulties that are generally associated with 
the use of the Myers-Briggs and Torrance Tests in assessing 
divergent thinking. For example evaluations of both the 
Myers-Briggs test (Stricker,1963) and Torrance Tests (Law, 
1990) concluded that these psychological tests are not by 
any means totally effective in testing divergent thinking, as 
a result of the considerable subjectivity involved in such 
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thinking. What these issues suggest is that there are major 
problems with Edwards's research and for that reason DeBono's 
use of it to defend his CoRT programme can only provide an 
inaccurate impression of the effectiveness of his programme. 
6.5. Summarising DeSono's CoRT programme 
The level of effectiveness that DeBono claims for his CoRT 
programme raises questions concerning the evidence for such 
claims. As indicated in the earlier sections of this chapter, 
there are major problems with CoRT as presented by DeBono. 
DeBono so far has not provided any coherent theoretical 
basis for this CoRT programme. Although some supporters might 
not view this lack of coherence as a major drawback for the 
successful implementation of the programme, the fact is that 
having a coherent theoretical basis is important in providing 
a deeper understanding of the programme and the appropriate 
ways for its application in education. 
The polymorphous nature of thinking as discussed in Part 
One of the dissertation clearly underlines the problems 
raised in viewing thinking purely as a skill and trying to 
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teach it as demonstrated in the CoRT programme. For the same 
reason the studies carried out to test for the effectiveness 
of CoRT have been unable to provide valid and conclusive 
evidence in favour of the programme. What these studies such 
as Hunter-Grundin's have done is highlight the shortcomings 
of the programme in how it aims to achieve its goal. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INSTRUMENTAL ENRICHMENT 
7.1. Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment(FIE) 
In contrast to both Lipman's and DeBono's programmes 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, Reuven Feuerstein's programme 
is more closely associated with psychological theory. 
Feuerstein developed his programme out of his concern 
for the integration of young Jewish people in Israel. These 
young Jews held in transit in Morocco and southern France 
originated from many deprived cultures in Europe, Asia and 
Africa. The fact that these Jews were being received, settled 
and schooled for citizenship in a new Jewish nation with a 
unique and modern technological culture required that tests 
of some sort had to be used. Consequently, tests of various 
psychological kinds were administered as a basis for planning 
their formal education later in Israel. 
Feuerstein's clinical observation and experience with 
the methods of measurements available for testing and 
classifying these young people indicated that a substantial 
wealth of capacities was often left out. Feuerstein's effort 
to address this problem led to a radical shift from the 
static method of a testing regime that only tested what these 
young people had already learnt to a more dynamic approach in 
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which the testing situation itself was transformed into a 
learning experience for them. This dynamic approach as 
demonstrated in the Learning Potential Assessment 
Device(1979) culminated in the development of the formal 
instructional programme known as Feuerstein's Instrumental 
Enrichment (FIE). 
FIE is presented as a strategy for the redevelopment of 
cognitive structure in the retarded performer. At the core of 
this conception of a retarded cognitive performance, 
according to Feuerstein, is the phenomenon of cultural 
deprivation, defined as a "state of reduced cognitive 
modifiability of the individual in response to direct 
exposure to sources of stimulation". Feuerstein's notion of 
cultural deprivation is not directly determined by factors 
such as emotional disturbance, low socio-economic status, 
poverty or even by organic disorders, but instead, by the 
lack of a mediated learning experience. This lack may arise 
as a result of parents not providing it in the early years of 
the child's cognitive development. Feuerstein believes that 
his Instrumental Enrichment programme based on the theory of 
mediated learning experience is capable of reversing the 
conditions of retarded cognitive performance as experienced 
by the culturally deprived. 
The programme is based on the fundamental idea that it 
is the learner rather than the material to be learned that 
should be modified. In his book Instrumental Enrichment, 
Feuerstein pointed out that: 
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The aim of the Feuerstein Instrumental Enrichment (FIE) program is to change 
the overall cognitive structure of the retarded performer by transforming his 
passive and dependent cognitive style into that characteristic of an autonomous 
and independent thinker. It is our view that both the low level of scholastic 
achievement and the low level of general cognitive adaptation of the retarded 
performer, especially among socioculturally disadvantaged adolescents, are a 
product of a lack of, or inefficient use, of those functions that are the 
prerequisites to adequate thinking (p.1). 
Feuerstein's belief that the human intellect is highly 
adaptable and modifiable at all ages and stages of 
development underpinned his entire approach to the 
development of the programme, which emerged from his theory 
of the relationship of early mediated learning experience and 
later cognitive competence. 
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7.2. The theoretical foundation of FIE 
Feuerstein's work on changing cognitive abilities by his 
Instrumental Enrichment programme was developed in the 1960s 
and Jean Piaget, with whom he had studied, was a major 
inspiration. Piaget's work on intelligence demonstrated that 
the essence of intellectual capacity lies not in its measured 
product as presented in IQ tests but in its active 
construction by the individual. Piaget's work helped to 
undermine the dominant view that intellectual capacity is 
fixed at birth, and in so doing shifted attention from the 
static concept of IQ towards a more dynamic process-oriented 
approach to understanding cognition. It is upon this dynamic 
process that Feuerstein's work is based. 
Mediated learning experience (MLE) provides the 
theoretical basis for Feuerstein's programme. MLE refers to 
the way in which stimuli emitted by the outside world are 
transformed by a mediator. A mediator is any knowledgeable 
adult who shapes the way the child perceives the world. 
Mediators are usually made up of parents and significant 
others in the life of the child such as grandparents, 
siblings, teachers, caregivers etc. Feuerstein argues that 
mediators are not simply sources of stimulation for the child 
but, more importantly, control the stimuli a child receives 
and in so doing help to structure the child's universe in the 
image of their own. Through this process of mediation the 
cognitive structure of the child is generally affected. In a 
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mediated learning experience the mediator intervenes between 
the child and the environment and in so doing transforms and 
organises the stimuli in the direction of some specifically 
intended goal or purpose. 
The place of mediators in the cognitive development of 
the child highlights the importance of culture in mediation. 
In other words cultural identity is transmitted to the child 
through the mediator. Indeed the theory views the absence of 
such cultural identity as a condition that is produced by a 
lack of MLE. For Feuerstein MLE can be considered as the main 
factor that determines the varying courses of cognitive 
development in otherwise similarly endowed individuals, even 
when they are subjected to similar conditions of stimulation. 
Feuerstein's ideas are groundbreaking, and it is in the 
conception of MLE that he differs from Piaget. Whereas 
Piaget's(1966) model of cognitive development emphasised the 
stimulus-organism-response formula, Feuerstein maintains 
that cognitive development in the human race is critically 
affected by human mediation, thus changing Piaget's formula 
from stimulus-organism-response to stimulus-human-organism-
response. 
Feuerstein presents MLE in terms of input, elaboration 
and output of data, which invokes a particular kind of model 
of the mind. If we view Feuerstein's theory of MLE as an 
information-processing model based on the input of 
information by the mediating adult and the subsequent desired 
output by the child, then what we are led to is the view that 
164 
the mind is a computer programme and the brain a digital 
computer, which can be repaired when faults occur. The 
problem with viewing the mind on a computer model is that it 
raises larger and central questions (Searle,1992) in the 
field of philosophy of mind, as already indicated in the 
first part of the dissertation. It is not the intention to 
discuss these problems in detail but merely to highlight a 
possible source of problems for Feuerstein's theory of MLE. 
Feuerstein views MLE as an essential determinant of 
cognitive modifiability that enables individuals to make 
efficient use of their experience. In other words it produces 
in the individual the tendency to develop strategies of how 
to learn by equipping him or her with the necessary cognitive 
tools. According to Feuerstein the ill effects of the lack of 
MLE, which may be conceptualised as the deprivation of the 
individual of the prerequisites of higher mental processes do 
not have the permanent, stable, and irreversible 
characteristics usually attributed to the neurophysiological 
organisation of the individual. Feuerstein offers his 
enrichment programme as a method of reversing the lack of 
MLE. Thus the assumption is that FIE is an enduring form of 
MLE by which the instruments provide the opportunities for 
the cognitive improvement of the retarded performer. However, 
further clarification is required on how the individual 
instruments in FIE contribute to the general improvement of 
cognition, and more importantly why these individual 
instruments were chosen. 
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Feuerstein's instruments are derived from his Learning 
Potential Assessment Device (LPAD), which attempts to produce 
fairer interpretations of intelligence test results by 
rejecting what Blagg(1991) referred to as "culture free" 
intelligence tests. For Feuerstein it is the child's peaks of 
performance and the conditions of their appearance that 
provide the key objects for the child's cognitive 
examination. Consequently the use of traditional measures as 
in formal test circumstances is seen as restricting the 
mediator's flexibility to assist the child to perform at the 
highest possible level. Feuerstein's method (as presented in 
the instruments) sacrifices quantitative measures of learning 
potential for deeper and better qualitative data, but this 
presents a serious problem in terms of the objectivity of its 
method of assessment, since it depends not only on the 
mediator's intimate understanding and interpretation of the 
child's responses but also on the mediator's ability to 
mediate effectively. Furthermore the tasks contained in the 
instruments are very similar in their content and 
presentation to formal intelligence and aptitude tests and as 
such it is not clear how effective these instruments are. 
According to Feuerstein the construction of the 
individual instruments of the programme is based on a 
cognitive map that aids in the categorisation and definition 
of the components of mental acts. The cognitive map is meant 
to be a model that covers seven dimensions)  by which a mental 
1 	
The seven dimensions are made up of the following Content, Mode, Operation, Phase, 
166 
act can be analysed. The issue this raises is that what 
constitutes normal cognitive behaviour is not commonly agreed 
upon and so it is not clear on what basis Feuerstein chose 
these seven dimensions as fundamental to the analysis of the 
cognitive behaviour of the retarded performer. A possible 
consequence of this is that the instruments offer no more 
than mere psychological tests with little prospect of 
transfer across subject domains. For example, how does the 
first instrument known as Organisation of Dots, which 
involves the drawing of geometrical shapes such as squares 
and triangles from a collection of dots (to be discussed 
fully in the next section), contribute to the improvement of 
cognition? For Feuerstein this instrument introduces a 
structure according to a given standard and the opportunity 
for the projection of virtual relations, which is a 
fundamental component of cognition. However Feuerstein makes 
no strong claims about the uniqueness of this instrument 
except that it is one of many tools for the improvement of 
cognition. This suggests that tests of similar nature can be 
employed. 
The Organisation of Dots is mathematical in spirit, and 
so if it can provide such a vital component of cognition we 
can assume that replacing the Organisation of Dots with other 
appropriate mathematical tests such as finding solutions to 
arithmetic or algebraic problems will leave the outcome 
expected by Feuerstein unchanged. If this is possible, then 
Complexity, Level of Abstraction and Level of Efficiency 
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what remains to be answered is why does Feuerstein use 
Organisation of Dots? A possible clue (Feuerstein,1980) is 
that this instrument is derived from a test designed and used 
by Andre Rey, one of Feuerstein's influential teachers, as a 
selective device for trainees seeking technical vocations and 
professionals requiring spatial skills. Clearly there are 
some theoretical concerns about FIE, but in spite of these 
issues the social aspect of learning that is built into MLE 
provides a powerful idea. 
In highlighting the importance of the social context of 
learning, Feuerstein's theory of MLE is similar to the ideas 
proposed by Lev Vygotsky on the cognitive development of the 
child. A central theme in Vygotsky's(1978) writing is that a 
child's development cannot be understood independently of the 
external social world which the child inhabits. Vygotsky 
argued that human learning presupposes a specific social 
nature and a process of participation by which children 
develop into the intellectual life of those close to them. In 
other words, through participation in activities with others 
children come to acquire cognitive, social and communicative 
skills that help them to function in socially acceptable ways 
within their culture. 
The importance of culture and social interaction in the 
intellectual development of the child underpins the highly 
influential Vygotskian concept called the zone of proximal 
development. This "zone" is essentially the distance between 
the child's independent capacity and the capacity to perform 
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in collaboration with or under the guidance of an experienced 
person. The role of culture and social interaction clearly 
highlights the striking similarities between Vygotsky's zone 
of proximal development and Feuerstein's MLE regardless of 
the interesting fact that both psychologists were writing 
from what can be assumed to be very different political 
perspective. Vygotsky wrote mainly from a socialist 
perspective. Feuerstein's writing on the other hand emanates 
from a democratic perspective. Although both theories are 
directed towards the understanding of the cognitive 
development of the child there is an important difference in 
the immediate aims of the two psychologists. Vygotsky's 
theory concerns the general relation between learning and 
development and the specific features of this relationship 
when children reach school age, while Feuerstein's on the 
other hand is directed specifically towards the cognitive 
rehabilitation of the mentally retarded. 
The attractiveness of Feuerstein's idea, which involves 
the interaction between mediator and child, rests on the 
notion that concepts and solutions do not emerge from a 
vacuum but are based on values and belief systems. For 
Feuerstein, such values and belief systems are fundamental to 
effective thinking, and underpinning his programme is the 
belief that all human beings of any age, however badly 
disabled, from whatever cause, can become truly effective 
thinkers. Feuerstein's programme promises to provide a remedy 
for specific cognitive deficiencies, and to promote maximum 
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transfer of skills gained to wider areas of opportunity as 
presented both formally and informally to the retarded 
performer. But how does the programme attempt to deliver such 
promise? 
7.3. How FIE works 
In order to liberate the potential of the retarded performer 
by the enhancement of their prerequisites of thinking, 
Feuerstein suggests the use of the special activities or 
instruments contained in his programme as a source of the 
much needed intellectual nourishment. 
The various components of the programme are called 
"instruments" as it is addressed not to any specific skill or 
content area but to the "process of learning itself". In 
other words, the contents around which each instrument is 
built serve only as a vehicle for the development of 
thinking. In Instrumental Enrichment, Feuerstein wrote: 
The content of an instrument is only a vehicle and is considered as secondary 
to the main goal, which is the acquisition of prerequisites of thinking 
(p.119). 
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What Feuerstein seeks to achieve is to facilitate the 
acquisition of certain basic habits such as planning, 
systematic analysis, keeness, attentivness etc through his 
very rich and ingenious materials. For Feuerstein, the 
acquisition of these basic habits is a process of learning 
characterised by three phases of mental acts as follows: 
1) Gathering information(Input) phase builds up the capacity 
to gather and organise information. 
2) Processing information(Elaboration) phase is the period 
when things are thought through. 
3)Expressing information as solutions(Output) phase involves 
the way in which thinking is communicated. 
By paying attention to these learning characteristics, 
Feuerstein believes that the low attainment of retarded 
performers caused primarily by the lack of mediation can be 
corrected. 
The Instruments of the programme are made up of 15 
components introduced and managed by teachers as a series of 
paper-and-pencil exercises involving materials for one-hour 
lessons, between 3-5 times a week, for 2-3 years. In the 
programme, each exercise is followed by discussions to prompt 
insight and applications to other areas of learning. These 
instruments are not set materials but instead are systematic 
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guides to imaginative teaching. Each instrument focuses on a 
specific cognitive deficiency and provides a learning 
experience to rectify it, hence each instrument is selected 
to fit identified deficiencies. The instruments include the 
following: 
Organisation of Dots 
Orientation in space I 
Orientation in space II 
Orientation in space III 
Comparison 
Analytic Perception 
Categorization 
Family Relations 
Temporal Relations 
Numerical Progression 
Instructions 
Syllogisms 
Transitive Relations 
Representational Stencil Design 
Illustrations 
These instruments form the foundation upon which the various 
exercises in the programme are based. 
In the Organisation of Dots exercise, for example, the 
pupil is presented with what seems like random arrays of dots 
(representing various geometrical shapes). The task is to 
find and trace out these shapes. The aim of this exercise is 
to help train pupils to plan and search systematically, to 
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formulate their own hypotheses, to perceive clearly and 
create their own order and information. 
The Orientation in space instruments are designed to 
help pupils identify relationships between objects. For 
example, in one task the pupil is asked to either stick or 
draw a picture of a boy in the middle of a garden scene, then 
decide which of the objects in the picture, for example 
flowers, treebench, house, is right, left, in front of or 
behind the boy. 
Similarly the instrument called Comparison gives pupils 
the opportunity to compare and contrast objects. The 
exercises involve the comparison of two items, starting with 
size, form, number, spatial and temporal concepts and 
concluding with abstract concepts such as function, 
composition etc. 
Feuerstein's programme is based on a limited range of 
tasks free from the traditional school curriculum content. 
According to Feuerstein this is necessary in order to allow 
the child to focus attention on the process of thinking and 
not to be distracted by the "clutter" created by content. 
7.4. Comments on the effectiveness of FIE 
In developing his programme as discussed in section 7.3 
Feuerstein attempts to produce context-free tasks in order to 
help the child from being distracted by the contexts of 
curriculum subjects. In view of this position it is difficult 
to establish how Feuerstein accounts for the object-
relatedness of thinking as already discussed in Chapters 1 
and 2. 
There is clearly no dispute that the programme was 
developed specifically for people with special educational 
needs as a result of their learning difficulties. However, 
given this initial reason for the development of the 
programme, a number of questions remain to be answered. 
(1) Is the programme successful in achieving what it 
considers to be its main goal, i.e providing a remedy for the 
deficiencies of the mentally retarded performer? 
(2) Is it appropriate to extend such a programme to the wider 
population of normal school children? 
In order to comment on (1) and (2), it would be helpful to 
look at the results of some of the studies carried out to 
test the effectiveness of the programme. 
The initial result of the evaluation of the programme 
conducted by Feuerstein involving a population of socially 
disadvantaged and culturally deprived low achieving 
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adolescents unsurprisingly confirmed the benefits of the 
programme for the group. Since then, there have been a number 
of studies into the effects of the programme on participants. 
In Britain, encouraging claims with regard to the benefits of 
the programme have been made by a number of studies on the 
effect of the programme. However, as we shall observe from 
some of these studies, there is still relatively little 
convincing evidence to substantiate the claims for the 
programme particularly in terms of (2) above. We now turn to 
two of these studies. 
7.4.1. "Making up our Minds" 
'Making up our minds' was what Weller and Craft(1980) called 
their exploratory study on the effectiveness of FIE in UK 
schools. The study was one of the largest of its kind in 
Britain to evaluate the effects of the programme. It involved 
five local education authorities (LEA), from which a total of 
eighteen institutions participated with about 36 teachers and 
over 250 pupils (some pupils had some form of learning 
difficulties) between the ages of 11-15 years. The schools 
ranged from special units to large comprehensive schools. 
Most of the pupils studied the materials from the programme 
for 2-3 hours a week over a period of two years. The teachers 
involved in the study were trained by a series of two five- 
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day residential courses. Weller and Craft reported initial 
scepticism among the teachers in that "some of the teachers 
were highly dubious" about the study. However, they later 
claimed that the situation improved during the course of the 
study. 
The diversity of the participating institutions 
highlights the assumption that FIE can be applied to any 
group of pupils. However, in view of the fact that the 
programme was designed specifically to aid children with 
cognitive problems it is not clear how FIE can be of value to 
pupils within the various institutions with normal to 
excellent cognitive development. The difficulty in providing 
unequivocal evidence in support of the effectiveness of the 
programme and its value to all pupils presents a serious 
problem in extending the programme beyond its original 
purpose. 
The main source of data for the evaluation of the 
programme was comments made by pupils and teachers and 
classroom observations by a group of independent evaluators. 
Weller and Craft admitted that the use of quantitative data 
was considered useful but little valuable test data emerged 
form the study. This is not surprising because, as 
anticipated in Chapter 1, monitoring changes in terms of the 
effectiveness of thinking is very likely to result in 
intractable problems due to its polymorphous nature. Weller 
and Craft were explicit in conceding the fact that there are 
no acceptable methods for assessing the acquisition of 
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cognitive skills and their transfer across various subject 
domains. The fact that the study depended heavily on the use 
of 'soft data', i.e comments and anecdotes, clearly confirms 
the difficult problem inherent in the measurement of the 
desired cognitive skills. The question that this difficulty 
raises is whether these skills, and in particular, their 
transferability can be effectively measured by formal tests. 
As already indicated in the previous sections of the current 
Chapter, the programme was derived from Feuerstein's Learning 
Potential Assessment Device (LPAD), which attempts to measure 
intelligence in a dynamic way. In other words it tries to say 
something about the cognitive potential of the retarded 
performer and as such it is difficult to quantify 
observations and changes that take place. The fact that LPAD 
was developed as a result of the inadequacy of rigid formal 
tests in assessing intelligence brings it directly in 
opposition to such tests. Consequently their use in 
ascertaining the effectiveness of FIE is unlikely to yield 
sensible or accurate results. 
Although nearly all the teachers involved were sure that 
the programme greatly enhanced their own professional 
development (this may well be due to the insights offered by 
the programme into teaching and learning perspectives), they 
were not entirely convinced about the value of the programme 
for pupils. Many of the teachers suggested that class sizes 
of at most ten pupils are needed for effective mediation. 
This suggestion highlights one of the most important aspects 
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of the programme: its original purpose in dealing with 
retarded performers on a more or less one-to-one basis. The 
study concluded that there was little hard evidence on the 
effect of FIE on pupils' cognitive development and school 
achievement. In fact, nearly half of all the pupils in the 
study responded in the negative or were unsure when asked if 
the programme they had undergone was useful in their other 
lessons. Although the study was inconclusive, claims were 
nevertheless made about the hope of a promising tool that 
Instrumental Enrichment has to offer teachers. We now turn to 
another large-scale study to establish the effectiveness of 
the programme. 
7.4.2. "Can we teach intelligence?" 
This large scale evaluation study carried out over a period 
of two years was reported by Blagg(1991). The motivation for 
it came from the exploratory study reported by Weller and 
Craft discussed in section 7.4.1 above and it promises to 
provide a more rigorous evaluation of FIE. The study was a 
British government-based initiative designed to explore the 
possibilities of improving the educational opportunities for 
14-16 year-old low-attaining pupils (in relation to the 
public examinations) in mainstream education, thus extending 
FIE beyond its original use. 
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The success of the study clearly depends on the kinds of 
appropriate tests that are employed, and in searching for the 
right assessment methods Blagg noted that it was difficult to 
devise "appropriate, accurate, and reliable procedures" to 
test the success of the programme. The lack of appropriate 
methods of assessing the effectiveness of the programme 
presents an important and persisting problem. As already 
encountered in our discussion of Weller and Craft's study in 
section 7.4.1, the use of traditional cognitive assessment 
methods of testing and evaluating are problematic because FIE 
attempts to influence the cognitive development of the 
learner in a dynamic way whereas most standardised tests 
evaluate the products of learning. In spite of these 
important limitations, a battery of standardised assessment 
tools was used to assess the effects of the programme on the 
pupils involved. Clearly the use of inadequate tools can only 
compromise the study and weaken the conclusions that are 
finally reached on the effects of the programme. The study 
relied on the use of questionnaires as the predominant method 
by which data was collected from teachers. 
The final conclusion of the study found little 
quantifiable evidence to suggest that the programme had a 
positive effect on the attainment of the pupils who were 
involved. There was no evidence, in particular, to suggest 
that the programme produced any improvement in their 
cognitive skills. Although there was some evidence of 
positive changes to pupils' self-esteem, the changes were 
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found to be as much a function of the whole school 
environment and the effectiveness of particular teachers 
involved in the study. 
For the teachers involved in the study, it was reported 
that the programme prompted them to reflect on how pupils 
think and learn as a result of the examination of their 
individual roles as mediators of children's intellectual 
development. However, the teachers were concerned about the 
relevance of the programme for the pupils. 
In considering the conclusions of the study, it is 
important to emphasize the limitations of the various 
standardised tests and their impact on the conclusions 
reached. However, there is no suggestion that FIE is highly 
effective in mainstream education. 
Although Blagg acknowledged the potential of the 
programme in improving cognitive skills, he concluded that 
while the pupils in the study became more conscious of these, 
there was little evidence to suggest that the pupils became 
more able to apply them outside the context of the programme. 
Blagg observed that the key issue with the programme is its 
failure to teach for transfer. In spite of the fact that 
Feuerstein deliberately sought to prevent "clutter" (i.e 
subject content) in the programme, teaching the prerequisite 
to thinking through a medium of abstract tasks that are 
contextually stripped bare presented problems of its own, as 
Blagg noted in his study as follows: 
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During the course of this study, pupils certainly became more competent in 
tasks, like searching for geometric shapes in amorphous clouds of dots. 
Unfortunately, the skills and strategies exposed by these tasks often remained 
steadfastly tied to those artificial contexts. The bridging process at the end 
of each lesson did not always work. Even with appropriate provocation and help, 
some pupils were unable to identify important elements in their learning and 
consider where else they might apply. Moreover, some teachers were less 
resourceful in prompting pupils to think of various literal or figural transfer 
situations. In other words, some pupils and teachers were "stuck in the dots 
and the triangles."(p135). 
What is clear from the study, given that it was intended as a 
highly detailed and searching evaluation of the programme, is 
that it confirmed the restricted application of FIE. 
7.5. Is FIE appropriate for all pupils? 
In spite of the lack of suitable tools to measure the 
effectiveness of FIE, the two studies discussed in the 
previous sections have both drawn conclusions that point to 
the restricted application of FIE to children with special 
educational needs. Between these two large-scale studies 
funded by local LEAs and controlled by government 
administrative officers and advisers there have also been 
small-scale independent studies. 
Shayer and Beasley(1987) carried out a small scale 
evaluation study of the programme over a period of two years. 
The study initially involved one teacher and a single class 
of twenty 12-13 year-olds low-attaining pupils in a 
comprehensive school. The focus group of ten pupils were 
withdrawn from their regular class for three lessons a week 
of Instrumental Enrichment lessons conducted by a trained 
Instrumental Enrichment teacher for the duration of the 
study. In this study, as in the studies already discussed, 
finding suitable measures to test the effectiveness of the 
programme proved difficult, so some adaptations had to be 
made to various standardised tests to give a quantitative 
record of change. This raises questions about the validity of 
the test results. Reporting on the result of their study, the 
authors noted evidence of substantial effects on the 
participants' abilities to process new data or information. 
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However, they also noted little evidence to suggest that the 
gains were readily transferred into improved general 
achievement in school. 
The studies discussed so far have all been unable to 
present substantial evidence beyond reasonable doubt that 
Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment programme is effective 
across all age and ability ranges. 
Although the positive evidence that the studies claim 
tends to be patchy, some researchers are so desperate to 
confirm the worthiness of the programme that they are 
prepared to take small signs of changes they noticed as 
evidence of the success of the programme. Shayer and Beasley, 
for instance, insisted that the evidence they found was 
enough to justify the time spent over the study. Such claims 
only raise questions about the objectivity of the 
researchers. 
Burden(1987) argues that the effectiveness of the 
programme is often weakened because studies carried out so 
far pay marginal attention to the conditions within which the 
programme should be delivered. For example, the programme 
should be delivered by specially trained teachers with 
thorough understanding of its theoretical foundation to 
specially chosen groups of adolescents under favourable 
conditions. These conditions would at least include a 
positive introduction of the programme into the school 
curriculum and a favourable environment for the transfer of 
acquired skills to other subject areas. 
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The difficulty in providing the conditions highlighted 
by Burden particularly with regards to mainstream 
comprehensive education (for example having the resources) 
are much more formidable than the lack of attention and due 
care that Burden suggests research studies are failing to 
address. The fact that the transfer of strategies to other 
subject areas forms one of the major goals of FIE implies 
that the programme can only be judged to be successful when 
this is achieved. But since this will involve major 
organisational changes in schools, for example providing a 
time-table slot for the programme lessons in addition to the 
teaching of the traditional subjects, this can only lead to a 
major disruption to an already overcrowded school day. 
In the light of such difficult problems, it is important 
that we bear in mind what the programme was specifically 
designed to do, for whom, and whether it is appropriate to 
use it beyond its limited area of operation. Head and 
O'Neill(1999) provide an example of the restricted 
application of the programme. Their experiment involved six 
pupils in a special school for children with social, 
emotional and behavioural difficulties. Head and O'Neill ran 
the programme for twenty weeks and reported encouraging 
results in the academic performance of the pupils. 
Feuerstein's ideas have provided major encouragement to 
researchers such as Adey and Shayer(1994) in their attempt to 
find appropriate methods of intervention in the cognitive 
development of pupils. Adey and Shayer's work resulted in 
what they called Cognitive Acceleration through Science 
Education (CASE), and this will form the topic of our 
discussion in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
COGNITIVE ACCELERATION THROUGH SCIENCE EDUCATION 
8.1. Rationale for the programme 
The rationale for the development of CASE (Cognitive 
Acceleration through Science Education) programme arose 
from the need to address issues concerning the low academic 
standards in schools and colleges since the end of the 
Second World War. CASE is a content-dependent cognitive 
intervention programme based on Piaget's analysis of 
cognition. In developing the programme Adey and 
Shayer(1993) adopted a Piagetian approach as this 
characterised "higher order thinking skills". They wrote: 
We started from this viewpoint that the possibility of teaching general 
thinking skills was worth pursuing and the viewpoint that what has 
recently been referred to as "higher order thinking skills"(Resnick, 1987) 
is well characterised by Inhelder and Piaget's descriptions of formal 
operations (p.3). 
Although Adey and Shayer acknowledge that there are 
difficulties associated with the validity of the Inhelder- 
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Piaget account of formal operations, they nevertheless 
insisted that in the main the characteristic performances 
of children on the Inhelder-Piaget tasks have always 
replicated the original findings and can be treated as a 
"fact requiring explanation." These considerations formed 
the basis upon which the development of the programme was 
carried out for over 15 years. 
The aim of the programme is to accelerate pupils' 
cognitive development to the level of formal operational 
thinking such that they can engage successfully with the 
instructional objectives of the traditional curriculum. 
According to the developers, they chose to set the design 
of their activities in a scientific context and used the 
schemata of formal operations as a guiding framework for a 
number of "micro-political" reasons. The "micro-political" 
reasons Adey and Shayer gave included their own familiarity 
with the foundations of science teaching, the cognitive 
mismatch between demands made by various science curricula 
and the abilities of average secondary school pupils, the 
interest shown by the science teaching community in the 
experimentation with learning theories, and finally the 
fact that the very scientific nature of Inhelder and 
Piaget's schemata of formal operations made it much easier 
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for the theory to be considered favourably by science 
teachers than teachers of languages. 
The course materials entitled Teaching Science are 
aimed at encouraging the development of thinking from 
concrete to formal operations. In particular, they are 
designed to help pupils develop confidence in scientific 
thinking from level 5 upwards of the National Curriculum. 
The learning materials originally consisted of 30 
activities but have since been increased to 32 activities 
to be taught over a period of two years to 11/12+ year 
pupils of average ability. The activities, each lasting 
about 60-70 minutes, target some aspect of formal 
operational thinking in a gradual and systematic way. The 
activities generally begin with some concrete preparation 
on the chosen topic, then develop through to problems 
requiring high level thinking. The initial activities focus 
on the control and exclusion of variables, and then they 
progress to ratio and proportionality, probability and 
correlation, compensation and equilibrium, use of formal 
models and so on. Both teacher and pupil worksheets with 
specific examples accompany each activity. 
The teacher's role in these activities is considered 
to be of great importance for the success of the programme. 
Consequently the developers suggest that training specific 
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to the delivery of the programme is essential for CASE 
teachers. 
Adey and Shayer(1993, 1994) reported very striking 
results after evaluating the impact of CASE on the GCSE 
grades of pupils who participated in the programme two 
years after the experiment. Based on the results reported 
by Adey and Shayer materials have been developed to promote 
the CASE methodology further (Moran and Vaughan, 2000). 
Nearly a decade after their report Adey and Shayer(2002) 
continue to maintain that the CASE intervention programme 
generally enhances pupils' thinking. We now focus on their 
study. 
8.2. Evaluating the impact of CASE 
Evaluation of the CASE programme involved nine schools in 
England. The age ranges of most of the schools were 11 or 
12 to 18, but two were 9 to 14 middle schools. All pupils, 
both control and experimental, were given a pre-test of 
reasoning tasks based on Piaget's framework at the 
beginning of the evaluation of the programme and as 
expected no significant difference in levels of cognitive 
development was detected between the experimental and 
control groups. At the end of the two years intervention a 
post-test was immediately administered, and in addition the 
common science achievement tests were taken by many of the 
schools. These tests were followed by delayed post-test a 
year later. The post and delayed post-test were also based 
on Piagetian tasks. In the fourth and fifth year after the 
intervention programme was initiated GCSE results were used 
to track the progress of ex-CASE pupils. 
Results from the various tests that were reported did 
not indicate conclusive gains by the experimental group 
over the control group. For example, it was reported that 
some 12+ years old boys in the experimental group made more 
highly significant gains in cognitive development than 
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those in the control group when post-test on Piagetian 
tasks were administered. This, however, is not surprising 
since the tasks relate to the way the programme was 
delivered and one would expect the experimental group to 
perform well on such tasks. But what was surprising on the 
other hand was that no significant differences emerged 
between any of the experimental and control groups when the 
common science achievement test was administered soon after 
the programme was completed. It is sensible to expect the 
experimental group to perform significantly better than the 
control since the programme was designed to enhance higher 
order thinking. When this did not occur, Adey and Shayer 
argued that it is not reasonable to expect an intervention 
programme such as CASE, which addresses underlying 
cognitive functioning, to show an immediate effect on 
academic achievement. They argued further that: 
It may very well be a couple of years before enough general experience 
has been re-processed with students' new higher powers to show up on 
crystallised intelligence test-items. There must in principle be a delay 
for effects to show on such tests (p.91). 
It may well be the case that some delay is required for the 
effects of the programme to show however Adey and Shayer 
give no particular reason why two years' delay is needed 
rather than say four or six years'. It may well be that 
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their choice was influenced by practical considerations 
such as the fact that most pupils are set to disappear 
(leave compulsory education) two years after the end of the 
programme (considering that the programme started in year 
8). Consequently this only provides two years maximum for 
observing any impact (if any) of the programme. However, 
choosing a time period based on such a consideration does 
not say anything useful about the programme but merely 
indicates administrative constraint imposed by the duration 
of compulsory education. 
In an attempt to justify their argument for the two-
year delay period, Adey and Shayer pointed to the GCSE 
success results of ex-CASE pupils in science, mathematics 
and English two years after the programme ended as an 
indication of the long-term effect of the programme. 
Furthermore, they claimed that the enhanced achievement in 
English and mathematics is evidence of "far transfer" of 
the effects of the programme, which was set in a science 
context. This evidence, they wrote: 
Supports the hypothesis of a general cognitive processor which can be 
positively influenced by appropriate intervention strategies set in the 
context of the ordinary curriculum (p.103). 
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There are difficulties with the claims made by Adey 
and Shayer regarding the success of pupils involved in the 
CASE programmes. Let us consider two of these claims. The 
first claim, that pupils' success is a direct result of the 
long-term effect of the programme, assumes that there were 
no other influential factors involved in the success of 
pupils. However, Adey and Shayer provide no evidence to 
show that the success was in fact caused by the 
intervention and not by other factors such as natural 
psychological processes due to maturation, or other 
learning experiences offered through the curriculum 
materials that participants might have had long after the 
programme ended. 
This brings us to the second claim. Adey and Shayer's 
second claim that pupils' success is evidence of 'far-
transfer' is directly related to the first claim. But as in 
the first claim they were unable to provide explicit 
evidence (considering the factors highlighted earlier) in 
support. What they were able to offer was merely a 
comparison of skills required for typical GCSE English 
tasks and those promoted by CASE, concluding from this 
comparison that success of ex-CASE participants in GCSE 
English must be a result of 'far-transfer'. Making such a 
claim complicates issues even further by the implicit 
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assumption that pupils in their GCSE English lessons are 
not sufficiently grounded in skills and techniques to deal 
with tasks typically required for GCSE English. Therefore 
the possibility that pupils' achievement in English was 
enhanced as a result of how the lessons were delivered must 
also be considered. 
So far the discussion has concentrated on some of the 
issues pertaining to some of the conclusions drawn by Adey 
and Shayer based on the trial test of the programme. There 
are further issues concerning the nature of the programme 
itself, to which we now turn. 
The CASE programme consists of ideas from two main 
theoretical sources: Jean Piaget's developmental psychology 
(highlighted in Chapter 5) and the socio-cultural theory of 
Lev Vygotsky (highlighted in Chapter 7). However, the 
programme is based largely on Piaget's developmental 
theory. In brief, the theory rests on the idea that there 
are different stages through which the mind of a child 
matures into the mind of an adult. The existence of the 
stages as real structures of the mind is derived from the 
inability of children at certain ages to perform certain 
kinds of task. Their failure to perform these tasks is 
taken to imply that their minds are still at a stage at 
which the cognitive operations necessary to perform such 
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tasks successfully are not yet available. The influence of 
Piaget's work has led to critical evaluations of the 
theory. 
In view of the reliance of CASE on Piaget's work it is 
surprising that Adey and Shayer failed to provide any 
substantial discussion of areas of controversy regarding 
Piaget's position. Where such controversial issues emerge 
in their discussions, Adey and Shayer(1994) offer 
inadequate explanations in support of Piaget's framework, 
and insist that the Piagetian task "has always replicated 
the original findings and can be regarded as a fact 
requiring explanation"(p.3). Nevertheless, difficulties 
associated with the Piagetian framework have so far 
persisted. 
In commenting on the Piagetian framework, 
Hamlyn(1967,1978) pointed out that Piaget's notions of 
accommodation and assimilation and the equilibrium to be 
achieved between these processes are essentially Kantian 
ideas. Hamlyn argued that Piaget presented a strictly 
philosophical point embedded in a biological/psychological 
theory. For Hamlyn the assumption underpinning Piaget's 
idea, that our knowledge of objects is partly determined by 
what these objects are in themselves, and partly by how we 
regard them, is wrong in two ways. Firstly, the growth of 
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knowledge is not itself a causal matter however much it may 
depend on bodily conditions. For Hamlyn the involvement of 
accommodation and assimilation in perception and the 
acquisition of knowledge amounts to the idea that there is 
a mutual modification of subject and object. But such 
reciprocal causal relationships mainly exist in biological 
situations where the attainment of equilibrium is the 
function of an organism. The efficient functioning of the 
body depends on the existence of physiological balances of 
various sorts. When the equilibrium of an organism is 
disturbed, the stimuli that affect certain organs are 
themselves affected and modified by a process of feedback. 
But the same process cannot be claimed for the relationship 
that comes to exist between concept and object in 
perception since the relationship is not at all causal. To 
have a concept of X or Y is to know what it is for 
something to be X or Y and this basically involves nothing 
causal. This leads to the second point. 
The second point highlights a direct philosophical 
problem that arises from the use of a misleading biological 
theory as a basis of the acquisition of knowledge. The 
theory suggests that the equilibrium to be attained is one 
between something essentially subjective about the 
individual (the concept) and something objective about the 
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world around us. Thus knowledge is a mix of the objective 
and the subjective. But this is precisely what Hamlyn 
objects to because there is nothing subjective in fitting 
something to a concept, as we are not imposing a subjective 
viewpoint on it. For Hamlyn the objectivity of a concept is 
connected with the idea that it must be inter-subjective 
and interpersonal just as knowledge is. Consequently, it is 
impossible to view the growth of knowledge as a transaction 
solely between the individual and his/her environment 
without any impact of the social, which Piaget seriously 
underestimated. 
A major difficulty with Piaget's theory was pointed 
out by Winch(1998). According to Winch, Piaget's thesis is 
essentially a negative thesis since it seeks to show that 
children cannot learn at certain ages. A difficult problem 
arises with any attempt to prove such a thesis since it is 
always possible for a counter-example to be produced which 
then leaves it untenable in its general form. For example, 
if one claims that anyone of age X cannot learn Y, then a 
single instance of someone of age X learning Y destroys the 
theory. The main response to such an argument is to say 
that the theory is about stages rather than ages, but this 
response will not hold because unless ages are linked 
closely to stages the theory reduces to a tautology. 
197 
What should be clear at this point is that Piaget's 
developmental theory is fraught with conceptual 
difficulties and as such it is important that any learning 
programme adopting the theory fully acknowledges its 
limitations by resisting the temptation to claim any kind 
of generality for the programme. 
8.3. Remarks on CASE 
Adey and Shayer(1994) present CASE as a general thinking 
skills programme set within a specific domain of knowledge 
but what is not clear is how they claim to achieve this. 
Far from being just a convenient way of overcoming 
administrative difficulties, the use of domain-specific 
knowledge forms a crucial factor in demonstrating the 
successes (if any) that Adey and Shayer claim for the 
programme. For instance they cite "micro-political" reasons 
for adopting a domain-specific approach to the development 
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of CASE. These "micro-political" reasons, as already 
mentioned in section 8.1, concern the ease with which 
science teachers are willing to accept the broad aims of 
the experiment and to cooperate with the researchers to 
achieve a successful outcome. If we grant that "micro-
political" reasons are not required for CASE to proceed, 
then what we are left with is a programme similar to 
DeBono's CoRT programme or Feuerstein's Instrumental 
Enrichment programme. In other words it would be a 'stand 
alone' programme to be taught on its own terms, and under 
this circumstance the need to contextualise the programme 
materials arise. Finding successful ways to present the 
programme so that the assumed general thinking skills can 
be applied in any context - the very essence of all general 
thinking skills programmes - remains a major source of 
difficulty for programmes seeking to promote such general 
skills of thinking. It is clear that adopting a context-
free approach for CASE is bound to lead to similar 
shortcomings associated with programmes already discussed 
in the earlier chapters. In fact Adey and Shayer(1994) 
later admitted that the reasons for seeking to embed the 
programme in a context-specific domain are much more 
serious than "micro-political" reasons. They commented 
that: 
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This is not simply a matter of micro-political expediency. The strategic 
decision to deliver the intervention through a specific context reduces 
the initial unfamiliarity factor for teachers and students enabling them 
immediately to apply new thinking skills within a familiar context 
(p.79). 
The delivery of Adey and Shayer's programme through a 
specific context goes far beyond the reduction of 
unfamiliarity with the material which they claim. It is 
clearly indicative of the fact that thinking involves 
intentional objects and as such specific contexts are 
necessary for the programme to make any sense. An important 
point about Adey and Shayer's comment above is that it 
reaffirms the importance of the development of pupils' 
specific skills as part of their overall cognitive 
development. 
Sensing the rising discrepancy as a result of the 
dependency of their programme on context-specific knowledge 
and their pledge to encourage general thinking skills, Adey 
and Shayer wrote: 
We reject the notion that science might claim a unique position for the 
development of general thinking skills but recognise that the work 
already done in a science context gave it certain pragmatic advantages 
over other subjects. Adding to this our own familiarity with the 
foundations of science teaching and the fact that the world of science 
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education has traditionally been rather sympathetic to psychologies of 
learning, the choice of science as the doorway through which to explore 
the development of general thinking become a reasonable one(p.79). 
Clearly Adey and Shayer are devoted to promoting general 
thinking skills through CASE, but what is implicit in their 
statement is the importance of knowledge specific to a 
context. For example, although it is not very clear what is 
meant in the passage above by "work already done in science 
context gave it certain pragmatic advantages over other 
subjects", we can assume that the "pragmatic advantages" 
will include the use of specific ways of viewing the world 
(scientific method) in order to gain understanding. Thus it 
is reasonable to conclude that CASE is much more dependent 
on context-specific skills than Adey and Shayer would 
admit. 
If CASE is deemed to be a successful intervention 
programme, it is due principally to the fact that it 
involves no more than the reorganisation and presentation 
of learning materials in motivating ways within a specific 
context. 
There are two key points that can be drawn from CASE. 
The first is that the programme suggests that finding 
interesting and imaginative ways to teach the curriculum 
subjects is essential in encouraging effective thinking. 
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The second point is that the method of delivery of the 
learning materials underlines the important role of the 
teacher. These points will later be argued further. Let us 
now turn our attention to the growing interest in the 
introduction of thinking skills in formal education. 
CHAPTER 9 
THINKING SKILLS PROGRAMMES IN FORMAL EDUCATION 
9.1. The International perspective 
The notion that there are generic thinking skills that 
can be deployed flexibly in a wide range of work and life 
contexts is at the heart of initiatives by national 
governments to produce well educated young men and women. 
The rationale for these initiatives by national 
governments is that future national and global success in 
business and industry is dependent on the ability of 
teachers and lecturers to teach knowledge and skills 
relevant to generic competencies as well as those 
specific to particular discipline areas such as 
engineering, chemistry, accountancy, computing, etc. 
Another reason for the interest in generic thinking 
skills is connected to private business's alleged desires 
for schools, colleges and universities to produce 
graduates who are analytic, critical, reflective, 
flexible and effective problem-solvers, able to add value 
to their organisations. The notion that there are these 
competencies or generic skills which students can develop 
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for the purposes of employment are very similar across 
international borders. 
In the context of the USA, for example, the 
Secretary's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills 
(SCANS) framework is part of an official nation-wide 
effort to link education to the world at large (Marginson 
and O'Hanlon,1993). The commission created a list 
consisting of five workplace competencies and three 
foundation skills called 'Workplace know-how' which 
included such thinking skills as 'the ability to learn, 
to reason, to think creatively, to make decisions, and to 
solve problems'. The commission recommended that these 
workplace competencies and skill be made explicit at all 
levels of the nation's school system. 
In the Australian context the Finn committee 
concluded that there are certain essential things which 
they termed 'employment-related key competencies' that 
all young people need to learn in their preparation for 
employment (Mayer, 1992). In other words, these generic 
skills are seen to be at the crux of life-long learning 
to enhance students' flexibility and adaptability for 
effective participation in changing patterns of work and 
work organisation. The committee identified seven key 
competencies including thinking skills, which in this 
case was referred to as 'solving problems'. This involves 
'the capacity to apply problem-solving strategies in 
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purposeful ways, both in situations where the problem and 
the desired solution are clearly evident and in 
situations requiring critical thinking and a creative 
approach to achieve an outcome'. 
As in the case of the USA the commission also recommended 
that these skills be explicit throughout the school 
system. 
The key competencies produced in the above countries 
have some obvious overlaps with those produced in the UK 
called 'key skills'. The Dearing report, Review of 
Qualifications for 16-19 Year Olds published in March 
1996, recommended the use of the term in order to reduce 
the confusion that existed over labeling and to underline 
their apparent importance. According to the Department 
for Education and Employment(DfEE), key skills are the 
generic skills which individuals need in order to be 
effective members of a flexible, adaptable and 
competitive workforce and for lifelong learning. Included 
in these key skills is 'problem solving.' This involves 
learning to 'identify problems; plan and try out ways of 
solving problems'. 
The Government sees learning such general problem-
solving skills as a priority and wants to move to a 
position where they are a normal and integral part of 
post-16 education and training. One of the ways in which 
this is being done is by finding the best possible method 
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grounded in research to deliver such skills to pupils. In 
the case of the UK, pupils are being targeted from as 
early as the first year of their secondary school 
education. Discussions in the proceeding sections will 
focus on the situation in the UK. 
9.2. Delivering thinking skills in UK schools. 
The growing interest in teaching children how to think 
reflects the current government's commitment to finding 
ways to improve the educational experience of children. 
In a recent announcement by the Secretary of State 
for Education and Employment, all children are to be 
taught thinking skills in their first three years at 
secondary school under a programme to develop imagination 
and creativity. The programme will first be launched on 
an experimental basis at pilot schools however, the 
Secretary of State plans to extend it throughout England 
over the next few years. In order to achieve this aim he 
indicated that teachers would be trained in techniques 
developed through the thinking skills programme called 
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CASE discussed earlier in Chapter 8. He is convinced that 
the benefits to be had in participating in the CASE 
programme could extend beyond academic attainment and 
consequently made a clear indication to that effect as 
follows: 
I want children to be able to think creatively and problem solve to 
address the issues of tomorrow - not just about work, but contributing 
to the debate about genetic engineering, the future of the planet and 
issues of global citizenship (The Guardian,6/1/00). 
Under the proposed programme teachers will be trained to 
teach thinking skills within their own subject areas. 
Guidance on teaching thinking skills is included in 
handbooks on the new national curriculum. 
The present level of interest in teaching pupils 
thinking skills is also shown by the government's 
endorsement of the research report on teaching thinking 
skills produced by Carol McGuinness(1999). Although the 
report is very much welcomed in bringing the discussions 
on teaching thinking skills to the fore, it is important 
that careful and detailed consideration be given to the 
dangers involved in the wholesale acceptance of its 
findings. The report(Report 115) was commissioned by the 
Department for Education and Employment(DfEE)and it is 
essentially a review and evaluation of the various 
approaches for developing pupils' thinking. 
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The research report is divided into ten sections. 
Section 1 states the purpose of the report. Section 2,3 
and 4 mention some of the ideas underpinning current 
attempts to teach thinking. Sections 5,6 and 7 all 
discuss examples of the three main approaches to teaching 
thinking. Section 8 investigates the role of information 
and communication technologies in developing thinking. 
Section 9 considers the importance of teacher development 
and support. Section 10 states the main conclusions from 
the research. 
The value of the report in highlighting the major 
approaches for developing pupils thinking cannot be 
denied. Although it is very comprehensive in its 
coverage, it is surprising that it fails to adequately 
review some of the well-known thinking programme such as 
CoRT developed by Edward DeBono, discussed in Chapter 6. 
More importantly, it almost completely fails to highlight 
the long-standing debate on both teaching thinking skills 
as a subject and the existence of general thinking 
skills, thus presenting a non-problematic view of what is 
involved in teaching thinking skills. The report also 
cites and approves the CASE programme as a successful 
model of cognitive intervention. The findings of the 
report will be the focus of further discussion in the 
next section. 
9.3. McGuinness's report on thinking skills. 
McGuinness's report has become an important blueprint for 
the integration of thinking skills into the school 
curriculum and for that reason it needs to be subjected 
to careful scrutiny. 
The purpose of the review was set out as follows: 
1) to analyse what is currently understood by the term 
"thinking skills" and their role in the learning process; 
2) to identify current approaches to developing 
children's thinking and to evaluate their effectiveness; 
3) to consider how teachers might be able to integrate 
thinking skills into their teaching - within subject 
areas and across the curriculum; 
4) to identify the role of Information Communication 
Technology(ICT) in promoting a positive approach to 
thinking skills; 
5) to evaluate the general direction of current and 
future research and how it might translate into classroom 
practice. 
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In view of the fact that the above points form the basis 
upon which the research was carried out, it is reasonable 
to focus on how the report addresses each of them. 
Point 1. 
In analysing what is currently understood by the term 
"thinking skills", the report fails to adequately 
highlight the issues associated with the use of the term. 
In the report, McGuinness claims that: 
The idea of thinking-as-a-skill continues to have theoretical force as 
it places thinking firmly on the side of "knowing how" rather than 
"knowing that" in the long standing philosophical debate about the 
nature of knowing (p4-5). 
It is not quite clear what exactly McGuinness means by 
"thinking being firmly on the side of knowing how rather 
than knowing that". The importance of clarifying the 
confusion surrounding the use of the concept of thinking 
goes without saying since it lies at the heart of any 
attempt to enhance pupils' thinking. In providing a less 
than adequate explanation, McGuinness only contributes 
to the existing confusion. The point that has already 
been made repeatedly in the dissertation is that due to 
the highly complex nature of thinking it is impossible to 
attempt to arrive at a coherent definition of thinking as 
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a unitary "skill". The idea that placing thinking-as-a-
skill "firmly on the side of "knowing how" rather than 
"knowing that"" at best assumes that knowing how is 
entirely independent of knowing that and at worst is 
nonsensical. The fact that knowledge can be understood in 
different ways does not necessarily imply that these 
different ways are mutually exclusive. For example, 
knowing how to do something presupposes knowing about 
that something, hence knowing how to drive a car involves 
knowing what a car is in the first place, knowing that a 
car has a steering wheel and various levers such as an 
accelerator, a combination of gears and brakes etc. 
The complex nature of the relationship between 
thinking and knowing highlights the point that thinking 
cannot be viewed simply as a general skill to be applied 
in any problem-solving situation. The content specificity 
of thinking (McPeck,1981; Barrow,1990) means that its 
development is tied to particular contexts. However, 
McGuinness overlooks this important point about the 
nature of thinking and argues that if we want pupils to 
become better thinkers then we must "devise ways of 
educating directly for thinking." If such an attempt ends 
in failure then it is (among other things) precisely 
because thinking skills cannot simply be introduced as a 
subject into the school curriculum. 
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The assumption that there are general thinking 
skills that can be taught in their own right pervades 
much of the work presented in the report. McGuinness 
presents the various approaches as merely vehicles for 
delivering thinking skills and labels these approaches 
as: 
(A) The general approaches include context-free and 
context-dependent programmes based on specially 
designed materials. 
(B) The subject specific approaches are based on the 
view that high quality thinking is linked with the 
ways of thinking associated with different 
disciplines. 
(C) The infusion approaches attempt to develop a 
"thinking curriculum" where teaching thinking is 
infused across all areas of the curriculum. 
In spite of the above categorisations it is difficult to 
find out how these various approaches differ in practice. 
For example, programmes such as CoRT or Instrumental 
Enrichment are easily identifiable as examples of the 
general approach. On the other hand CASE, which is a 
context-dependent programme, is also considered by 
McGuinness as an example of a general approach programme. 
But the fact that CASE is linked with the ways of 
thinking associated with science means that it can also 
be viewed as belonging to the subject-specific approach 
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group. McGuinness mentioned LOGO (a computer aided 
learning programme developed by Seymour Papert(1980) for 
teaching children about mathematical concepts of shape 
and space) as an example of a specific approach to 
teaching thinking, but it is not obvious how LOGO differs 
from CASE, considering the fact that they both depend on 
specific contexts. Thus confusion arises over how we are 
to consider and classify the various teaching thinking 
programmes. This confusion is augmented once we begin to 
consider other methods such as McPeck's 'philosophy-of' 
approach. McPeck is also interested in promoting higher-
order thinking and calls for the teaching of the 
philosophies of the various curriculum subjects. Does 
this therefore make McPeck's suggested approach a 
subject-specific thinking skills programme as indicated 
by McGuinness? Obviously McPeck would object to this 
classification on the basis that there are only specific 
thinking skills to be gained through his approach. What 
is required from McGuinness in order to resolve the 
existing ambiguity in her categorisation is further 
clarification of how the various thinking skills 
programmes are categorised. 
The transfer of thinking skills across domains 
provides the fundamental reason for all the various 
teaching thinking skills programmes and approaches. In 
view of the importance of transfer, why did such a 
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crucial aspect of teaching thinking skills only receive 
minor attention in the report? The answer is that the 
issue of transfer presents an intractable problem for 
teaching thinking skills programmes. And in order to 
avoid dealing with the implications of such an 
intractable issue supporters of thinking skills 
programmes either try not to highlight it, or produce 
less than adequate evidence in support of the 
transferability of their programmes, as suggested in the 
previous chapters of the present part of the thesis. 
Sternberg's (1987) observation that the activities of 
teaching thinking skills are meaningless if they do not 
result in transfer is still relevant today. Similarly the 
conclusion drawn by Perkins (1987) that programmes on 
teaching thinking skills fail to provide the conditions 
for transfer continues to hold. 
McGuinness acknowledges the major problem regarding 
the transferability of thinking skills across domains and 
concludes that in order to be successful, all thinking 
skills programmes need to adopt methods to minimise the 
risks of failing to transfer the "general thinking 
skills" gained across domains. This advice to prospective 
users of thinking skills programmes is indeed futile, 
since the assumption that there are such "general 
thinking skills" to be transferred across domains is 
unsubstantiated. 
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Point 2. 
In identifying current approaches to developing 
children's thinking McGuinness introduced a number of 
well known programmes such as Feuerstein's Instrumental 
Enrichment(FIE), Cognitive Acceleration through Science 
Education(CASE) and Philosophy for Children(PfC). These 
influential programmes have formed the main topic of 
discussion in this part of the thesis. It is very much a 
cause for concern that although McGuinness mentioned 
positive evaluations of these programmes, very little or 
no critical evaluation of these thinking skills 
programmes was provided. As demonstrated in Chapters 
5,6,7, and 8, these critical evaluations are very 
important in providing a balanced view of the 
effectiveness of general thinking skills programmes, 
given the importance of the report in influencing the 
current proposal to introduce all pupils in Britain to 
thinking skills. McGuinness also stated that DeBono's 
CoRT programme is a widely known thinking skills 
programme but gave no reason for not discussing it as a 
structured programme for developing thinking. 
Point 3. 
In discussing how teachers might be able to integrate 
thinking skills within and across various subject areas, 
McGuinness highlighted various strategies and experiments 
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conducted in mathematics, science, history and geography. 
These strategies offer no more than quality teaching, 
which can be found in any thriving traditional method of 
teaching. For example the various competencies necessary 
for successful mathematical problem-solving such as depth 
of mathematical knowledge, level of understanding of the 
problem, reflection and monitoring of possible solutions, 
and confidence in mathematics are an intrinsic part of 
learning to become a mathematician. These competencies 
are not exclusive to a thinking skills approach. 
Similarly, the infusion approach, which seeks to "exploit 
naturally occurring opportunities for developing thinking 
within the ordinary curriculum (p.19)", provides no more 
than what pupils are likely to obtain from any well-
structured and durable form of teaching. 
Point 4. 
The emergence of the electronic computer as an important 
tool in recent years has helped to turn the limelight on 
the impact of computers in education. In discussing the 
role of computers in education the report mostly provided 
information on various experiments and programmes 
involving the use of computers in developing pupils' 
thinking. However, much of the research on the use of 
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computers focused mainly on describing various 
experiments. No attention was given to any critical 
discussion of the experiments and researches mentioned in 
the report except for some cautionary notes on the use of 
computers. 
Point 5. 
The attempt to evaluate the general direction of current 
and future research and how it might translate into 
classroom practice is underpinned by the assumption that 
there are general thinking skills independent of any 
subject-specific content. According to McGuinness, there 
is now a "shift from thinking skills to thinking 
classrooms" and this shift can be observed through the 
three models of teaching thinking skills (ie via the 
general, subject and infusion approaches). However, it is 
not exactly clear what McGuinness implies by "thinking 
classrooms" in spite of its mention in connection with 
information and communication technology. 
The report generally provides an initial survey of 
the various attempts to teach thinking skills, but, as 
already indicated, the conceptual difficulties associated 
with the idea that thinking can be viewed as a general 
skill have not been adequately addressed. 
9.4. Preparation for life 
One of the key functions of formal education is to do 
with the preparation of pupils for future participation 
in adult life. National governments are determined to 
find ways to achieve their goal of preparing their young 
citizens in the best possible way. However, the 
probability of such grand proposals failing runs very 
high particularly when they lack any sort of thorough 
analysis or evaluation. The importance of seeking ways to 
enhance the effectiveness of pupils' thinking cannot be 
denied, but it is vital that care is taken in finding the 
best way to achieve this task. 
In the concluding section of the report McGuinness 
maintains that, although theoretical emphases can differ, 
sufficient research and ongoing practice have accumulated 
to identify core concepts in a framework for developing 
skills in thinking. McGuinness implies that finding a way 
through the difficult conceptual issues associated with 
the idea of teaching thinking is not altogether crucial 
in affecting the kind of framework that is employed. But 
not paying careful attention to finding a firm 
theoretical foundation can only result in the 
perpetuation of the present conceptual confusion. 
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The report produced by McGuinness is mainly 
descriptive in nature, providing a generally positive 
overview of some of the widely known teaching thinking 
skills programmes. Consequently, the conclusions reached 
in the report fail to present a balanced account of the 
ongoing debate on teaching thinking. The bias in the 
report is brought sharply into focus by the uncritical 
review of the thinking skills programme Activating 
Children's Thinking Skills (ACTS) developed under the 
guidance of McGuinness. 
Johnson(2001) draws our attention to the dangers 
associated with the attempts to teach thinking as a set 
of skills. For such attempts will lead to specific-
subject knowledge being viewed not only as mere material 
on which to practice such skills, but worse still as a 
source of great inconvenience or waste of pupils' time. 
Specific subject knowledge, as pointed out by Johnson, is 
far more important than proponents of general thinking 
skills care to admit, for the same reason given by Hirst, 
McPeck and Barrow that one cannot separate thinking from 
the context within which it is applied. In other words, 
what counts as good thinking is determined largely by the 
subject matter. And to have knowledge of subject matter 
is to acquire certain ways of saying or doing things and 
feeling about those things. 
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Another source of danger noted by Johnson is the 
reduction of all thinking to problem solving, which can 
subsequently be reduced to following a few simple rules 
to arrive at the desired solution(s). In the end the real 
danger in viewing thinking as merely rule following is 
that flexibility, which is of great importance in the 
search for general thinking skills, will be lost as the 
ways and methods of thinking become set in some 
prescribed and rigid format. Furthermore, reducing 
thinking skills to merely rule following can create a 
condition that undermines or completely ignores the 
feelings and emotions that form a crucial part of 
thinking. 
9.5. Learning from the past. 
The current efforts being made to introduce general 
thinking skills into the school curriculum have their 
roots in the late nineteenth century, a time when faculty 
psychology very much dominated educational thinking. In 
his book The New Education, about educational thinking in 
the period 1870-1914, Selleck(1968) tells us that the 
influence of faculty psychology brought with it the 
notion of general mental abilities. In particular, three 
main doctrines from faculty theory were dominant among 
educationists of the time. 
The first postulated the existence of a number of 
faculties or powers through which the mind operated. The 
intellectual faculties for example, consist of the 
faculties of imagination, of judgement, of reasoning, of 
perception, of memory. Other faculties such as the 
faculty of form contribute to the understanding of form 
and size, while the faculty of tune assists in the 
understanding of melody. The subject of morality is 
covered by including the faculty of the will. 
In addition to the assumption that these faculties 
existed was the notion that they could be trained, which 
in turn provided the justification for the belief that a 
general discipline of the mind was possible. As a result, 
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faculty training became the basis upon which education 
was defined. The curriculum in the main was viewed as a 
means of training the various faculties. For example, 
arithmetic developed the reasoning powers; history 
developed the powers of memory etc. 
To the belief in the existence of faculties and the 
need to train these faculties was added the assumption 
that, just as muscles can be trained through a series of 
physical exercises, so, too, can the mind be trained in 
the activities of the classroom. This training can then 
be transferred to tasks in real life situations far 
beyond normal school settings. 
What is clear with regards to teaching general 
thinking skills is that traces of faculty theory persist 
in the twenty first century, long after its collapse as 
an influential theory. If we are seriously interested in 
seeking ways to enhance pupils' thinking we should pay 
careful attention to past efforts in order to avoid 
repeating similar mistakes. 
There are no easy or straightforward solutions to 
the issue of teaching pupils to think effectively. Care 
must be taken to seek a firm foundation. We must not 
ignore or avoid the difficult conceptual questions that 
arise, especially if thinking skills are held to be of 
great importance not only to the pupil but also to the 
community in general. These questions include: What is 
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the nature of thinking? Are there different kinds of 
thinking? What personal qualities are most beneficial in 
promoting effective thinking in pupils? How can these 
qualities be developed? Supporters of teaching general 
thinking skills very rarely devote much effort to finding 
answers to these kinds of difficult questions. 
As already indicated there are major practical and 
theoretical problems involved in considering the 
introduction of thinking skills programmes in formal 
education. We now turn to some of these practical issues. 
9.6. Practical Issues Concerning the Programmes 
The discussions in Chapters 5,6,7 and 8 indicate 
important issues, both practical and theoretical, that 
present formidable obstacles for the implementation of 
general thinking skills programmes into the mainstream 
curriculum within formal education. In this section brief 
comments will be passed on some of these practical 
problems. 
9.6.1. Evidence of effectiveness 
One of the limitations of the thinking skills programmes 
is related to the quality and objectivity of the 
evaluation studies of them. 
In a survey of some of the evaluation studies, 
Sternberg and Bhana(1986) highlighted major scarcity of 
evidence in support of some the general claims made in 
favour of thinking skills programmes. The survey found 
that evidence offered in support of the benefits of these 
programmes is often based on the confirmation of users 
whose selection is usually unspecified. Moreover, many of 
the studies were conducted by the originators of these 
223 
programmes themselves and the results announced or made 
available only through journals and books published by 
the same originators. 
For example, as already indicated in Chapter 5, 
studies and reports on Lipman's Philosophy for Children 
are largely published through the programme's journal 
entirely dedicated to the promotion of the positive 
aspects of the programme. This raises issues to do with 
bias. 
Regarding DeBono's CoRT programme, with the 
exception of Hunter-Grundin's(1985) independent 
evaluation of the programme involving primary school 
children which produced no concrete evidence of cognitive 
generalisability, much of the evidence concerning its 
effectiveness can hardly be obtained outside of what 
DeBono publishes on the programme's effectiveness. Here 
too, issues to do with bias are raised. 
Although firmly rooted in a theory of learning, the 
extension of Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment 
programme to "normal school settings" rather than 
specific "special needs settings" presents difficulties 
in terms of the effectiveness of the programme across all 
age and ability ranges. 
The scarcity of positive evidence in support of 
the effectiveness of these programmes can be attributed 
to a number of factors to be examined next. 
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9.6.2. Demands on Teachers 
The importance of the teacher's contribution to the 
success of the general thinking skills programmes cannot 
be overstated. The major programmes under discussion here 
acknowledge the importance of the teacher in the smooth 
running of the programmes. 
For Lipman et al(1977), it is the teacher in the 
classroom who can arrange the learning environment in 
such a way as to enhance the continual growth of 
children's philosophical awareness. However, one of the 
most important requirements demanded of the teacher is 
that he/she must not only know philosophy, but must also 
know how to introduce this knowledge in a way that 
supports the child. In order to achieve this aim, 
teachers have to be carefully prepared to use the 
programme materials, particularly by becoming accustomed 
to the requirement of leading a community of inquiry. The 
fact that the programme is highly teacher-sensitive 
implies that, in general, it is only open to those 
teachers who are pre-disposed to this method of teaching. 
DeBono's CoRT programme, on the other hand, requires 
no training to either explain or teach the material. 
According to DeBono, any teacher ought to be able to 
understand the material regardless of his/her background. 
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Given the rigidity of the programme (that is, the 
programme material is strictly defined in terms of what 
and how pupils must learn) it is ironic that teachers are 
asked by DeBono to "feel their way through the course." 
It is not too surprising that this situation, as already 
discussed in Chapter 6, arises simply because of the 
immense confusion inherent in the theoretical foundation 
upon which DeBono's entire programme is constructed. 
Feuerstein admits that his programme poses a huge 
problem for the training of teachers to teach the 
material contained in it, due to the complexity of the 
entire Instrumental Enrichment programme. The demands of 
the programme are such that extensive and indeed 
expensive teacher training is required in order to master 
all the materials and techniques based on the guiding 
theory of Mediated Learning Experience. Consequently, 
comprehensive and thorough teacher training is not easy 
to achieve. 
There is little doubt that the success of the 
programmes depends on the quality of training that the 
teachers involved undergo. However, it is doubtful 
whether these training requirements can be met. Given the 
nature of the programmes it is difficult to establish a 
practical and unambiguous teaching method. In most cases 
only vague indications of what is required are outlined 
while the crucial task of actually teaching and guiding 
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pupils is left to a self-selection of dedicated teachers. 
The problem surrounding the training of teachers is one 
of the major difficulties facing these programmes. We now 
turn to another important limitation of the programmes. 
9.6.3. Transferability 
A critical test for the success of any general thinking 
skills programme is whether the competence developed 
through instruction can be applied in another context 
different from that in which it was first developed. 
Consequently, the transferability of thinking skills from 
one domain to another domain lies at the very heart of 
thinking skills programmes. Sternberg(1987) described 
transfer as the fundamental question in the teaching of 
thinking without which instruction in thinking skills is 
in effect meaningless. In other words the activities of 
any thinking skills programme are useless if it does not 
result in transfer. 
Given the importance of transferability, we should 
therefore expect to find abundant cases of successful 
transfer. On the contrary, there are as yet no conclusive 
results confirming this. In an attempt to highlight this 
issue Perkins(1987) noted that instructional programmes 
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on thinking fail to establish the necessary conditions 
for transfer. The inadequacies of these programmes in 
this respect are indeed far-reaching, given the fact that 
transferability forms the single most crucial reason for 
the pursuit of teaching thinking as a subject. The issue 
of transferability forms an important part of the 
discussion in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE DEBATE ON GENERAL THINKING SKILLS 
10.1. Sources of the debate 
The importance of the debate on General Thinking Skills 
(indicated henceforth as GTSs) is that it enables a 
better understanding of what these skills involve and 
whether or not they exist. 
In order to engage in the debate it is important to 
first discuss the sources from which the campaign to 
teach GTSs originates. Two sources can be readily 
identified as: 
1) The desire to assist children to become autonomous 
adults by developing the general effectiveness of 
their thinking. 
2) The influence of cognitive psychology in searching 
for GTSs. 
These two sources have played significant roles in the 
efforts to teach GTSs and will now be briefly discussed. 
The desire to assist children to think effectively 
in order to develop into autonomous adults has been 
significant in the justifications given for the promotion 
of thinking as an important educational aim. For example, 
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Dewey(1933) argued that thinking must be made an 
educational aim because 
In the first place, it emancipates us from merely impulsive and merely 
routine activity (p17). 
Decades after Dewey's influential work, Siegel(1988) 
concluded that based on democratic principles 
The critical thinker must be autonomous- that is, free to act and 
judge independently of external constraint (p54). 
The vision of autonomy based on the notion of liberating 
the individual from ineffective ways of thinking runs 
through the various teaching thinking programmes 
discussed earlier. The main target group of these 
programmes is the general student population, although 
Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment programme originally 
targeted a special group within this. 
The main aim of Feuerstein's programme also includes 
the promotion of autonomy. It seeks to assist the 
retarded performer to gain acceptable cognitive 
competence and by so doing restore dignity and respect to 
them. However, attempting to extend the programme to the 
general population in formal education raises a difficult 
problem in that doing so implies that all pupils have 
cognitive difficulties as defined by Feuerstein. Another 
issue is that although the programme presupposes the 
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improvement of the skills of reading, writing and 
calculating, it is unclear how this is achieved through 
the use of context-free material. The inconclusive 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of the programme 
suggests that it is perhaps best for the programme to 
concentrate its special efforts on the improvement of 
special needs education. 
DeBono's rationale for his CoRT programme rests on 
his belief that the individual must be liberated from the 
shackles of the present educational system by the 
introduction of generative thinking. In order to do so, 
DeBono(1976) argued that: 
Education must free itself from the impractical myth that scholarly 
excellence will solve everything (p.16). 
For DeBono, it is imperative that thinking is taught as a 
subject in order to compensate for the inadequacies (i.e 
deficiencies in promoting independent thinking) of the 
educational system as we know it. Yet in spite of the 
fact that DeBono relies heavily on the use of visual aids 
as an important aspect of his 'attention directing 
tools', he nevertheless assumes that participants in his 
programme can at least read, write and calculate. 
Lipman's paramount reason for his Philosophy for 
Children programme is based on the idea of autonomy, that 
is, the ability of the child to make his or her own free 
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independent judgements. For Lipman, the ability to think 
independently forms the distinguishing feature of the 
reflective model of education. Lipman(1991) wrote: 
Not uncommonly, the reflective model of education is distinguished 
from the standard model on the ground that the primary objective of 
the reflective model is the autonomy of the learner (p.19). 
In order to realise this vision of the child as an 
independent thinker, the Philosophy for Children 
programme relies extensively on the assumption that the 
child's ability to read, write and calculate is in a 
sense complete. 
All of these programmes therefore suppose that they 
offer the means to liberate the potential of the 
individual with regards to his or her independent 
thinking, hence promoting their autonomy. The programmes 
have identified important issues which the traditional 
educational system must address. It is because of the 
shortcomings of this system in the promotion of autonomy 
and independent thinking that teaching thinking 
programmes have received much attention in the past and 
continue to do so at present. The point made by them that 
in promoting autonomy the improvement of thinking must be 
paramount is beyond dispute. But the means they suggest 
for attaining such a goal (ie developing GTSs) remains 
problematic, as discussed in earlier chapters. 
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The other major source that has been influential in 
the debate on GTSs is cognitive psychology. As indicated 
in Chapter 9, the connection between psychology and the 
endeavours to teach GTSs is traceable to the nineteenth 
century. 
Cognitive psychologists conceptualise GTSs as 
strategies that are related to the successful undertaking 
of tasks. Their approach tries to discover problem-
solving like processes implicated in tasks and form these 
into rules or techniques to be studied and deployed with 
skill. 
For instance, Meichenbaum's(1985) programme for 
training children in problems to do with self-control is 
one of many examples of the attempt to teach cognitive 
skills. In another study working with retarded children 
to improve their cognitive skills, Brown(1978) listed a 
number of strategies as follows, 
(1)Spend a brief moment to consider the task at hand. 
(2)Deliberate on what one knows and what is required for 
a solution to the task. 
(3)Check that one's plan of attack is ready to go into 
operation. 
(4)Review ongoing progress. 
In a similar study to improve the cognitive 
functioning in aggressive boys, Camp(1980) developed a 
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cognitive skills programme based on seeking answers to 
key questions as follows - 
(1)Define what the problem is 
(2)Devise a plan for the problem 
(3)Try out plan 
(4)Review result of plan 
Although these kinds of strategies are now being extended 
to normal school settings (just as in the case of 
Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment programme), they 
were initially developed to support children learning in 
special educational needs settings. Some psychologists, 
however, do not see these strategies as usurping domain-
specific knowledge but rather as supplementing it, as 
indicated by Meichenbaum(1985): 
We see our approach as supplementing the already existing school 
curriculum (p.421). 
On the other hand, there are other psychologists who are 
uncertain about the benefits to be gained in the direct 
training in such strategies. For example, studies by Chi 
et al(1982) and Carey(1984) on 'expert' and 'novice' 
thinkers suggest that the crucial differences between the 
two groups of thinkers are due almost entirely to the 
level of sophistication of their domain-specific 
knowledge, with negligible part played by learning 
general skills or strategies. Hunt(1991) noted that 
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researchers in the field of Artificial Intelligence found 
no inferential rules that were domain independent which 
could be employed to build general intelligence. 
What these various studies highlight is the lack of 
consensus among cognitive psychologists on the 
effectiveness of general thinking skills. The lack of 
consensus is symptomatic of deeper practical and 
conceptual problems inherent in the attempts to teach 
thinking skills as a separate subject. The 
transferability of GTSs is one such problem and to this 
we now turn. 
10.2. The transferability of thinking skills 
In the long-running debate on teaching thinking what 
continues to be a source of much contention is the sort 
of thinking that holds the best promise of maximum 
transfer across domains. 
What the limitations of programmes teaching general 
thinking skills indicate is that in spite of its numerous 
shortcomings there is still no substitute for the 
knowledge that comes from the study of the various 
disciplines of the school curriculum. 
A large number of the curriculum disciplines are 
built around propositional knowledge and the kind of 
thinking common to these consists largely (but not 
exclusively) of theoretical reasoning. The individual 
disciplines do not draw just on one type of thinking. 
Instead, different disciplines emphasise different types 
of thinking in very complex ways. For instance, 
disciplines like fine art, music and literature emphasise 
imaginative thinking but they also involve other types of 
thinking such as reasoning and contemplative thinking. In 
these disciplines reasoning is involved in working out 
the layout of how the piece of art work, music or 
literature is to proceed, and appreciating the final 
product involves contemplative thinking. Similarly, 
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religious study emphasises contemplative thinking, but 
may still, for example, involve imaginative thinking; and 
in science, the emphasis may be on reasoning but 
imaginative and contemplative thinking are also 
important. What this suggests is that the emphasis on the 
different types of thinking in the major disciplines 
occurs in such complex ways that they cannot be addressed 
adequately by teaching just one particular type of 
thinking that can be generally transferred and applied 
across all disciplines or domains. 
10.2.1. Transfer between closely related subjects 
Transferability of thinking skills across domains remains 
the key motivating factor for the establishment of 
general thinking skills programmes in formal education. 
In what ways can we accept the notion that transfer 
of some sort could occur? Subjects of study that are 
closely related share very similar features and therefore 
the possibility of transfer of thinking skills from one 
to the other is high. For example, the close relationship 
between subjects such as mathematics and physics suggests 
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that thinking skills from one subject could be easily 
transferred to the other 
Let us examine some of the basic thinking skills 
essential to doing mathematics and then investigate their 
use in the field of physics. Since the close relationship 
between mathematics and physics underlines the obvious 
transfer of thinking skills between the two disciplines, 
the examination therefore will be presented as an example 
of what transfer of thinking skills between disciplines 
may entail. 
Engagement in mathematics requires one to be 
proficient in the use of a huge number of technical 
skills. These skills provide the tools for thinking and 
solving problems in the subject. For example, mastery 
of basic technical skills such as the rules of number 
(i.e. addition, subtraction, multiplication and division) 
and basic algebra form part of the foundation for 
thinking in the subject. 
Mathematics generally can be regarded as a structure 
of relationships, the formal symbolism being a way of 
communicating or thinking about parts of the structure. 
As a way of making connections within the structure, 
mathematical statements are used, and to express such a 
connection involves symbolism. For example the symbolic 
statement: 
2(x + y) = 2x + 2y 
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states a connection between two parts of the structure, 
one dealing with addition and the other with 
multiplication. The knowledge that we can proceed from 
the symbols 2(x + y) to the symbols 2x + 2y and vice 
versa is a technical one and it is used in the process of 
solving mathematical problems. Algebra is the area of 
mathematics that uses symbols to represent numbers and to 
make generalisations about the relationships between 
them, hence in the above example x and y can be 
substituted for numbers and as such these letters 
represent any number. A polynomial is an algebraic 
expression that is the sum of a number of terms, for 
example the algebraic expression : 
4x3 + 6x2 + 5x + 2 
consists of three terms and this is called a polynomial 
in x of degree 3. Similarly the expression: 
8x6+ 3x4 9x + 7 
is a polynomial of degree 6, since the expression could 
be written as: 
8x6 + Ox' + Ox4 + 3x 3+ OX2 	 9x + 7 . 
The most general form of a polynomial can therefore be 
written as: 
anxn 
 
+ an_1x11-1 + an_2xn-2 + 	 + a2x2 + aix + ao 
This is a polynomial in x of degree n, meaning the 
highest power of x is n. In a polynomial, n must be a 
positive integer (written n E Z') and an must not be zero 
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(written an * 0). The number an is the coefficient of xn 
and, whilst n must be a positive integer, no restriction 
applies to an. 
The use of polynomials pervades the field of mathematics 
and the rules of number can be applied in the same way to 
polynomials, making it possible for two polynomials to be 
added, subtracted or multiplied. 
We can add 3x2 + 4x + 6 and 6x3 + x + 5 as follows: 
3x2 + 4x + 6 
6x3 + Ox2 + x + 5 
6x3 + 3x2 + 5x + 11 . 
We can subtract 2x2 + 4x + 3 from 7x3 + 3x2 + 5x + 4 as 
follows: 
7x3 + 3x2 + 5x + 4 
2x2 + 4x + 3 
7 X3 + X2 + X + 1 . 
And in a similar manner we can multiply 
4x2 - 3x + 4 by 3x3 - x + 1 as follows: 
Firstly the two sets are enclosed in brackets in order to 
provide a clear method of grouping as follows 
(4x2 - 3x + 4)(3x3 - x + 1). 
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Each term of the first is then multiplied by the whole 
set of the second expression as follows: 
4x2(3x3 - x + 1) - 3x(3x3 - x + 1) + 4(3x3 - x + 1) 
=12x5 - 4x3 + 4x2 - 9x4 + 3x2 - 3x + 12x3 - 4x + 4. 
Like terms are then collected together i.e. simplified to 
give the following result 
=12x5 - 9x4 + 8x3 + 7x2 - 7x + 4. 
Polynomials can also be factorised. That is, some factor 
common to each of the terms in the polynomial can be 
extracted. For example, the expression 
5x3 + 3x 
contains x in each term of the polynomial so 
5x3 + 3x can be said to be identical to x(5x2 + 3). 
In solving mathematical problems polynomials form the 
basis of the different types of equations and 
inequalities for which solutions are then obtained. For 
example, the equation 
4x + 6 = 2x + 12 
is a linear equation, i.e it involves just one unknown 
and the value of this is the solution of the equation. 
Using the rules of number, the method of solution is to 
get all like terms together on one side of the equality 
sign which in this case is the left hand side (LHS) and 
the rest on the right hand side (RHS) as follows: 
4x - 2x = 12 — 6 
2x = 6 
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x = 3 . 
The solution indicates that the LHS is identical to the 
RHS when the value of x is 3. We can verify the 
correctness of the solution by substituting the x's with 
3 in the original equation. The same way of thinking can 
be applied to non-linear equations and inequalities. An 
equation is called an inequality when the equal sign (=) 
is replaced by one of four inequality signs: 
> is greater than; 
a is greater than or equal to; 
< is less than; 
s is less than or equal to. 
So 'three is greater than one' can be written 3 > 1, and 
'minus 5 is less than 2 can be written -5 < 2, and so on. 
The rules for manipulating inequalities are the same as 
those used for manipulating equations with one major 
exception. This major exception comes into force when we 
try to multiply or divide both sides of an inequality by 
a negative number. In this case the inequality sign is 
reversed. That is, if x > y then 
nx < ny if n is negative 
and 
x/n < y/n if n is negative. 
The thinking behind this rule can easily be shown from 
the following examples: 
i) 8 > -3 i.e 'eight is greater than minus three'. 
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But if we multiply through by -3 say, then (i) becomes 
-24 < 9 i.e 'minus twenty-four is less than nine'. 
ii) -16 < 4, i.e 'minus sixteen is less than four'. 
But if we divide by -4 then (ii) becomes 4 > -1. 
For example, to find the set of values for which 15 - 6x 
< 23 - 4x the following steps are applied: 
-6x + 4x < 23 — 15 
-2x < 8 
2x > -8 
x > -4. 
The solution shows that any value of x greater than -4 
will satisfy the inequality. 
In mathematics the notations and the rules governing 
their manipulations are important in thinking and stating 
things clearly, and form the basis for the skills 
involved in doing mathematics. In the field of physics 
the application of mathematical thinking skills is 
clearly self-evident. 
Let us for example look at the relative velocity 
rule. This rule states that in a perfectly elastic 
collision the relative velocity before collision is the 
same as the negative of the relative velocity after 
collision. Using mathematical symbolism, skills and other 
known laws of motion, the rule can be derived as follows: 
By the principles of conservation of momentum 
+ m2u2 = m1v1 + m2v2 (notice the use of mathematical 
symbols). 
Putting like terms together (a mathematical thinking 
skill) 
M1111 	 M1V1 = M2V2 - M2112 • 
Factorising (a mathematical thinking skill) 
(i) m1(u1 - v1) = m2(v2 - 112)- 
By the principle of the conservation of energy 
1/2m1u + 1/2m2u22 = 1/2m1v12 + 1/2m2v22 . 
Applying above mathematical thinking skill, therefore, 
( U12 - v12 ) = M2 ( V22 - U22 ) 
and 
(ii) ml(u/ - vi)(ul + v1) = m2(v2 - u2)(v2 + u2) 
Substituting (i) in (ii) 
m2(v2 - U2 ) (V, + u1) = m2(v2 - u2) (v2 + U2 ) . 
Therefore 
u1 + v1 = v2 + u2 , 
which gives the coil and recoil equation as follows: 
U1 - 1.12 = - (v1 - v2). 
Similarly, the minimum velocity that a small mass 
must have in order to escape from a point in a 
gravitational field and reach infinity can be worked out 
by the application of mathematical thinking skills as 
follows: 
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The potential energy of a small mass at distance r from 
the centre of a large mass M is given by: 
Ep = -GMm/r . 
Ep is the amount of energy the mass will need to just 
escape the gravitational field. If the mass is projected 
with a speed v, it follows that it will escape if: 
(1/2)mv2 s GMm/r , 
that is 
V2 
	 2GM/r . 
Hence the escape velocity v has magnitude given by 
v = (2GM/r)1/2 . 
The above examples demonstrate the abundance of 
mathematical thinking skills in the field of physics. 
Indeed the mathematisation of physics makes it difficult 
to draw a clear line between the two subjects. Generally 
mathematics plays an important role in the natural 
sciences and therefore it is expected that transfer and 
use of skills from mathematics to the natural sciences 
will be very strong. But can the same be said for acting 
or activities such as boxing, swimming or playing 
football? In other words is it possible to transfer 
mathematical thinking skills to the performance of, say, 
playing football? 
Solving mathematical problems and playing football 
are very different sorts of activities and the 
246 
application of mathematical thinking skills as discussed 
above is inappropriate in playing football. In the latter 
the skills and judgements concerning what a footballer 
does cannot be adequately taught by breaking the skills 
down into various parts. In the process of scoring a goal 
the footballer does not go through a list of skills as is 
the case in solving mathematical problems. Similarly, the 
boxer does not consult a checklist before stepping back 
to avoid a punch aimed at his jaw, nor does he check his 
list before landing an uppercut. 
An important aspect of thinking skills has to do 
with feeling, which is closely related to judgement. In 
attempting to score a goal the footballer must have the 
right kinds of feelings about how to handle the ball, in 
particular, how close to get to the goal post, when to 
shoot the ball and so on. Similarly the boxer must have a 
feel for the right moment to step aside or take a 
particular stance in order to block his opponent's blow 
or deliver the knockout punch. In exercising swimming 
skills the swimmer must also feel confident about the 
application of those skills. These feelings are specific 
to the fields in question and depend on being initiated 
into them. 
The point that is being made in this section is that 
the possibility of transfer occurring across closely 
related domains cannot be denied due to the complex 
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interconnections between these domains and the way they 
share concepts. Where the domains are further apart one 
would expect less transfer. An example may be useful to 
emphasise this. A car and an aeroplane are modes of 
transportation, however it is clear that having the skill 
to drive a car does not necessarily imply that one can 
pilot an aeroplane. Of course one might be able to drive 
other cars or even a six-metre long articulated lorry. We 
can rightly assume that the fact that one can drive a 
normal motor vehicle means that such skills can be easily 
transferred to the handling of other normal motor 
vehicles. But, having such skills is of no particular use 
in piloting an aeroplane since being able to pilot an 
aeroplane does not necessarily depend on having motor 
vehicle driving skills. An aeroplane and a car are simply 
very different sorts of vehicles, even though both share 
activities related to the control of their movements such 
as for example, switching on the ignition in order to 
start the engine, acceleration, braking, etc. The issue 
regarding the transferability of thinking skills has 
played a major role in the debate on GTSs. 
10.3. A defence of general thinking skills 
Much has been discussed in earlier chapters about 
difficulties in presenting a sound argument for the 
teaching of thinking as a subject in its own right. In 
spite of these difficulties interest in teaching thinking 
continues to grow, as suggested by Higgins and 
Baumfield(1998). 
In their defence of general thinking skills, Higgins 
and Baumfield highlighted three kinds of arguments 
which in their view form the core of the major 
objections offered against general thinking skills. In 
this section brief descriptions of these arguments 
together with the responses by Higgins and Baumfield 
will be presented. 
i) Argument (1) - A priori arguments. 
A priori arguments relate to or involve deductive 
reasoning put forward in advance of any empirical 
evidence. Such arguments against general thinking 
skills are based on the premise that thinking must always 
be thinking about something. 
For Higgins and Baumfield an apparent paradox is 
created as a result of the hidden dangers in a priori 
248 
249 
arguments concerning general thinking skills. In 
attacking such arguments Higgins and Baumfield cite 
Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise as a forceful 
insight into the debate. They claim that although it 
seems logically impossible for Achilles to overtake the 
tortoise, it is clear that in the real world Achilles 
must overtake the tortoise because 'common-sense' tells 
us that if he is running faster and has enough time then 
he will obviously catch and overtake the tortoise. 
Similarly the logical arguments against general thinking 
skills cannot yet destroy the evidence for their 
existence. 
ii) Argument (2) - Domains of knowledge argument. 
The domains of knowledge argument is also an a priori 
argument with the special condition that not only must 
thinking always be thinking about something but this 
something must be domain-specific. This argument against 
the teaching of general thinking skills is based on 
Hirst's(1965) domains of knowledge theory (to be 
discussed later in Chapter 11). 
According to Higgins and Baumfield, in order for 
such a theory against general thinking skills to be 
valid, the domains of knowledge must be mutually 
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exclusive, that is, they do not overlap or intersect in 
any way. Consequently, the burden falls upon those who 
hold this view to demonstrate the mutual exclusivity of 
the domains. For Higgins and Baumfield it is clear that 
the domains theory of knowledge does not necessarily 
imply that if thinking is always about X then this X is 
domain-specific. 
iii) Argument (3) - Expert-Novice argument 
The expert-novice argument is based on studies in the 
field of artificial intelligence reported by Chi (1982) 
and Hunt (1991) (highlighted in section 10.1). This 
argument states that experts use detailed subject-
specific knowledge in solving problems within their 
particular areas of expertise rather than general 
thinking skills, thus invalidating the existence of such 
skills. 
Higgins and Baumfield's objection is that it does 
not follow from this argument that novices need only more 
detailed subject-specific knowledge in order to become 
expert thinkers in a particular field. They argue that 
further investigations regarding the application of 
detailed specific knowledge by the expert are needed in 
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order to ascertain the strength of the expert-novice 
objection. 
In general Higgins and Baumfield view these three 
arguments as insufficient to render further 
investigations in support of general thinking skills 
redundant. Their attempt to expose weaknesses in the 
above arguments against general thinking skills received 
a sustained response from Johnson and Gardner(1999) in 
opposition to their attempt. 
10.4. The case against general thinking skills 
In this section the case against general thinking skills 
will be outlined. Before focusing on Higgins and 
Baumfield's response to argument (2) very brief comments 
will be passed on their view regarding arguments (1) and 
(3). 
i) Comment on argument (1) 
Johnson and Gardner(1999) noted that in the 
objections raised by Higgins and Baumfield it is not at 
all clear what they mean in their response to argument 
(1) that "logical arguments against general thinking 
skills cannot yet destroy the evidence for their 
existence." The fact still remains that there is no 
substantial evidence in support of the existence of 
general thinking skills, and consequently the claim by 
Higgins and Baumfield that there is such evidence only 
contributes to the erroneous argument against a priori 
objections to GTSs. 
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ii) Comment on argument (3) 
Higgins and Baumfield may have a case in claiming 
that novices do not only need more detailed specific 
subject knowledge, but they are mistaken in assuming 
that what is needed in addition is learning some general 
thinking skills. What separates experts from novices is 
not only their wealth of subject specific knowledge but 
also their long and sustained period of hard work, which 
involves among other things experience, persistence and 
determination in developing their understanding and 
feeling for their subjects. These good qualities of 
character cannot be taught simply as pure skills as in 
the case of writing or performing a headstand. 
iii) Comment on argument (2) 
Higgins and Baumfield's demand that if such 
arguments against general thinking skills are to be 
successful then the domains must be mutually exclusive 
only serves to confuse the debate further. In the 
extensive literature on teaching thinking skills those 
who argue against them do not deny that the domains are 
interrelated. Hirst(1974), whose influential work forms 
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the cornerstone of the domains of knowledge theory, made 
the point very clear that: 
It was no part of the thesis even in its earliest formulation that the 
forms of knowledge are totally independent of each other, sharing no 
concepts or logical rules. That the forms are inter-related has been 
stressed from the start (p.89). 
The point that has been made repeatedly is that 
although some types of thinking such as imaginative 
thinking appear in several domains, they take on 
particular characteristics within the different domains. 
As rightly indicated by Johnson and Gardner(1999), 
proponents of general thinking skills are influenced by 
what they called the 'Naming Fallacy'. This is the 
condition whereby the existence of a general label such 
as 'imagination', 'observation' or 'persistence' 
applicable to a range of activities leads to the 
assumption that there is a general thinking skill 
corresponding to the general label. But the activation of 
any of the above(i.e imagination, observation or 
persistence) in effective thinking is dependent on the 
agent having specific knowledge of some sort (this will 
be discussed further in Part Three). 
10.5. Coming to terms with general thinking skills 
In spite of Johnson and Gardner's excellent work in 
highlighting the major flaws in Higgins and Baumfield's 
argument, Johnson and Gardner are not willing to commit 
themselves to the position that general thinking skills 
do not exist. Their non-commitment to this position is 
clearly suggested in their response as follows: 
And we must admit we have never knowingly argued that there is 
anything contradictory in the idea of GTSs (p436). 
Johnson and Gardner are right in holding the view that 
there is nothing contradictory in the idea of GTSs but 
conclusive empirical evidence is required to substantiate 
their existence across all subject disciplines. 
One of the major sources of confusion surrounding 
the discussions on GTSs is that writers fail to make it 
explicit in what ways their use of the term 'general 
thinking skills' is to be understood. For example Higgins 
and Baumfield stated that: 
Recently, however, interest in the teaching of thinking has been 
expressed by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) who are 
considering the introduction of Critical Thinking into the post-16 
curriculum and in the White Paper (Dfee 1997) which recommends "the 
systematic teaching of thinking skills". 
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One major barrier to the wholesale introduction of thinking 
skills has been the absence of sufficiently robust data to support the 
efficacy of thinking skills programmes in improving pupils learning in 
other aspects of the curriculum (transfer) (p.391). 
Does Higgins and Baumfield's discussion of general 
thinking skills embody an unproblematic conception of 
critical thinking shared by all? In highlighting the 
various variations in the conceptions of reasoning, 
Govier(1988) identified six different approaches to the 
teaching of logic as follows: 
1) Formal Logic; this represents the traditional subject 
of logic known to most students. It is taught using 
symbols and rules, and approximate equivalences between 
the symbols and expressions in ordinary language, such 
as "not", "if-then", "or", "all" etc. They are 
generally taught to test arguments represented 
symbolically for their validity. 
2) Discipline-specific Logic and Critical Thinking; this 
approach advocates little need to teach critical 
thinking or even the evaluation of natural 
argumentation outside the various academic subjects of 
study. 
3) Informal Fallacies; this is a natural approach to 
teaching logic in a more practical and appealing way 
than it is possible with formal logic. 
257 
4) The General Argumentation Approach; this approach 
attempts to teach the identification, interpretation, 
and evaluation of natural arguments of whatever type. 
5) The General Claims Analysis Approach; this approach is 
underpinned by the idea that if one is going to claim 
to really teach critical thinking, it is certainly 
desirable to teach the critical analysis claims, 
definitions, and explanations as well as arguments. 
6) 'Strong' Critical Thinking approach; this approach 
demands that the conceptual frameworks or worldviews 
presumed be identified not only in the argument but 
also in the evaluator. 
Although these approaches all focus on the analysis of 
argumentation, there are some variations in their 
conceptions of reasoning. It is important, therefore, 
that in view of these varied approaches to teaching 
critical thinking or reasoning skills writers are very 
clear about which approach they are referring to. Higgins 
and Baumfield in this case fail to do so. In view of such 
lack of information, how are we to understand their 
comment about "thinking skills in relation to the 
improvement of pupils' learning in other aspects of the 
curriculum"? What is suggested by their talk of thinking 
skills is a very general kind of skill that can be 
applied in any learning or problem-solving situation. 
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Johnson and Gardner equally fail to highlight this issue 
in their critical response to Higgins and Baumfield and 
as a result it is not clear how we are to understand the 
term 'general thinking skills'. This confusion runs 
through much of the writing on thinking skills. For 
example Sternberg's (1987) remark that: 
Lipman's Philosophy for Children is designed to bring thinking skills 
into the everyday lives of children, blurring as much as possible the 
distinction between thinking as a subject for academic study and 
thinking as a part of one's everyday life (p.254). 
What are we to make of the above remark? Frankly, we are 
being urged to view the Philosophy for Children programme 
(discussed in Chapter 5) as a general thinking skills 
programme far beyond its original ideals. 
The temptation to generalise pervades much of what 
is presented in favour of thinking skills programmes. 
Some writers such as Pithers and Soden (2000), 
acknowledge that there is disagreement and an ongoing 
debate on the nature of thinking and the notion of 
transfer from one discipline domain to another, but they 
still cannot resist using the term 'critical thinking' 
not only "as defined in the literature" but also as a way 
of "summarising the generic abilities" which can be 
deployed flexibly in a wide range of work and life 
contexts. Whilst Pithers and Soden accept that the notion 
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of the generalisability of thinking skills is contested, 
Burden and Nichols (2000) state the contrary, that this 
is no longer disputed. 
In an attempt to clarify the issues that contribute 
to the persisting debate on thinking skills Smith(2002) 
argues rightly that the notion of thinking skills has 
often been misapplied by supporters of GTS. Smith then 
goes on to describe thinking skills in terms of tasks as 
follows: 
Thinking skills are used in the performance of thinking tasks, tasks 
requiring a considerable mental contribution for their performance 
(p.209). 
Smith explains thinking tasks as follows: 
A task is a job or piece of work, something that needs to be done. 
Most tasks involve both mental and physical activities, though their 
proportions vary considerately — chess versus rugby, for instance. 
Tasks that have a high degree of mental content, or where thinking is 
the key to success, can be thought of as 'thinking tasks'. Playing 
chess is a thinking task, as is writing poetry and planning a party 
(p.211). 
It is clear from the passage above that for Smith playing 
chess involves a higher mental content than playing 
rugby, but this view is problematic. The fact that chess 
involves minimum physical activity in relation to playing 
rugby does not necessarily imply that playing rugby 
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involves a lesser mental content. In both cases making 
the right strategies and moves in the attempt to win 
require effective thinking as already highlighted in the 
first part of the thesis concerning the nature of 
thinking. Furthermore, in viewing thinking skills as 
tasks it is not clear how Smith accounts for 
contemplative thinking for example, since such thinking 
is not necessarily aligned to tasks, as already discussed 
in Chapter 2. On one hand, Smith rightly points out the 
fruitlessness of seeking a universal criterion for GTSs 
(ie across all fields of thought and practice) and on the 
other hand, he argues that thinking skills (ie those that 
are usefully applicable in "a majority of content 
domains") should be regarded as 'general' and on that 
basis be included in thinking skills programmes. In view 
of earlier discussions in Chapters 5 to 8 concerning the 
aims and proposed methods of delivery of the GTSs 
programmes, it is not clear how we are to understand 
Smith. 
The lack of clarity surrounding what writers refer 
to as general thinking skills continues to sustain the 
ongoing confusion. There are some important points to be 
made here. 
Firstly, this ongoing confusion is a direct result 
of writers substituting 'thinking' for 'reasoning'. 
Sternberg exemplifies this kind of confusion in his 
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comment above about blurring the distinction between 
"thinking as a subject for academic study and thinking as 
a part of one's everyday life." There are different types 
of thinking involved in dealing with the wider issues of 
life and these are much more complex than the type of 
thinking (i.e reasoning) studied as an academic subject. 
Secondly, the different types of thinking discussed 
in Chapter 1 clearly highlight the complex nature of 
thinking. For example, sign-cognition as a type of 
thinking consists of certain features that distinguish it 
from contemplative thinking. Therefore to view thinking 
exclusively in terms of reasoning or contemplation, say, 
without regard to the different ways that it manifests 
itself can only result in erroneous conclusions about the 
concept. The multifacetedness of the notion of thinking 
illuminates the difficulty in the claim that there is a 
list of GTSs that can be applied to any given context 
(further comments will be made later). In supporting such 
a claim Higgins and Baumfield include the following 
items: observation, using evidence, being systematic. 
But are these qualities just purely skills? It can be 
argued that being observant also depends on keenness, 
attentiveness, carefulness say, and these are 
dispositional. The claim by Elliot(1975) that knowledge 
as a product of thought owes its successes to the 
operations of such mental powers as guesswork, pushing 
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ideas to their limits, shifts of perspectives, 
discovering objects of feeling and impressions and so on 
underlines the importance of dispositions. Such mental 
powers can be adequately understood in this way. One 
cannot consider these mental powers merely as skills that 
can be perfected through practice and exercise in the 
same manner as being able to whistle. 
The ability to reason or think imaginatively, say, 
may involve certain skills (such as writing) that can be 
improved by exercise, but there are certain aspects of 
mental qualities involved in thinking that have very 
little to do with skills. For example, to be an 
imaginative thinker is not simply a matter of perfecting 
skills or techniques, it also involves dispositions such 
as patience, perseverance, courage etc. and a 
considerable knowledge of specific context(s) towards 
which the thinking is directed. Furthermore, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, one of the key characteristics inherent in 
thinking is that it involves intentionality, and as such 
it requires an intentional object. If (x) is an 
intentional object, then one's attention is directed 
towards that object (X), hence thinking involves 
attention being directed or focus on an object (X). The 
involvement of intentionality in thinking means that some 
knowledge regarding the object(X) is essential. 
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As already mentioned, there is nothing conceptually 
illogical about the idea of general thinking skills. But 
the assumption that there are easy and uncomplicated ways 
of improving the average pupil's standard of thinking 
contributes to the present confusion surrounding the 
teaching of GTSs. After all, we have established that 
having mathematical thinking skills can be very useful in 
physics, for example, and perhaps other related subjects. 
Smith(2002) also highlights this point. However, the 
transferability of mathematical thinking skills to other 
related subjects must not be taken to mean that such 
skills are transferable to any context; it must be 
understood to mean transferable to some other related 
context(s). In seeking the most effective way to promote 
pupils' thinking we stand to gain much in our 
clarification and understanding of what it means if we 
resist the use of the phrase 'general thinking skills' as 
the term of reference. 
The skills we learn form part of our experiences and 
these in turn shape our characters and the sorts of 
persons we become. For example, when one acquires the 
martial art skill of Aikido, one's character is 
transformed in certain ways by the experiences of the 
skill gained in that one becomes more confident as the 
skill becomes part of one's way of life. In the same way, 
gaining any skill such as for example, writing, composing 
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poems, swimming, horse riding, piano playing, singing in 
tune, speaking a foreign language, driving a car, 
piloting a jumbo jet, calculating the integral of a 
hyperbolic function, advancing theories in cosmology, 
analysing human genetic material, performing key-hole 
surgery, making friends and so on, informs and shapes our 
characters and our outlook on life. Just as the different 
kinds of food items that we eat contribute to the 
maintenance of our bodies so, too, the skills that we 
learn contribute to the shaping of our attitudes and 
characters in relation to the way we say and do things. 
Little account is taken by supporters of general thinking 
skills (Barrow,1987) of the extent to which 
understanding, dispositions, values and emotional 
maturity are involved in the acquisition of nearly all 
skills. 
To think effectively requires one to be in 
possession of knowledge relevant to the particular object 
of thought together with the appropriate dispositions. 
These essential ingredients form the basis upon which any 
successful engagement in thinking can take place. These 
factors will form the basis of the discussion in Part 
Three of the thesis. 
10.6. Rethinking teaching thinking 
What has emerged from the discussions above is the 
profound confusion and difficulty surrounding the 
conceptual and practical soundness of some of these 
programmes. The immense contribution of these programmes 
to the debate on how the young of today can be guided to 
become effective thinkers of tomorrow cannot be denied. 
Nevertheless the bid by these programmes to project 
themselves as subjects of study in their own right has 
failed, simply because of their assumption that it is 
only in this way that teaching and learning to think 
effectively can flourish. 
The idea that thinking can be taught as a skill 
forms a major assumption running through the works of 
those in favour of teaching thinking as a subject, but is 
this assumption justified? 
A moment's reflection on what is meant by thinking 
makes it clear that it ranges over more than just a 
single notion. The discussion in Chapter 1 clearly 
indicated the multitude of meanings that the notion of 
thinking can be understood to embody. 
Proponents of general thinking skills often present 
a list of skills to be mastered as a major part of their 
programmes. For instance, Lipman (discussed in Chapter 5) 
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listed over thirty skills which children should learn. 
Similarly, DeBono(discussed in Chapter 6) and Feuerstein 
(discussed in Chapter 7) each have lists of skills to be 
mastered. The idea that by learning and mastering the 
itemised list of skills one can become an effective 
thinker, capable of bringing such thinking to bear on any 
domain, can be traced back to Dewey's(1933) writing on 
the topic. In developing what he called 'reflective 
thinking' (discussed in Chapter 1), Dewey produced a list 
which he regarded as forming the steps in the process of 
thinking as follows: 
1)Recognising the existence of a difficulty. 
2)Locating and defining the difficulty. 
3)Finding possible solutions. 
4)Refining the possible solution(s) by reasoning. 
5)Reviewing the result and drawing conclusion. 
What was central for Dewey was that the mind should be 
skilled in strategies for attacking and solving problems. 
From the discussion in Chapter 1 it is clear that 
reasoning is a subset of thinking, so to reduce thinking 
to the mastering of a list of reasoning skills can only 
result in inconsistency and confusion. 
If helping students of all ages to become more 
effective thinkers is important, we must rethink teaching 
thinking so as to secure a firm foundation for its 
development. One of the key elements in this is the 
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examination of the nature of thinking. Given this, it is 
alarming that in the vast literature on teaching general 
thinking skills, there are only very limited in-depth 
discussions on the nature of thinking. What has been 
established in this Part of the thesis is that 
1.General thinking skills programmes have been unable to 
provide convincing evidence for the effectiveness of 
their programmes. 
2.Any conception of thinking and its teaching and 
learning must embrace knowledge of various contexts as 
well as the acquisition of the appropriate dispositions. 
SUMMARY OF PART TWO 
In Part Two of the thesis the focus has been on the 
various programmes devised for the promotion of thinking 
as a curriculum subject. 
These programmes are in some cases underpinned 
by theoretical framework(s) and in Chapter 4 two main 
frameworks were considered. In Chapter 5 Lipman's 
Philosophy for Children was discussed with some detailed 
evaluation of some of the studies that are used in 
268 
support of the programme. In Chapter 6 the focus was on 
the basis on which DeBono's CoRT programme is considered 
to be effective for teaching thinking. Chapter 7 
concentrated on Feuerstein's instrumental enrichment and 
some of the issues in its use beyond special educational 
needs. In Chapter 8 CASE was discussed and the importance 
of good teaching rather than the use of special thinking 
skills programme was highlighted. In Chapter 9 the focus 
was on the teaching of thinking skills in formal 
education with particular discussion of the current 
official interest in teaching such skills in state 
schools in England. Chapter 10 concentrated on the 
general thinking skills debate and concluded that 
although the existence of general thinking skills is not 
logically impossible there is no sufficient or good 
empirical evidence for them. 
What remains problematic is the assumption that 
since we can talk about general thinking skills then we 
must be able to teach them generally across any context, 
regardless of knowledge specific to the context. We now 
turn to Part Three of the thesis. 
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PART THREE 
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THINKING 
The development and transfer of thinking across different 
domains form a major part of the programmes promoting general 
thinking skills. 
These programmes radiate confidence in the existence of 
general thinking skills that can be taught. But whether there 
are such skills that can be applied to any domain without 
recourse to specific knowledge within domains is highly 
debatable, as suggested in the earlier chapters of the 
thesis. 
In this part of the thesis the discussion will explore 
the necessity of knowledge and the importance of courage and 
other dispositions in thinking effectively. This is followed 
by considerations about the promotion of thinking in formal 
education. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE NECESSITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
11.1. The Concept of Knowledge 
In view of the vastness of the literature on knowledge only a 
brief account of the concept will be presented in this 
section. It is not the intention to present a comprehensive 
account, but merely to provide a background for the main 
discussion on the necessity of specific knowledge in 
effective thinking. 
In order to think effectively relevant knowledge of some 
sort is required. As already mentioned, there are different 
types of thinking and these depend on specific knowledge 
among other things. For example, thinking effectively in 
mathematics depends on some specific knowledge of 
mathematics. Similarly, being able to think effectively in 
playing chess depends on knowing how to play chess, and in 
the same way being able to think effectively in legal matters 
depends on having knowledge of law. 
In our ordinary conversations we use the word "to know" 
in a number of different ways. For example, we talk of: 
a. Knowing Tony Blair 
b. Knowing London 
c. Knowing how to play the piano 
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d. Knowing how to solve mathematical problems involving 
calculus. 
e. Knowing that London is the capital city of Britain. 
f. Knowing that the moon revolves round the earth 
These examples are only a small sample of the different ways 
in which the word is used, and what this indicates is the 
wide range of our everyday concept of knowing. From the 
sentences above it is not difficult to observe the different 
meanings that the word brings out. In one sense, 'to know' 
as in sentence (a) and (b) means to be familiar with; 
however, the degree of familiarity may vary. One can say one 
knows Tony Blair although one has never met or spoken to him 
before except viewing him in the media. In this case one's 
knowledge of Tony Blair is limited to the experiences of 
seeing him, in the media. In another way one can know by 
actually having first hand experience. In this case one knows 
Tony Blair as a result of one's familiarity with him in the 
sense that not only is one able to recognise him on seeing 
him, but more importantly one has had the experience of being 
in his company on one or several occasions. However, to know 
London, in this sense of being familiar, may prove to be more 
complicated, since 'knowing London' might simply mean that 
one is acquainted with London or it might mean that one has 
the skill or competence to find one's way around London 
geographically, historically or socially. Therefore to say 
that one knows London might mean that one knows it in both 
the skill and familiar senses of knowing. 
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In a second sense, 'to know' as in sentence (c) and (d) 
involves having some skill or competence. Hence to know how 
to play the piano involves demonstrating the skill in action. 
Similarly, to know how to solve mathematical problems 
involving calculus means that given such problems one has the 
skill or competence to solve them successfully. It is this 
skill or competence that is involved when one is said to know 
how to do or say something. 
In a third sense, 'to know' as in sentences (e) and (f) 
involves the acquisition of some true information 
(Lehrer,1974). Hence for one to know that London is the 
capital city of Britain involves having correct information 
about London and Britain. Similarly, knowing that the moon 
revolves round the earth involves having the correct 
information about the moon and the earth. Since this sense of 
knowing forms the largest part of the philosophical 
literature on the concept of knowledge, further discussion of 
this kind of knowledge will be undertaken. 
Knowing what to do or feel is another kind of 
knowledge. It involves the ability to do and feel what is 
right in terms of moral choice (Scruton, 1996). As noted 
earlier, there are many varieties of knowledge and the 
examples given above represent but a small selection. 
Philosophers describe the kind of knowledge that applies 
to our belief and convictions in the statements we make (as 
in our earlier examples (e) and (f)) as knowledge of truths. 
In the same way they refer to the knowledge which is not 
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entirely linguistic but involves knowing people, places or 
feelings as in examples (c) and (d) as knowledge of things. 
Russell (1912) described knowing by personal experience as 
'knowledge by acquaintance' and knowing through some verbal 
account as 'knowledge by description'. For some philosophers 
(Russe11,1912; O'Hear,1985) knowledge by acquaintance is 
fundamental to knowledge of description, because knowing, for 
example, that bananas change from greenish colour to 
yellowish colour when they ripen involves acquaintance with 
greenness and yellowness and the other things that make up 
the features of a banana. However, the idea that there can be 
such knowledge by acquaintance is debatable and is not shared 
by all philosophers (O'Conor and Carr, 1982). 
What is common among philosophers is the desire to 
distinguish knowledge into theoretical and practical 
versions, commonly known as 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. 
These are terms popularised by Ryle (1949) and Hartland-Swann 
(1958). Knowing how involves being able to perform a skill 
and this need not require any verbal ability as seen in 
example (c), whereas the need to verbalise what one knows is 
important, for example, in knowing that the moon revolves 
round the earth. In most philosophical discussions 
theoretical knowledge forms the basis of the standard 
analysis of knowledge, and the argument in its defence is 
that practical knowledge requires theoretical knowledge. For 
example, knowing how to play the piano involves knowing that 
the piano keys must be pressed down in order to sound a note. 
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Similarly, knowing how to bake a cake involves knowing that 
eggs are required for baking the cake. In the next two sub-
sections the focus will be on further discussions of 
theoretical and practical knowledge. 
11.1.1. Theoretical knowledge 
Much of the analysis of knowledge in the literature seeks to 
explain the conditions that one must satisfy and how it may 
be done in order for one to claim knowledge that. A common 
definition sets three conditions for knowledge, referred to 
as the belief condition, the justification condition and the 
truth condition:- 
X knows that (p) 
if and only if 
(a) (p) is true 
(b) X believes that (p) is true 
(c) X is justified in believing that (p) is true 
These conditions jointly define knowing that, and as such 
form the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. 
The conditions provide an important way into the analysis of 
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knowledge but the existence of counter-examples to these 
conditions presents some difficult problems for the standard 
analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. However, it 
is not the intention in this discussion to delve into any 
detailed discussions of the conditions and their shortcomings 
but to merely present a very brief and very general overview 
of the concept. 
Although there is no question about the necessity of the 
first condition for knowledge that '(p) is true', there are 
issues relating to the rest of the conditions defining the 
traditional theory of propositional knowledge. 
Some philosophers have argued that a person may know 
that (p) is true without believing that (p) while others have 
opposed it (Lehrer, 1974). The popular example used to show 
that 'X can know without believing that (p)' is where a 
person gives correct answers to questions without a hint of 
confidence or conviction that this is the true answer. 
Concerning the third condition - 'X is justified in 
believing that (p) is true', one can imagine cases that are 
true but not well founded. For example, a person might 
believe that certain lottery numbers are going to be the 
winning numbers simply because he/she dreamt it. Even when 
the numbers appear as the winning numbers we would hardly say 
that this person's belief, regardless of the firmness with 
which he held it, amounted to knowledge since the grounds for 
the dream were not properly justified. This is why the third 
condition is held to be necessary. But a problem concerning 
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this condition arises where someone 'just knows'. That is, 
they are sure in their minds about certain things and are 
consistently right about them but are unable to provide 
justifications for their belief. A popular example of this 
type of situation is that of the spiritualist medium with 
clairvoyant powers who makes clear, definite and true claims 
regarding the whereabouts of certain objects or states of 
affairs elsewhere. 
The level of justification required before we can talk 
of knowledge is also another source of difficulty. For 
example, if we conclude that X's justification for believing 
that (p) must entail the truth of (p), then this leads to an 
infinite regress since the truth of (p) may depend on the 
truth of (p') which in turn depends on (p") and so on. 
Attempts have been made by philosophers to formulate the 
third condition so as to be general enough to allow for at 
least some cases in which the appropriate grounding of X's 
true belief does not lock into a regress. Ayer (1956) 
presented an example of this attempt as follows: 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something is the case 
are first that what one is said to know to be true, secondly that one be sure 
of it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure (p35). 
This refinement of the conditions of knowledge allows for the 
right to be sure under circumstances that may vary with 
subject matter, expertise or standards of rigour. However, 
277 
there still remains a difficulty. For example, in the case of 
the spiritualist medium mentioned earlier, we may in the end 
say that she has the right to be sure, though not for any 
other reason except that she is right about the things that 
she claims to know. It is not difficult to establish that 
having the right to be sure forms a necessary condition of 
knowledge. It is not, however, sufficient in the sense that 
one may have the right to be sure of something if one 
believes it to be true on the best of authority, yet what one 
thinks one knows may turn out to be false and is not for that 
matter knowledge. 
There are many things we know for which we have no 
adequate justification. Consequently the plausible existence 
of unjustified knowledge continues to be problematic for the 
traditional theory of knowledge. There are further questions 
about the sufficiency of the conditions of knowledge 
presented in the standard definition. Gettier(1967) 
described a set of cases that suggest that the traditional 
theory must be wrong, because even when all the conditions 
are met as well as they could be, this still does not 
guarantee a case of knowledge. Gettier used his examples to 
suggest how the traditional theory of knowledge fails to 
state a sufficient condition for someone's knowing a given 
proposition. Gettier himself draws no implications from his 
examples but the difficulties involved in producing a 
criterion have led to various theories (Scruton,1996) 
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designed to distinguish reliable beliefs from unreliable 
ones. 
11.1.2. Practical knowledge 
By contrast with theoretical knowledge, as already mentioned 
in our earlier discussions, practical knowledge is to do with 
procedure. This kind of knowledge cannot be analysed as if it 
involved belief, justification and truth. In other words, it 
cannot be treated in the same way as the propositional case 
where X knows that so and so is the case. The procedural case 
where X knows how to do something involves the demonstration 
of skill(s) or competence(s). 
Knowing how to do X is a matter of skill or technique. 
It represents the possession of a learned capacity or 
competence that is rationally exercised. In other words, this 
kind of knowledge is relevant only to cases where training is 
typically involved in a gradual way by means of repeated 
performances or trials. 
Having a skill or technique is very different from 
knowing that the skill involves x and y. For example, a 
person might well have all the relevant information about 
riding a bicycle without having the actual skill of riding 
one. 
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It has already been said that knowing how to do 
something involves a procedure. In considering how this 
procedure works Ryle(1949) asked, 
What is involved in our descriptions of people as knowing how to make and 
appreciate jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess, to fish or to argue? 
Part of what is meant is that, when they perform these operations, they tend to 
perform them well, i.e correctly or efficiently or successfully. Their 
performances come up to certain standards, satisfy certain criteria. But this 
is not enough. The well-regulated clock keeps good time and the well-drilled 
circus seal performs its tricks flawlessly, yet we do not call them 
'intelligent'. We reserve this title for the persons responsible for their 
performances. To be intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply 
them; to regulate one's actions and not merely to be well regulated (p29). 
For Ryle we learn how through the cycle of example, practice 
and criticism, hence knowing how can be understood in terms 
of intelligent and skilful procedure, which, as already 
mentioned in section 1.2 of Chapter 1, would be commonly 
described as involving thinking what one is doing while one 
is doing it. 
In contrasting intelligent performances with habits, 
Ryle wrote: 
The ability to give by rote the correct solutions of multiplication problems 
differs in certain important respects from the ability to solve them by 
calculating. When we describe someone as doing something by pure or blind 
habit, we mean that he does it automatically and without having to mind what he 
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is doing. He does not exercise care, vigilance, or criticism. After the 
toddling-age we walk on pavements without minding our steps. But a mountaineer 
walking over ice-covered rocks in a high wind in the dark does not move his 
limbs by blind habit; he thinks what he is doing, he is ready for emergencies, 
he economizes in effort, he makes tests and experiments; in short he walks with 
some degree of skill and judgement. If he makes a mistake, he is inclined not 
to repeat it, and if he finds a new trick effective he is inclined to continue 
to use it and to improve on it. He is concomitantly walking and teaching 
himself how to walk in conditions of this sort. It is of the essence of merely 
habitual practices that one performance is a replica of its predecessors. It is 
of the essence of intelligent practices that one performance is modified by its 
predecessors. The agent is learning (p.42). 
Ryle's distinction between habits and intelligent 
performances is characterised by practice and criticism in 
the sense that in performing intelligently the agent is 
always learning, criticising and improving performance 
through practice. This distinction is of considerable 
interest from an educational point of view particularly with 
regards to the development of thinking, as will be seen in 
the proceeding chapters. 
The brief outline of the concept of knowledge presented 
above is intended to provide a basis for discussing the 
importance of knowledge in thinking. 
11.2. The need for knowledge in thinking 
The suggestion from the above section is that knowing that 
something is the case and knowing how to do something are 
connected to specific contexts. However, it is evident from 
the way some general thinking skills programmes (e.g CoRT) 
attempt to teach their materials that they tend to assume 
there is no need for knowledge in learning to think 
effectively. The idea that thinking can be taught as a 
general subject of study fails to recognise the 
complexities involved with respect to knowledge and its 
importance in thinking. Mankind's struggle not only to 
survive, but also to appreciate and value the world as it 
is, generates the need for, and the accumulation of, 
knowledge, and its subsequent refinement and transfer to 
the next generation through education. 
Let us dwell for a moment on the centrality of knowledge 
in thinking. In considering what constitutes thinking in 
Chapter 1 it was noted that the importance of intentionality 
in thinking presupposes the use of concepts, and it is not 
difficult to show that to think at all about something 
involves having some idea(s) about that something. For 
instance, to think about catching the 12noon train from 
Euston station to Barnet first of all involves knowing what a 
train is. Similarly to think about riding a bicycle involves 
knowing what a bicycle is. 
281 
282 
One cannot think about a mobile telephone without 
knowing how to recognise a telephone or more precisely a 
cordless one. On the same account, one cannot think about a 
square table without knowing how to recognise squareness or 
table. The importance of concepts in the notion of 
intentionality means that the different types of thinking 
discussed in Chapter 1 do involve knowledge and 
understanding. This will be clear from the following 
examples. 
1) As already discussed in Chapter 1 sign-cognition is a type 
of thinking that is closely connected to practical behaviour. 
This type of thinking is presented in an example given in 
Chapter 1 of a marksman shooting a snipe. To be able to shoot 
a snipe the marksman must first have some knowledge of snipe 
and their movement in order to estimate their flight pattern. 
2) Reasoning generally involves trying to find a solution to 
a problem. This type of thinking could take the form of 
practical or theoretical reasoning. Practical reasoning, 
where the emphasis is on bringing about some good, requires 
knowledge for the attainment of that good. For example, 
trying to fit a lock and handle to a door in the first 
instance involves knowledge of what a lock and handle is, and 
secondly knowledge of how to fit the lock and handle. 
Similarly, the structural engineer who is confronted with the 
problem of saving a subsiding building from collapsing 
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requires knowledge of building structures and knowledge of 
how to distribute weights and forces acting on the building. 
Where the emphasis is not directly on bringing about some 
practical good but rather on illuminating truth and 
understanding, the reasoning involved is theoretical 
reasoning. To prove that a prime number is divisible by only 
1 and the prime number itself depend on knowing what a prime 
number is, knowing about the number system and knowing how to 
construct a mathematical proof. It is not necessary to show 
that theoretical reasoning is a sub-species of practical 
thinking. However, what is important to note is that in both 
cases knowledge specific to the problem being solved is 
crucial. 
3) Our earlier discussion of the imagination indicated 
various ways in which thinking can be described as involving 
imagination. For example, being able to form a novel 
hypothesis and follow new or alternative lines of inquiry 
requires knowledge of what is generally believed to be the 
case. For instance, the Ptolemaic conception of the universe 
based on the notion that the earth was the centre of the 
universe dominated the minds of learned people for more than 
a thousand years until Nicholas Copernicus challenged the 
established view by successfully following alternative line 
of inquiry regarding the earth and its position in the solar 
system. According to Reichenbach (1942) the significance of 
Copernicus lies precisely in the fact that he broke with 
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traditional belief which appeared to be supported by 
compelling sensory experience. The success of Copernicus in 
initiating a scientific revolution was rooted in his vast 
command of scientific knowledge of the time. Reichenbach 
commented on the success of Copernicus as follows: 
He could do it only because he had at his disposal a considerable amount of 
accumulated scientific thought and scientific data, only because he himself had 
followed the road of disillusionment in knowledge before he glimpsed new and 
broader perspectives (p.13-14). 
What is clear is that the key to effective thinking when 
considering alternative lines of inquiry lies in the 
possession of relevant specific knowledge. 
To be able to image depends on having concepts of some 
sort. Thus being able to imagine a barking dog depend on 
knowing what a dog is and being able to recognise the sound 
of a barking dog, and in the same way being able to imagine a 
tall ship depends on knowing what a ship looks like. Being 
able to imagine the smell of roses depends on knowing what 
roses smell like. The different ways in which knowledge is 
used in the different forms of imagining yet again highlight 
the complex ways in which thinking depends on knowledge. 
4) In contemplating, attention is focused on particular 
objects of contemplation. These could be of God, sounds, 
pictures, natural scenes and objects such as animals, plants 
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etc. For example, the contemplative listening to music, say 
Beethoven's fifth symphony or last string quartets, depends 
on having some knowledge and understanding of his music. 
Similarly, to contemplate the impact of the work of 
Copernicus in shaping how we view the universe depends on 
knowing his work and the challenges that he had to overcome. 
What is clearly obvious in all the examples discussed 
above is the importance of knowledge in each of the different 
types of thinking. 
In view of the above discussion, developing effective 
thinking within and across domains requires the acquisition 
of knowledge within an extensive and thorough education. The 
kind of education envisaged would involve the study and 
acquisition of both practical and theoretical types of 
knowledge for example knowing how to read, write, calculate 
and live in multicultural settings and knowing that history 
is important in shaping our lives. 
Contrary to the view that is often disseminated by 
proponents of teaching thinking programmes, the nature of 
such an extensive and thorough education is that it requires 
years of considerable endurance and dedication to hard work. 
This brutal fact cannot be glossed over by pretending there 
are short cuts to acquiring such knowledge, for there are 
none. 
The process of adhering to certain standards in trying 
to get things right is part of the aspect of education which 
R.S.Peters called 'initiation'. For Peters, this initiation 
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is always into some body or collection of knowledge and the 
process by which this body of knowledge is gained requires 
effort in upholding standards enshrined in the living body of 
knowledge by reference to which it is possible to feel, think 
and act with varying degrees of taste, relevance and skill. 
In education the curriculum subjects provide the means 
by which the different types of knowledge are attained. In 
mathematics for example, geometry is not only concerned with 
knowing that the sum of the three interior angles of any 
triangle equal 180 degrees but also knowing how to construct 
a triangle. Similarly, history involves knowing how to 
construct a historical account although it is mainly 
concerned with knowing that events in the past occurred in 
some particular order. In sports education the emphasis is on 
knowing how to play sports. 
The way of thinking in a specific subject of study is 
largely dependent on some knowledge of the subject and on the 
different types of thinking that form the basis of that 
subject. For instance, in mathematics having some basic 
mathematical skills is important to how we think in the 
subject. On the other hand, however, the way we think in the 
subject forms the basis for gaining a deeper understanding 
and knowledge of the subject. The different types of thinking 
involved in coming to gain further mathematical understanding 
and knowledge include reasoning (following rules), 
imagination (supposing, hypothesising and in some instances 
picturing) and contemplation (appreciating proofs). 
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In thinking mathematically reasoning is needed for 
presenting rigorous logical arguments and also for following 
basic rules that guide a mathematical procedure. The use of 
imaginative thinking in mathematics is very important where 
the solution or understanding of a problem not previously 
encountered is required. Contemplative thinking in 
mathematics is essential in coming to appreciate the 
simplicity and beauty of some mathematical results. What is 
crucial in the effective deployment of these different types 
of thinking in the subject is having some knowledge of the 
subject. 
Similarly, in cookery reasoning is called for in 
following rules governing the sequence in which ingredients 
in a recipe are applied. It also involves imaginative 
thinking in the creation of new and exciting recipes, and in 
most cases where the ingredients need to be applied in a 
particular way this calls into action the use of sign-
cognition. What this indicates is that knowing how to cook 
well involves different types of thinking, but that these 
different types of thinking depend on some knowledge of 
cookery. 
The subtle ways in which the different types of thinking 
mesh within a subject domain show that thinking in a 
particular domain requires some knowledge relevant to that 
domain. For example, in history, being able to think 
historically depends on having some historical knowledge 
which consist in knowing the relevant facts about past events 
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and also knowing how to interpret these facts in the present. 
For Collingwood (1986) history is a special form of thought 
and therefore to think historically requires historical 
knowledge. Collingwood argued that: 
Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the past, and at the 
same time it is the redoing of this, the perpetuation of past acts in the present. Its 
object is therefore not a mere object, something outside the mind which knows it; it 
is an activity of thought, which can be known only in so far as the knowing mind re-
enacts and knows itself as so doing. To the historian, the activities whose history he 
is studying are not spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived through in 
his own mind; they are objective, or known to him, only because they are also 
subjective, or activities of his own (p.218). 
Thinking historically as suggested by Collingwood includes 
knowing how to re-enact the past. To do this involves being 
able to think not only critically but also imaginatively. 
What emerges from the present discussion is the 
affirmation of the complex nature of thinking as already 
indicated in Chapter 1. Although knowledge is a product of 
thinking, still the way in which knowledge and thinking 
interact remains very complex. This high level of complexity 
is evident from the way in which on the one hand knowing is a 
goal of thinking in such cases as solving a problem, pursuing 
truth etc, and on the other hand, it is crucial as a 
precondition for thinking, as in the example given earlier 
regarding the necessity for mathematical skills on thinking 
mathematically and vice-versa. 
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The seductiveness of the rationale underpinning the 
general thinking skills programmes is very clear. It emanates 
from the fact that no one is capable of knowing all there is 
to know about everything, together with the fact that we are 
incapable of predicting what kinds of knowledge might be 
required for particular situations in the future. Thus the 
general thinking skills approach promises to teach certain 
general principles which students can apply to all areas of 
human knowledge and in the process overlooks the complexities 
highlighted above. This approach contrasts with attempts to 
promote effective thinking through the body of knowledge as 
presented in the established traditional fields of study. In 
the attempt to bypass these, the case for the general 
thinking skills approach is greatly weakened. 
11.2.1. Domain specificity of knowledge 
The position that without any specific or related knowledge 
about (X) it is impossible to think effectively about that 
(X) has been argued for in various ways by philosophers 
(McPeck,1981 ; Barrow,1987). However, these philosophers do 
not themselves provide explicit theories in support of this 
position. The most significant theory to be deployed in 
support of the domain specificity of knowledge is Paul 
Hirst's(1965)'forms of knowledge' theory. 
The 'forms of knowledge' theory holds that a good 
problem-solver, an imaginative thinker or a critical thinker 
is a person who has a thorough understanding of the 'logic' 
of a specific form of knowledge and as such is capable of 
applying it in ways which can be described as imaginative, 
critical or effective. Since each form has its own logic, 
being a critical thinker, an imaginative thinker or an 
effective thinker conforms to the logic of a specific form of 
knowledge. 
Hirst listed four distinguishing features by which a 
developed form of knowledge can be identified. These features 
are as follows, 
1) There are a group of core concepts that are peculiar in 
character to the form. Thus gravity, acceleration, hydrogen, 
and photo-synthesis are characteristics of the sciences; 
number, integral and matrix are characteristics of 
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mathematics; God, sin, and predestination of religion; ought, 
good, and wrong of moral knowledge; and so on. 
2) Each form has its own distinct logical structure by which 
concepts can be related. 
3) Each form has its own distinctive expressions, which are 
testable against experience. 
4) Each form has its own particular techniques for exploring 
experience and testing its statements. 
By using these distinguishing features Hirst classified the 
various distinct forms of knowledge as mathematics, physical 
sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and 
the fine arts and philosophy. 
One of the important aspects of Hirst's thesis is that 
it helped to shape discussions on the curriculum particularly 
in terms of its justification and taxonomy. The various 
critical comments on the inadequacies of the thesis resulted 
in Hirst's(1974) further clarification and minor modification 
of the original thesis, for example by omitting the fourth 
distinguishing feature of a form of knowledge. 
In spite of this subsequent clarification, there have 
been further critical views (Elliott,1975. O'Hear,1981. 
Kleinig,1982) of the 'forms of knowledge' thesis. For 
example, in rejecting Hirst's view, Elliott(1975) argued that 
the most fundamental development of mind is the development 
of the powers of the mind and it is possible for this to 
occur outside the various forms of knowledge. According to 
Elliott such mental powers include among others those of 
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retention and anticipation, synthesis and synopsis, discovery 
of structure, discovering the objects of feelings and 
Impressions, guesswork, pushing ideas to their limits, shifts 
of perspectives and so on. For Elliott the forms of knowledge 
owe their origin, character and achievement to the operations 
of the mental powers. But does Elliott's theory lend support 
to the existence of general thinking skills? 
The operations of the mental powers are generally 
important to our existence, so it is not useful to use such 
factors to support arguments for the existence of general 
thinking skills because life is something that we have as a 
necessary condition for being alive, and to be alive is not 
something that one learns to do. For the same reason some of 
Elliot's powers of the mind, such as, for example, retention 
and anticipation, are necessary conditions of living that we 
are born with and therefore need not be considered in the 
discussions. However, others such as pushing ideas to the 
limit and shifts of perspectives are not necessary conditions 
but are tied to specific contexts. 
In spite of the inadequacies of the theory put forward 
by Hirst, it still remains a powerful thesis in highlighting 
the point about the need for knowledge in effective thinking. 
This thesis views the principles inherent in Hirst's theory 
as relevant to the point made earlier that effective thinking 
in X requires at least some knowledge of X. To highlight 
further the importance of specific knowledge in effective 
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thinking let us consider an example from the field of 
mathematics. 
11.2.1.1. Effective thinking in mathematics 
Throughout the history of mathematics new ways of thinking in 
the subject have always depended on detailed knowledge of the 
domain and its applicability. In explaining the process of 
his own mathematical creativeness, Henri Poincare (1952) 
clearly indicated the importance of detailed mathematical 
knowledge in his thinking. He wrote: 
Often the mathematician uses a rule. Naturally he begins by demonstrating this 
rule; and at the time when this proof is fresh in his memory he understands 
perfectly its meaning and its bearing, and he is in no danger of changing it. 
But subsequently he trusts his memory and afterward only applies it in a 
mechanical way; and then if his memory fails him, he may apply it all wrong. 
Thus it is, to take a simple example, that we sometimes make slips in 
calculation because we have forgotten our multiplication table (p.34). 
If we ask what mathematicians require in the use of rules we 
will find among other things a detailed knowledge of the 
subject matter. It is on the basis of this knowledge that 
thinking mathematically and the subsequent creation of new 
ideas in the subject occurs, as Poincare clearly suggests: 
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For fifteen days I strove to prove that there could not be any functions like 
those I have since called Fuchsian functions. I was then very ignorant; 
everyday I seated myself at my work table, stayed an hour or two, tried a great 
number of combinations and reached no results. One evening, contrary to my 
custom, I drank black coffee and could not sleep. Ideas rose in crowds; I felt 
them collide until pairs interlock, so to speak, making a stable combination. 
By the next morning I had established the existence of a class of Fuchsian 
functions, those which come from the hypergeometric series; I had only to write 
out the results, which took but a few hours (p.36). 
He goes on to say: 
Now we have seen that mathematical work is not simply mechanical, that it could 
not be done by a machine, however perfect. It is not merely a question of 
applying rules, of making the most combination according to fixed laws. The 
combinations so obtained would be exceedingly numerous, useless and cumbersome. 
The true work of the inventor consists in choosing among these combinations so 
as to eliminate the useless ones or rather to avoid the trouble of making them, 
and the rules which must guide this choice are extremely fine and delicate 
(p.39). 
Poincare's observations clearly indicate that problem-solving 
ability does not develop in a vacuum. It needs a wealth of 
background knowledge before it can operate effectively. This 
point was also emphasised by Polya(1957) as follows: 
We know, of course, that it is hard to have a good idea if we have little 
knowledge of the subject, and impossible to have it if we have no knowledge. 
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Good ideas are based on past experience and formerly acquired knowledge. Mere 
remembering is not enough for a good idea, but we cannot have any good idea 
without recollecting some pertinent facts; materials alone are not enough for 
constructing a house but we cannot construct a house without collecting the 
necessary materials. The materials necessary for solving a mathematical problem 
are certain relevant items of our formerly acquired mathematical knowledge, as 
formerly solved problems, or formerly proved theorems (p.9). 
The sequential nature of mathematics demands the acquisition 
of prior knowledge in order to think and solve mathematical 
problems. For example, in elementary geometry knowing the 
definitions, axioms and propositions and being able to prove 
important theorems is crucial in understanding the topic. 
Similarly, knowledge of the theory of numbers requires 
thorough understanding of the basic units of number and the 
various ways in which they can be combined. Until this 
important body of mathematical knowledge is acquired, 
thinking in the subject is greatly limited. A glance at the 
following typical mathematical problem on isomorphism should 
make the point clearer. 
Prove that the groups given by the following multiplication 
tables are isomorphic. 
-1 	 1 
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G : -1 
1 
1 -1 
-1 1 
0 	 1 
H : 	 0 
1 
0 1 
1 0 
A typical way in which a seasoned mathematician would solve 
this problem is as follows:- 
Let p: G 	 H be defined by 1p = 0, -lp = 1; 
then p is one-to-one and unto mapping. We need to check that 
(g1.g2)p = g1pg2p for all possible choices of gl and g2 in G i.e 
we must check that: 
(i) 	 (1.1)p = 1plp 
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(ii)  (-1.1)p = (-1p)(lp) 
(iii)  (-1.-1)p = (-1p)(-1p) 
(iv)  (1.-1)p = (lp).(-lp) 
(i),(ii),(iii) and (iv) hold. 
Thus for (i): 1.1 = 1 by the multiplication table. 1p = 0. 
1p.lp = 0.0 = 0 hence (i) holds. 
Therefore G is isomorphic to H. 
Is it possible for the mathematically unsophisticated to 
solve this problem by simply relying on general thinking 
skills? Clearly in order to solve this problem it is 
important to have some specific knowledge about the topic. At 
least one would have to know that: 
1. A typical group(G) is a non-empty set with a binary 
operation and the following properties, 
(i)it has a unique identity element 
in other words x.1 = x = 1.x for all x in G 
(ii)for every choice of the elements 
x,y,z in G, (x.y).z = x.(y.z) 
(iii)every element x in G has an inverse y in G such that x.y 
= 1 = y.x where y=1/a. 
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2. Isomorphism is a one-to-one and unto mapping therefore 
isomorphic groups are roughly the same except for the names 
of their elements. 
The preceding discussion shows that for thinking to be 
effective it requires the acquisition of relevant knowledge. 
However, having knowledge alone does not necessarily mean 
that it will be applied whenever the need arises. Where 
knowledge is applied in thinking effectively courage plays an 
important role. Although this claim is mainly psychological, 
its importance is clear in thinking which leads to 
imaginative results. Arriving at an imaginative or original 
result involves some element of uncertainty and risk of 
failure, thus courage is important in order to persist in 
spite of the risks of failure. A further discussion of 
courage will form the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE IMPORTANCE OF COURAGE 
12.1. The dispositions in thinking 
In this chapter the focus will be on courage as an 
important dispositional quality in thinking. The 
dispositions in general play a considerable role in 
thinking and are essential in any attempt to find ways to 
support pupils in learning to think effectively. 
Ryle(1949) gave some useful examples of dispositional 
properties such as the brittleness of glass and the 
solubility of sugar. The brittleness of glass does not 
necessarily consist in the fact that it is at a given point 
in time actually being reduced to smithereens on impact, 
the glass may be brittle without ever being shattered to 
bits. The brittleness of the glass, therefore, is a 
characteristic property of the glass. Similarly, to say 
that sugar is soluble is to maintain that when added to 
liquid it dissolves. Whether or not the sugar is added to 
liquid does not negate the solubleness of the sugar, as it 
is a characteristic property of the sugar. To possess a 
dispositional property is independent of any actual state 
or change. It is, maintained Ryle, to be bound or liable to 
manifest a particular state or change when a particular 
condition is realised. Although in the same way this is 
also true about dispositions concerning qualities of human 
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character, the solubleness of sugar is not the same as a 
feature of human nature like generosity, since sugar does 
not have a mind. The comparison however, brings out the 
same underlying idea. For example, to describe Mr K. as 
being a chronic gambler does not mean that K is gambling at 
a particular given moment, but refers to K's enduring 
tendency to gamble when not engaged in some other way. 
There are many human dispositions. The virtues for 
example, are dispositions connected to choice. Siegel(1999) 
highlighted 	 'thinking dispositions' that are particularly 
connected to thinking. As observed by Siegel, these 
dispositions have direct implications for education. Siegel 
argues that "a thinking disposition is the tendency, 
propensity, or inclination to think in certain ways under 
certain circumstances." 
According to Siegel's definition, to describe a 
person, Anne for example, as having the tendency to 
critically assess what she is told or hears, is to claim 
that Anne is inclined to evaluate the information she 
receives. The evidence for this claim is that she regularly 
and routinely acts in this way. In other words, Anne is 
prone to think in a variety of ways, i.e. question the 
reliability of the source of her information, check whether 
it is in harmony with other beliefs of hers, and so on. 
Siegel's analysis underlines the role of the 
dispositions in effective thinking. But much of what Siegel 
has to say adds no more to what we already know about this. 
In particular, a key point made by Siegel that thinking 
dispositions are properties of thinkers was raised before 
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him by McCarthy(1992) in objection to an earlier conception 
of critical thinking put forward by Siegel in his book 
Educating Reason where he, Siegel, argued that the term 
'critical thinking' must include the inclination to be 
appropriately moved by reason. The shift in Siegel's 
position on the dispositions in critical thinking is a 
clear indication of his assimilation of McCarthy's 
criticism. Similarly, his call for the need to focus on 
student sensitivity and the creation of favourable settings 
in any educational effort aimed at fostering thinking 
dispositions was highlighted by Passmore(1972) in 
advocating teaching children to be critical. 
In analysing the dispositions Siegel oversimplifies 
their structure and consequently misrepresents what is 
involved in their acquisition. Siegel notes that there are 
many different sorts of dispositions, ranging from 
mechanical ones such as the solubility of sugar to 
'cognitively charged' ones such as standing up to 
authority. For Siegel these 'cognitively charged' thinking 
dispositions constitute the 'animating force' that causes 
thinkers to think well hence it is important for 
educational research to focus on a deeper understanding of 
their cognitive character. In focusing mainly on this 
cognitive character of dispositions, it seems that Siegel 
is reducing the acquisition of such dispositions to 
cognitive development. But this acquisition does not only 
involve what one thinks but also how one feels and the 
spirit in which one acts. For example, a person's tendency 
to being careful involves not only what the person thinks, 
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knows, understand etc., but also a variety of emotions and 
feelings such as love of getting things right, loathing for 
hypocrisy, disgust at shoddiness etc., as well as the 
willingness to act or persevere in the face of difficulties 
etc. 
The claim by Siegel that thinking dispositions entail 
the critical assessment of information assumes much that 
needs to be clarified. For example, Siegel offered as a 
basic example of a thinking disposition the tendency to 
evaluate and be directed by reason, but how basic is this 
basic example? In order to critically assess information, 
as already argued, one needs content-specific knowledge and 
other dispositions such as being careful, being 
conscientious, being patient, being persistent, being 
hopeful etc. It is not clear if Siegel is including these 
dispositions in his basic example. However, one of the 
useful features of Siegel's analysis is that it focuses 
attention on the review of what kinds of dispositions 
should be fostered for effective thinking. 
Richard Paul(1987) proposes the cultivation of the 
rational passions if we are to grasp the problem of 
teaching critical thinking skills in the 'strong sense'. 
According to Paul teaching critical thinking in the 'strong 
sense' is teaching it so that students explicate, 
understand, and critique their own deepest prejudices, 
biases, and misconceptions, thereby allowing them to 
discover and contest their own egocentric and sociocentric 
tendencies. Paul's rational passions include clarity, 
accuracy, fair-mindedness, a compelling drive to seek 
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evidence, a devotion to truth as against self-interest, the 
desire to consider sympathetically opposed points of view 
and an intense aversion for contradiction. Paul argues that 
these rational passions enable us to question what is 
passionately believed and socially sanctioned, and to 
conquer the fear of abandoning a long and deeply held 
belief even when we are ridiculed by others. The rational 
passions put forward by Paul are not in the main very 
different from the dispositions identified by Siegel. What 
both Siegel and Paul acknowledge is the inherent challenge 
in thinking well. Thinking effectively in most cases 
involves facing up to difficult or complex situations and 
finding successful ways to overcome or understand such 
difficulties or complexities. In such situations an 
important disposition to have is courage. 
Courage according to Aquinas, requires the confidence 
to undertake a mission and drive to follow it through. The 
courage to endure depends on patience and perseverance to 
remain undefeated by hardships. These qualities of 
character allied to courage are connected in important ways 
to the thinking dispositions discussed earlier. For 
example, being careful and attentive to detail is connected 
in important ways to being confident. On the other hand, 
self-confidence involves hopefulness with which one faces 
the future. Analysis of the different kinds of 
hope(Day,1969; Fitzgerald,1979; Godfrey,1987) clearly 
establishes its central part in our existence; however, 
this will not be pursued in our discussion. What is clear 
is that there are various dispositions that are very useful 
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in thinking well, but the focus will be on the importance 
of courage in thinking effectively. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion 
in this section is that if the development of thinking in 
education is to be addressed then pupils must first of all 
have a thorough grounding in a variety of disciplines. 
Finding solutions to novel problems or understanding the 
world that we live in depends on the kinds of knowledge 
that we learn to acquire. For example, in physical 
education the thinking involved in playing games depends on 
knowing how to play the game as well as knowing things 
about it. However, knowledge alone is not sufficient for 
successful transfer of thinking skills within a domain or 
from theory to practice, since having knowledge does not 
necessarily guarantee its application by the possessor. In 
many situations applying knowledge in thinking effectively 
requires courage. Therefore if any form of educational 
programme should seek to foster effective thinking within 
and across domains it should among other things endeavour 
to promote courage. We now focus on this. 
12.2. Defining courage 
Thinking effectively requires among other things qualities 
that are allied to courage. It involves effort, 
determination, perseverance, patience, hope and in most 
cases the willingness to take intellectual risks, since it 
is by no means certain that one's thinking will necessarily 
always terminate in some sort of effectiveness. 
In the popular sense, courage invokes a particular 
kind of quality to do with the display of fearlessness by a 
person in the face of danger. One of the common images of 
this view of courage is that of the warrior fighting an 
enemy with brute determination in a situation of extreme 
danger. What this popular notion allows is very little or 
no distinction between the ends to which such fearlessness 
in the face of danger may lead. On the one hand this image 
of courage is by no means an excellent or positive quality 
in itself. Although it may sometimes be good, there is the 
possibility that it may be turned to bad ends including the 
worship of force. On the other hand, courage is viewed as 
one of the highest forms of excellence of human conduct. 
The intention in this section is not to provide answers to 
the contradictions associated with courage or put forward a 
new formulation for its definition but only to provide a 
starting point for our discussion of the importance of 
courage in effective thinking. We will begin by considering 
some of the influential conceptions of courage. 
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In the classical framework advanced by Aristotle the 
end result of a fearless act is crucial to labeling such an 
act courageous. It begins with the distinction between the 
means and the goal of action. It holds that if there is an 
end to all that we do, it will be the good achievable 
ultimately by action through the use of our reasoning power 
in accordance with virtue. Since virtue is connected with 
choices and actions, any action is properly considered as 
virtuous if it has a good or noble end, and what is equally 
important is the thoughtfulness exercised in particular 
situations to reach that end. Consequently, the goal of a 
courageous act must be good or noble. But the means are 
also important. Hence for an act to be truly courageous it 
must in the process of reaching a noble or good end be 
performed thoughtfully and carefully. 
Critical to the classical framework is practical 
reasoning. This differs from scientific reasoning in that 
there are no invariable laws of practical reasoning, but 
the kind of reasoning to be applied is dependent on the 
situation in question. In other words, one's actions in 
being courageous cannot be repeated exactly in the same 
way. In the main the framework holds that courage is 
concerned with feelings of fear, confidence and safety. 
Choosing the middle way of acting between extremes is the 
distinctive quality of a courageous person. Courage, then, 
is a state of character consisting of a kind of moderation 
in one's deliberate choice of action based on a careful and 
mindful consideration of the situation in question. 
Although courage is concerned with confidence and 
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fear, the classical model is concerned more with the 
latter; for the person who in the face of fear remains 
composed and chooses the right action is more truly 
courageous than the person who does so towards the things 
that inspire confidence. It is harder to face what is 
painful or uncomfortable than to abstain from what is 
pleasant, and it is for facing what is painful that a 
person is called courageous. Therefore by the standard of 
this model an act by a person who shows resoluteness, 
endurance and other qualities in confronting a fearful 
situation for an ignoble or wicked end does not qualify as 
a courageous act. 
The influence of the classical framework on the 
writings of later philosophers on the subject cannot be 
denied. For example, apart from minor differences, the work 
of Thomas Aquinas essentially takes the same general 
direction as this framework. For Aquinas too, courage is a 
virtue that demands endurance, effort, and patience. 
Although the classical framework provides an important 
analysis of courage, there are some difficulties associated 
with it. For example, if to be courageous an act must be 
done for the clear purpose of the enrichment of mankind, it 
is difficult to see how one could truly call Sir Francis 
Chichester's sailing round the world courageous. But given 
the risk and difficulties involved it is readily accepted 
as a highly courageous act. In some cases the classical 
model admits as courageous acts that are not and in others 
rejects those that are. Attempts to address these issues 
resulted in the formulation of an influential modern 
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conception by James Wallace which we now turn to. 
According to James Wallace(1978), the courageous man 
is the one who undertakes an act that he believes to be 
dangerous but is nevertheless worth the risk. His formal 
definition consists of a set of five conditions as follows: 
An act X, is courageous if, and only if Agent A: 
(a) believes that it is dangerous for him to do X. 
(b) believes that his doing X is worth the risk it 
involves. 
(c ) believes that it is possible for him not to do X. 
(d) sees that the danger in doing X is sufficiently 
formidable that most people would find it difficult to do 
X. 
(e) is not forced into doing X by threats of punishment 
that he fears more than the danger of doing X. 
Wallace's account of what constitutes a courageous act 
raises some difficult problems as presented in the 
following examples: 
i) The act of the scientist who believes that direct and 
unprotected contact with a cocktail of deadly viruses is 
dangerous but is worth the risk. 
ii) The act of the reckless skier who believes skiing in an 
avalanche is dangerous but is worth the risk. 
The problem posed by these types of acts is that they meet 
all of Wallace's conditions but are acts that we may 
instinctively avoid calling courageous. On the other hand, 
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there are certain kinds of acts that fail to meet these 
conditions but are nevertheless acts that we could call 
courageous. One such example is that of the bible story of 
Job, who, in spite of his misfortunes, persevered with 
great patience in his belief in the righteousness of the 
way of the Lord. Furthermore, all the conditions not only 
fail to consider the end for which the dangerous act is 
performed, but also tend to ignore the kind of courage 
displayed for example in situations involving compromise. 
The attempts at providing a definition of courage by 
the two conceptions above tend to cater well for acts 
within extreme margins. For example Aristotle's classical 
formulation has a moral requirement set into it. This 
requirement is clear in the demand that for an act to be 
truly courageous not only must it involve fear, but also 
the end of the act must be for some good. Consequently, the 
extremely narrow margins within which the standards are 
formulated exclude some otherwise courageous acts. On the 
other extreme Wallace's modern conception places no 
emphasis on the moral requirement for an act to be 
courageous but instead structures the conditions in terms 
of what the person believes to be worthwhile. As a result 
of the extreme openness of this formulation it fails to 
provide a check on the sort of acts that can be considered 
courageous and in so doing admits of absurd acts as 
courageous. What is required is a formulation that 
addresses the extremism to which the two formulations tend 
to, and such a proposal is put forward by Walton. 
Douglas Walton(1986) proposes that we formulate the 
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conditions in two parts in order to separate the normative 
and non-normative elements inherent in the notion of 
courage. Walton's definition of courage therefore consists 
of five conditions divided into two main parts. The non-
normative part, called the practical reasoning base 
comprises of three conditions as follows: 
(P1) In order to bring about B, K considers that it is 
necessary to bring about A. 
(P2) K brings about A. 
(P3) K could have not brought about A 
The normative part of the definition, which is imposed on 
the practical reasoning base is called the ethical matrix 
and this is made up of two conditions as follows: 
(El) K considers that B is [highly] worth K's bringing 
about. 
(E2) K considers that his bringing about A is dangerous or 
difficult [to a formidable extent]. 
In the above formulation K represents an agent, A 
represents a courageous action and B is some state of 
affairs. 
According to Walton, the practical reasoning base has 
311 
to be interpreted and decided upon in specific instances 
against some background knowledge in the evaluation of K's 
act. This is essential since the evaluation of the act 
requires a defensible account of what the circumstances 
were, how K saw the situation and the extent to which the 
facts fitted K's estimation. It is presumed that there are 
a number of possible choices that required K to make some 
form of deliberation that accounts for K bringing about A 
as a necessary element in K's plan. Secondly, the ethical 
matrix expresses the worth of K's intentions in relation to 
K's reasoned position. Walton's justification for putting 
(E2) in the ethical matrix is that the assessment of risk 
or danger is a subjective matter in the evaluation of 
whether an act is courageous. 
Walton's basic definition is a positive attempt to 
overcome some of the difficulties raised by the definitions 
discussed earlier. But, as in the earlier cases this 
definition also appears to raise its own issues since the 
requirements of the ethical conditions (El) and (E2) do 
not necessarily overcome all the difficulties encountered 
in the earlier definitions. It appears Walton recognises 
this problem and duly acknowledges the difficulties as 
follows: 
Implementing both these clauses in particular cases is a normative matter 
that raises many problems characteristic of the concept of courage in 
particular, and other traditional ethical problems having to do with the 
general moral principles, duties, and particular circumstances. 
It is disputable whether we should demand these five conditions as 
necessary for courageous actions precisely as they stand, or require that 
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the agent believes they obtain, knows they obtain, or justifiably believes 
they obtain. We prefer the latter, and will defend this preference from 
time to time, though not dogmatically (p87-88). 
How do we begin to view the concept of courage given the 
difficulties in formulating a definition? What appears to 
be evident, however, is that the notion of courage can be 
applied to a variety of situations where one or various 
combinations of factors such as fear, risk, danger or 
difficulty exist. Although in many cases essential 
reference is made to fear in defining courage, this is not 
necessarily the only possible way. Courage, as indicated by 
Walton, is not always coupled with the presence or absence 
of fear but in many instances it is defined by a positive 
element of determination or persistence in overcoming a 
difficulty. Hence a mark of courage is how one overcomes 
the difficulty. 
A useful distinction that we can employ in viewing 
courage is suggested by Amelie Rorty(1986). Rorty argues 
that if we consider, say, compromise or co-operation as 
aspects that serve to enable us to persist in acting well 
under stress and enduring hardships when following our 
judgments on difficult or dangerous situations, then this 
opens up the opportunity of viewing courage as a set of 
non-homogenous dispositions helping us to maintain a well 
balanced stance while acting under stress. This view of 
courage enables us to accept the performance of both the 
warrior on the battlefield and Job in his distress as 
courageous. It can also enable us to view certain ways of 
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thinking such as being imaginative as courageous. This 
perhaps is what Passmore meant when he said: 
Imaginativeness is a form of courage; it is generally safer to stick to an 
established way of doing things (p.163). 
To be imaginative, then, is considered a form of courage 
since it requires that we take a difficult and risky step 
in going beyond what we know intellectually or practically. 
It is difficult because we are attempting to apply our 
knowledge to an unknown situation, and it is risky because 
the possibility of failure is great. 
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12.3. Why courage is important in thinking effectively 
The traditional view of courage as indicated in the 
previous section is defined by the overcoming of fear. 
However, if we accept Rorty's(1986) suggestion for a 
redefinition of courage as consisting of a non-homogenous 
set of dispositions, this allows for the exploration of 
courage in effective thinking particularly within 
educational settings. 
Courage is essential in the process of thinking things 
through or providing solutions to unfamiliar and difficult 
problems. It is with courage that we are able to think 
through the possibility that we are not under any 
obligation to think in some set way. In so doing, we are 
able to reject established norms if they ought to be 
rejected or rules changed if they ought to be changed. 
Let us consider the contrary situation where courage 
is absent in thinking effectively. A classic example of 
such a situation formed a major theme in John Holt's(1990) 
book How Children Fail. Holt noted that fear is a major 
reason for the failure of children at school. In his 
observation of how a child's fears might influence his or 
her problem solving strategies, Holt observed that children 
use self-centred and self-protective strategies to avoid 
embarrassment, disapproval or loss of status. He wrote: 
These self-limiting and self-defeating strategies are dictated, above all 
else, by fear. For many years I have been asking myself why intelligent 
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children act unintelligently at school. The simple answer is 'Because 
they're scared.' I used to suspect that children's defeatism had something 
to do with their bad work at school, but I thought I could clear it away 
with hearty cries of "Onward! You can do it!" What I now see for the first 
time is the mechanism by which fear destroys intelligence, the way it 
affects a child's whole way of looking at, thinking about, and dealing with 
life. So we have two problems, not one: to stop children from being afraid, 
and then to break them of the bad thinking habits into which their fears 
have driven them (p.92). 
Holt's observation highlights the link between fear and 
ineffective thinking particularly within school settings, 
suggesting that in order to break free from the use of 
self-defeating strategies courage has a special part to 
play in transforming ineffective thinking into effective. 
Although there are clear differences between school 
settings and that of the soldier's battlefield, in the 
sense that the fear a pupil might face at school, for 
example, may largely revolve round pressures exerted by 
peers whereas the fear of the soldier in the main revolves 
round death on the battlefield, nevertheless to overcome 
the fears generated by the different situations calls for 
courage. 
In the writings of both Dewey and Ryle on what 
thinking is, as discussed in Chapter 1, the idea of 
courage, perhaps not directly but indirectly, forms an 
important basis for their views. Dewey(1933) concluded 
that: 
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To be genuinely thoughtful, we must be willing to sustain and protract that 
state of doubt which is the stimulus to thorough inquiry, so as not to 
accept an idea or make a positive assertion of a belief until justifying 
reasons have been found (p16). 
If one were to ask Dewey what is involved in the 
sustaining and protracting of that state of doubt, he might 
provide us with a list of factors. However, what Dewey 
would find very difficult not to include would be some 
factor allied to courage such as endurance, persistence and 
effort. For how is it possible to face up to difficulties 
without courage, as discussed in the previous section? 
Ryle(1979) also wrote that: 
Thinking is trying to better one's instructions; it is trying out promising 
tracks which will exist, if they ever do exist, only after one has stumbled 
exploringly over ground where they are not (p78). 
Similarly, if we were to press Ryle to explain what he 
meant by "trying", he too might also provide us with a list 
of possible explanations, but what he would find very 
difficult not to acknowledge is, in many cases, the 
importance of those character traits such as endurance, 
persistence, perseverance etc allied to courage in his 
explanation, for the simple reason that trying out 
promising tracks requires effort, and the fact that this 
may or may not yield the desired result calls for courage 
to keep on searching. 
In education, we are mostly interested in a certain 
type of thinking. This is generally understood in terms of 
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thinking as an activity largely directed towards learning, 
problem solving and understanding. Thinking can be 
described as being effective when it results in learning 
new things, or the production of desired solutions, or the 
understanding of things in our world. 
In How to Solve it, Polya(1957) uses specific examples 
taken largely from geometry to teach a method which 
according to him can be applied to the solution of other 
general problems. Although these examples are not important 
for the present argument, what is important is that Polya 
identified four important phases in thinking and solving 
problems effectively. The first of the four phases advises 
us to understand the problem, for we have to see clearly 
what is required before we begin to seek solutions. In the 
second phase, we have to make a plan. That is, we have to 
see how the various items of the problem are connected and 
in particular how the unknown is linked to the information 
already at hand. In the third phase we carry out our plan 
that we have devised through to the end. And finally, we 
review the end result in order to consider whether our plan 
has yielded the right results. 
Polya noted that the most difficult part in the 
process of solving a problem is devising a plan. He said: 
we have a plan when we know, or know at least in outline, which 
calculations, computations, or constructions we have to perform in order to 
obtain the unknown. The way from understanding the problem to conceiving a 
plan may be long and tortuous. In fact the main achievement in the solution 
of a problem is to conceive the idea of a plan (p.8). 
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So for Polya, like other philosophers and educators 
interested in the enhancement of thinking in education, the 
element of courage in the painstaking search for the right 
plan and the eventual desired end(if there is any) is 
fundamental to any successful end result. 
In a similar problem solving approach, Bransford et 
al(1987) emphasised five components of thinking that are 
applicable to a wide variety of situations. The first 
component, the ability to identify the existence of a 
problem, ranks as "one of the most important 
characteristics of successful problem solvers". The second 
component is to do with the definition of the problem. The 
third component involves the exploration of strategies, 
for, according to the writers, "the ability to identify and 
define problems provides no guarantee of a successful 
solution". Consequently, it is important that a variety of 
strategies are explored. The fourth component is to act on 
the plan that has been conceived and finally, the fifth 
component involves a review of the effect of the result of 
the action. The writers in this case also argued that: 
If people simply think about possible strategies without actively 
attempting to apply them, they deprive themselves of information that can 
help to identify unforeseen problems caused by old modes of thought (p167). 
In this approach too, it is easy to detect the 
importance of courage in the painstaking search by the 
thinker for the right result. Although the above examples 
do not form a comprehensive list, it is reasonable to 
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conclude that one of the important components in thinking 
effectively is courage. In view of the various ways in 
which courage is involved in thinking can it be further 
analysed in some way? 
12.4. Can there be different kinds of courage in thinking? 
It is possible for the discussion of the importance of 
courage in thinking as presented in the thesis to be 
challenged on the grounds that courage is assumed to be 
transferable. In other words, once developed in a 
particular situation or context, it will also be evident in 
other contexts. 
To what extent is courage different in the different 
contexts of thinking? In the classroom for example, is the 
kind of courage required by pupils in successfully solving 
particular subject problems such as a difficult 
mathematical question the same as the courage involved in 
overcoming the fear of ridicule by peers or the courage to 
withstand teacher intimidation? Is the courage involved in 
the various contexts mentioned above the same as the 
courage required in playing physical sports such as tennis 
or football? Let us now focus on courage in each of the 
different contexts. 
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1) Thinking in the context of solving problems in 
particular subject areas as presented in the school 
curriculum involves, for example, the risk of getting 
things wrong as a result of the difficulties inherent 
in making progress in the subject matter. Some tasks 
are demanding because of their abstractness, as in 
mathematics. Others are difficult because they demand 
uniqueness, as in fine art. In some others they 
challenge received ideas, as in science (e.g the 
courage that scientists such as Copernicus, Darwin 
and Einstein needed to persevere with their 
theories). The kind of scholarly courage required in 
facing up to the various difficult problems may 
differ but would involve among others persistence, 
thoroughness and hope. 
2) The main difference between courage involved in 
overcoming the anxieties of peer attitudes and 
scholarly courage is that whereas the former is 
directly concerned with how to deal with other 
persons the latter is not necessarily so. It is 
possible that a person may have the courage to pursue 
and find answers to very challenging mathematical 
problems but lack the courage to face up to pressures 
from his or her peers in making independent 
decisions. In this regard the courage required for 
challenging peer pressure is similar to the courage 
involved in enduring teacher intimidation. In so far 
as such instances of courage deal with one's self- 
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worth and one's relationship to others it could be 
understood as spiritual courage. 
3) The courage involved in playing sports on the other 
hand is different from scholarly and spiritual 
courage in the sense that it involves the 
determination to risk or suffer physical pain. This 
form of courage in the main can be identified with 
physical courage. In playing tennis for example, 
being able to react appropriately in order to return 
a serve effectively may involve a player taking 
certain physical risk such as diving through the air 
in order to reach the ball at the right time. 
The above categorisation does not in anyway attempt to 
suggest that the various forms of courage are mutually 
exclusive but merely to indicate the different contexts 
within which courage can be understood. However, it is by 
no means clear that courage is easily transferable. In 
other words, it does not necessarily follow that if one has 
the courage to tackle a difficult mathematical problem then 
one can easily transfer such courage to fiercely challenge 
the wrongdoings of political rulers, for example. 
In spite of the potential difficulties that may be 
associated with the transferability of courage, the 
pressing question that requires attention is: how can it be 
promoted in education? So far, the promotion of courage has 
not been sufficiently or seriously considered in the 
expanding body of work on the enhancement of thinking in 
education. 
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12.5. Nurturing Courage 
Ryle(1972) attempted to explore further the age-old 
question on whether virtue can be taught. His explorations 
concern us here since courage is also considered as a 
virtue. Ryle argued that there are numerous things that can 
be learned and yet cannot be got by merely reading or being 
instructed by dictation like, for example, riding a 
bicycle, since the skill in riding a bicycle is inculcated 
by example and by exercise. Hence the acquisition of the 
skill and competence comes, if at all, with practice. The 
same holds true for conduct. Ryle(1972) held that: 
It is not enough just to have memorized five moral lectures or sermons 
which admonish us to curb our greediness, malice or indolence. This 
memorization will not make us self-controlled, fair-minded or hard-working. 
What will help to make us self-controlled, fair-minded or hard-working are 
good examples set by others, and then ourselves practising and failing, and 
practising again, and failing again, but not quite so soon and so on (p436-
437). 
In other words, for matters involving the development of 
virtues, we learn first by being shown good examples by 
others, then by critical supervision and training by 
others, and finally through our own discipline and constant 
practice. Consequently, we develop our virtues (and in this 
case our interest is focused on courage) largely through 
exercise and not by the memorisation or consideration of 
theories or doctrines. On the same issue, Passmore's(1980) 
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argument is very similar to Ryle's in that being virtuous 
is not a skill but a character trait. In practice it is 
very difficult for teachers to teach their pupils to be 
virtuous. For Passmore, the sort of teaching which sets out 
to develop character traits relies to a considerable degree 
upon example rather than theory. 
If we accept that courage is a virtue and therefore a 
character trait, then the point that character traits are 
not activities at all clearly indicates that one cannot be 
taught to be courageous in a formal way. Although this 
situation leaves a formidable task in finding ways to 
create favourable settings for the promotion of courage, it 
is worth the effort given the importance of courage in 
effective thinking. 
The need for desirable settings rich in desirable 
examples of courage calls for a review of how teaching and 
learning is conducted. Rorty(1986) reminds us that: 
The best preparation for courageous action is the preparation for action: 
competence and confidence in competence (p161). 
The acquisition of competence plays a crucial role in 
education, and for this reason the basis for an educational 
system that takes into account the importance of courage 
appears already to exist. But larger questions concerning 
the kinds of changes within the system that will allow for 
the issue to be fully addressed remain to be answered. In 
the next chapter a framework for the promotion of effective 
thinking will be considered. 
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CHAPTER 13 
EDUCATION FOR THINKING 
13.1. Promoting thinking 
The importance of learning to think effectively in our 
rapidly changing world cannot be overstated. The reasons 
given in Chapter 3 for seeking to teach thinking skills, 
together with unfolding technological changes, make a 
compelling case. Consequently, the ongoing debate on the 
best possible settings for promoting effective thinking 
must go on for the sake of securing a firm foundation. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are different types 
of thinking skills programmes claiming to teach general 
thinking skills however in reality they focus on particular 
types of skills such as reasoning skills and techniques in 
generating ideas. But being able to think effectively 
involves much more than these. It is therefore important to 
find ways to enhance the various types of thinking already 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
In the school curriculum the different types of 
thinking manifest themselves in various ways (and this must 
not be assumed to indicate any form of generality). For 
example, sign-cognition as a form of thinking occurs in 
physical education but this type of thinking could also be 
beneficial in interpersonal and social education. 
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Contemplative thinking is encouraged in religious education 
but can also form an important part of understanding in 
other curriculum subjects. Reasoning skills play a crucial 
part in nearly all curriculum subjects from mathematics to 
home economics, and it is as a result of the importance of 
such skills that some of the major thinking skills 
programmes were created. In art, imaginative thinking is 
what the subject seeks to develop, but the power of 
imaginative thinking is such that it can be applied in most 
curriculum subjects. The importance of the imagination in 
most aspects of our existence makes it a vital form of 
thinking to be developed. 
The discussions in the following sections will focus 
on the manifestations of the various types of thinking 
within the curriculum subjects in order to highlight some 
of the salient factors in promoting thinking. 
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13.2. Supporting Sign-cognition 
In Chapter 1 the discussion focused on sign-cognition as 
the typical mode of mental operation at a stage of mental 
development where cognition and action are not yet sharply 
differentiated. Hence the sign of some later state of 
affairs (or present unobservable one) is a sign for doing 
something about it. For example, the loud whistle of the 
train station attendant is a sign of the train departing. 
It is also a sign for hurrying to catch the train or taking 
other appropriate action. Similarly, when a child, for 
example, wanders into the middle of a path only a short 
distance ahead of a cyclist, this signifies an imminent 
collision with the child, as well as the application of the 
cycle brakes. Sign-cognition is important in helping us 
understand people when they send signals with their bodies 
without speaking. Through sign-cognition we are able to 
learn all kinds of things about people by paying attention 
to their body language and the things they do.However, 
given the discussion in Chapter 1 and 2, the particular 
contexts within which this type of thinking functions must 
be taken into consideration. 
It is not difficult to see how this form of thinking 
where one event or state of affairs is taken as a sign of 
another is involved in much of what we do in our daily 
lives. Much of what we do involves some sort of 
communication with others, and although we rely mostly on 
the use of words, in most face-to-face contact we pay 
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particular attention to the various signs and signals that 
form part of the way we communicate. These signs and 
signals termed 'markers of emotion' (Goleman,1996) can be 
picked up from facial expression, gestures, tone of voice 
and other non-verbal signs and signals. 
These signs and signals assist us in steering away 
from potential difficulties or dangers that in some cases 
experience warns us against, and towards potentially 
positive outcomes. Hence being able to read these signs and 
signals is useful in trimming down the size of the 
potential choices that accompanies decision-making and 
making the process more manageable. 
In a letter written by Albert Einstein (1952) to 
Jacques Hadamard in which he was trying to explain the kind 
of mental processes he uses in solving mathematical 
problems, he wrote: 
The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to 
play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem 
to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear 
images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced and combined (p.43). 
He went on to say: 
The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some of 
muscular type. Conventional words or signs have to be sought for 
laboriously only in a second stage when the associative play is 
sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will (p.43). 
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Although it is not clear what precisely Einstein meant by 
'signs', if this relates to seeing, say, a visual element 
as a sign of another this highlights the far ranging use of 
sign-cognition in thinking effectively. If this type of 
thinking is important, the question that needs to be 
addressed is how it can be enhanced in pupils. 
The difficulty with the enhancement of sign-cognition 
in formal education is the fact that this type of thinking 
is non-verbal and entirely dependent on timing, which is 
contrary to much of how education is conducted using verbal 
communication. However, we can begin by highlighting some 
activities that draw on sign-cognition within the school 
curriculum; activities such as sporting games, cookery and 
drama offer possibilities for engagement in this type of 
thinking. For example, playing football, hockey, tennis and 
many other sports draws on sign-cognition since being an 
effective player depends on how well one reads the signs 
and signals that present opportunities in the game. 
Similarly, cookery provides opportunities for engagement in 
sign-cognition since in cooking it is crucial to be aware 
of the right moments(given the various signs) to do 
particular things and in what sequence in order to produce 
the desired culinary delight. Drama offers opportunities to 
highlight and learn about sign-cognition among other 
things. In drama one of the objectives is to convey deeper 
feelings far beyond the words employed in particular 
situations, and to reach such depth also involves sign-
cognition. For example, in William Shakespeare's Othello we 
can observe how Desdemona's handkerchief that fell into the 
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possession of Iago was skilfully used in his murderous plot 
by creating an important sign with tragic consequences for 
Othello. 
As already indicated earlier, the argument being 
advanced does not suggest that sign-cognition is in any way 
general. In other words, it does not necessarily follow 
that being able to apply sign-cognition in the context of 
playing tennis, for example, will result in its use in 
another context, say cookery. 
The development of sign-cognition in many cases is 
underpinned by repeated practice in learning to see X as a 
sign of Y, which involves the sharpening and engagement of 
the appropriate skill(s) within specific contexts. As 
already indicated, finding ways to involve pupils in 
thinking by signs and signals is by no means easy but in 
spite of the difficulties the importance of sign-cognition 
in our actions and responses in thinking effectively calls 
for the encouragement of this type of thinking in 
education. 
If we can only explain sign-cognition solely in terms 
of action then contemplation occupies the opposite end of 
the same pole. In other words, we can view contemplation in 
terms of complete cessation of action. Let us turn to the 
discussion of contemplation as an important aspect of 
effective thinking. 
13.3. Encouraging Contemplative thinking 
Contemplation can deepen the understanding of the object(s) 
upon which the thinking is directed and in so doing improve 
the quality of subsequent thinking regarding the object(s). 
The detachment from action, which is characteristic of 
contemplative thinking, makes it possible to focus one's 
attention on whatever that is under one's consideration. 
If we take for granted that contemplation has no place 
in thinking effectively then we are left with no means by 
which we can come to fully appreciate the end product(s) of 
thinking. Contemplation offers a way of reflecting on 
thoughts, actions and things. It is likely that implicit in 
what Dewey(1933) called reflective thinking is 
contemplative thinking. Although Dewey's conception of 
thinking mainly focuses on problem solving, still his view 
that reflective thinking is an "active, persistent and 
careful consideration" of any belief or knowledge with 
regards to the grounds that support it and the further 
conclusions that may follow, can also be said to touch on 
contemplative thinking. 
In view of the role of contemplation in thinking well 
how can it be promoted? Let us begin by noting some of the 
difficulties involved. The main problem in promoting this 
type of thinking is to do with the complex ways in which it 
relates to the other types of thinking, as indicated in 
Part One. It is possible this is what Dewey(1933) meant 
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when he concluded that the problem of acquiring the right 
habit of reflection would be much easier than it is "did 
not the different modes of thinking blend insensibly into 
one another (p.9)." For example, in mathematics, coming to 
appreciate the beauty of the result of Pythagoras that V2 
is not a fraction is an important part of being a 
mathematician. The cultivation of such thinking forms an 
important part of understanding a subject or a context. 
Contemplative thinking cannot be simply assumed to be 
generic. What is involved in thinking contemplatively in 
religion may not necessarily be the same as in mathematics. 
In other words, we cannot take for granted that thinking 
contemplatively about God is the same as thinking 
contemplatively about an algebraic problem. 
In spite of the potential difficulties in promoting 
contemplation, finding ways to enhance this type of 
thinking in pupils within the specific contexts that are 
conducive to such thinking is not impossible. In the school 
curriculum Religious Education provides an existing path 
into contemplative thinking, but in addition to this 
various ways are open for exploration. Music appreciation 
rather than music playing can offer pupils another way. For 
example, pupils can be guided and encouraged to listen to 
the works of the great classical composers contemplatively. 
Art appreciation, too, can provide such a starting point. 
It is possible that most of the curriculum subjects can 
provide pupils with valuable opportunities for them to 
engage in contemplative thinking. This, however, does not 
necessarily require that separate lessons are created in 
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order to promote this type of thinking; what is important 
is that subject materials are presented in such ways that 
make it possible for pupils to engage with such materials 
in contemplative ways. Most topics in mathematics, for 
example, can encourage pupils to think contemplatively. On 
the topic of shape and space, say, dealing with problems 
involving the circle can provide an opportunity to think 
contemplatively about curves, circles and spheres in 
general. Their beauty, perfection and nature's preference 
for the use of this shape more than any other shape can 
provide excellent points of entries into contemplative 
thinking. 
It is possible for contemplation to lead to action and 
for action to lead to contemplation but what mediates 
between the two positions is reasoning. The importance of 
reasoning in our actions and its enhancement in pupils is 
what we now go on to discuss. 
13.4. Enhancing Reasoning 
The significance of reasoning in nearly all the activities 
that we engage in has led some proponents of general 
thinking skills to the mistaken view that it is the only 
main route to effective thinking, rather than one of many 
types of thinking. Lipman(1986) declared that 
"reasonableness is the single most important characteristic 
of the educated man (p.151)." But Lipman's assertion is 
mistaken simply because there are other equally important 
types of thinking, in spite of the fact that the ability to 
reason is crucial in our everyday lives. The origin of 
this error can be traced back to two sources, the first 
being the ease with which "reasoning" is interchanged with 
"thinking", while the second is that much of our thinking 
is dominated by problem-solving which forms the basis of 
reasoning. 
The justifications for the enhancement of reasoning in 
education, as discussed in Part One, go back to the central 
position of this type of thinking in our lives. In Chapter 
1 we observed that reasoning primarily aims at calculation 
and is generally divided into the practical and the 
theoretical but that this division does not necessarily 
imply that the two forms of reasoning are mutually 
exclusive. It is important that the context is taken into 
consideration since being able to reason in one context 
does not necessarily guarantee its use in a different 
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context. For example, being able to reason well in finding 
solutions to problems in physics does not necessarily imply 
that one is able to apply that in playing excellent 
football. Although in both cases reasoning is important, it 
cannot be assumed to be the same since the two cases 
involve different contexts. In the context of physics 
theoretical reasoning plays the leading role in how the 
physicist tries to solve problems. In playing football the 
footballer relies on practical reasoning in the attempt to 
win or force a draw. 
How can pupils' reasoning be enhanced? In order to 
tackle this question it is important to highlight the 
importance that is attached to theoretical thinking. In 
education great emphasis is placed on theoretical 
reasoning, while marginal attention is given to practical 
reasoning. It is not clear why theoretical reasoning 
commands much more attention than practical reasoning. A 
possible answer could be the ease and speed with which 
theoretical thinking can be assessed. For example, it is 
not difficult to assess a pupil's theoretical reasoning on 
calculating the percentage profit on items sold. It merely 
involves checking that the pupil knows and applies the 
appropriate mathematical method. However, the situation 
becomes much more difficult as soon as the problem is 
translated into assessing the practical reasoning involved, 
say, in how pupils decide to spend their weekly pocket 
money. 
In spite of the difficulties mentioned above, 
practical reasoning is crucial in thinking effectively 
335 
since it is about the means that we choose to attain our 
desired ends. In order to enhance such thinking we can take 
certain curriculum subjects as starting points. For 
example, subjects such as design and technology, civic 
education, home economics, etc, provide excellent 
opportunities for the encouragement of practical reasoning. 
Designing and making things encourages pupils to engage in 
it. Similarly, civic education can be useful in enhancing 
pupils' capacities in making decisions and choices 
concerning their lives. Home economics provides similar 
opportunities. 
What is required in order to challenge pupils to 
reason practically is that interesting and exciting ways 
are found of teaching and learning curriculum content. This 
suggests the involvement of the imagination, which forms 
the topic of discussion in the next section. 
13.5. Fostering the Imagination 
The role of the imagination in thinking well cannot be 
over-emphasised. Philosophers such as Warnock(1976), 
Passmore(1980), Egan(1992) have argued for the development 
of the imagination in the educational process. 
Passmore(1980) argued that: 
There is no form of enterprise that cannot be conducted imaginatively. 
Equally, there is no subject that cannot be taught imaginatively or 
unimaginatively (p158). 
Passmore's argument suggests that imaginative thinking cuts 
across subject areas and that all stand to benefit if 
schools and colleges encourage it and seek to make it an 
educational aim. 
Imaginativeness plays an important part in shaping our 
view of the world and how we deal with the issues that life 
and living presents (this does not imply that the other 
types of imaginings are less important). In most fields of 
human endeavour it is an asset, for it is imaginative 
scientists, engineers, philosophers, designers who provide 
us with the solutions to our pressing problems. The 
versatility of the imagination suggests that it can be 
applied in many diverse situations. However, this is not to 
imply that the pervasiveness of the imagination in various 
activities means that it is generic. Clearly the context 
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in which it operates must be taken into account. It cannot 
be taken for granted that being able to think imaginatively 
in breaking new ground in the field of mathematics for 
example, will automatically result in being able to do the 
same in the field of, say, chemistry or music. 
In order to break new ground, it is important that one 
is able to go beyond what is currently known or accepted. 
For example, Copernicus demonstrated imaginativeness and 
independence of thought in challenging the Ptolemic 
conception of the universe, which at the time had dominated 
the minds of learned people for over one thousand years. 
The Copernican view of the world contradicts our immediate 
experiences, since every immediate experience shows the 
world as being stationary while the heavens continue to 
move. The significance of Copernicus lies in the fact that 
he had the courage to go beyond the norm, in other words he 
was able to pursue an alternative possibility radically 
different from the dominant belief apparently supported by 
Immediate experiences. The move away from the safety of the 
dominant belief or norm is very significant in the works of 
those imaginative men and women who have changed our views 
of the world. 
The notions of imagination discussed in earlier 
chapters suggest that in the classroom teachers will be 
confronted by a variety of pupils some of whom imagine by 
forming vivid mental images, and others, while not being 
totally unable to form images, only do so in a very sketchy 
manner. On the other hand it may be that the non-visualiser 
is imaginative in generating different perspectives on 
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given situations. 
As indicated by Passmore(1980), the fact that a 
person can be imaginative in one area and unimaginative in 
another area presents a problem to the teacher since the 
latter would prefer to use methods of fostering imaginative 
thinking which are widely effective across the different 
ways that pupils are likely to imagine things. In view of 
this difficulty, how can the fostering of imaginative 
thinking among pupils be achieved? A possible way forward 
is to view imaginative thinking as the consideration of a 
diversity of alternatives specifically within the various 
learning experiences encountered in the curriculum. Hence 
in the mathematics class asking what difference it would 
make if our number system as we know it consisted solely of 
even numbers provides a good example. Considering such an 
alternative to the present number system could stimulate 
imaginative thinking about our number system in particular 
and its application to our daily affairs. However, such 
consideration is predicated on pupils' existing knowledge 
of the subject. 
As an initial starting point in fostering pupils' 
Imaginativeness, curriculum subjects could be introduced 
and taught from historical perspectives. For example, 
presenting mathematical knowledge initially from a 
historical perspective can reveal the story of how the 
subject has evolved, the successes and failures in the 
attempts by mathematicians to solve their particular 
problems and the origins of the problems themselves. 
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In order to foster pupils' imaginative thinking, 
teachers will have to present learning materials in very 
different ways from what is currently the case, where a 
central aim is to get pupils to pass examinations. This is 
not to claim that examinations are unimportant but only to 
indicate that where teaching to pass examinations takes 
precedence over teaching for understanding it is difficult 
to see how learning to think imaginatively can flourish. 
When facts are presented as one possibility out of many 
possibilities it is much more likely to result in fruitful 
reflection, which in turn leads to a deeper understanding. 
The development of pupils' thinking is by no means simple 
and this forms the focus of the discussion in the next 
section. 
13.6. The complexity of teaching thinking 
The complexity of teaching thinking must be acknowledged in 
any attempt to develop or enhance pupils' thinking. Failure 
to recognise the various types of thinking can only produce 
inadequate results. 
Teaching thinking simply in terms of the improvement 
of reasoning or the generating of ideas as in the cases of 
the programmes discussed earlier fails to address the 
complex nature of thinking. For example, DeBono's CoRT 
programme attempts to teach what he calls "generative 
thinking" by instructing learners to simply memorise and 
apply his techniques. DeBono's method fails to address 
important factors such the importance of knowledge and 
reasoning in generating ideas. 
Progress is being made in the right direction through 
the introduction of thinking skills in the new National 
Curriculum (2000) for England. However there are issues 
that remain to be addressed. The targeted thinking skills 
are grouped under five main headings as information 
processing, reasoning, enquiry, creativity, and evaluation. 
However, it is not clear why these have been identified as 
representative of thinking since others such as 
contemplation and sign-cognition have not been included in 
the above list. The manner in which the thinking skills 
have been presented seems to suggest that they are taken to 
be general skills that can be taught through individual 
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subjects. But, as this thesis has argued, there are 
problems in viewing the listed thinking skills to be 
separate from the individual curriculum subjects. 
The interconnectedness of the various types of 
thinking means that in seeking to enhance pupils' thinking 
all the various types of thinking must be targeted. An 
analogy with our dental structure may help here. Our teeth 
can be categorised into molars for crushing and chewing, 
incisors for cutting and canines for tearing. Although 
there are differences among them, they are connected and 
work together to help us eat solid food more efficiently. 
It is possible to use only the incisors or the molars to 
eat but this is generally inefficient, as any one who has 
lost their incisors knows very well. Similarly to target a 
particular type of thinking to the exclusion of the others 
may not necessarily hinder thinking, but it may do so. The 
ways in which the various types of thinking come into use 
in thinking effectively are underpinned first and foremost 
by knowledge, as discussed earlier in Chapter 11, and among 
other factors by courage, which was discussed in Chapter 
12. In order to develop pupils' thinking, attention must be 
paid to the enhancement of these two major factors. 
In Chapter 4 the discussion highlighted the framework 
produced by McPeck. The framework presented some useful 
ideas that can be adapted for teaching and learning. For 
example, McPeck's philosophy-of approach, which basically 
emphasises the study of the philosophical aspects of 
individual curriculum subjects as an essential part of 
learning those subjects, can be transformed to the 
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history-of approach so that the history of subject X and 
the history of subject Y become an integral part of what it 
means to "learn X" or to "learn Y". Gaining knowledge of 
the historical contexts within which the various subjects 
have developed can deepen pupils' knowledge and 
understanding of their subjects long before they begin to 
think philosophically about them. Thus the history of 
mathematics would be as much a part of mathematics 
education as elementary algebra, that is, it would be well 
woven into the fabric of the subject rather than an 
optional extra. Alongside the presentation of materials in 
their historical contexts every opportunity must be sought 
to immerse pupils in the various types of thinking 
underpinning the subjects under consideration. 
The possession of courage among other virtues is 
important in thinking effectively because the possession of 
knowledge will not necessarily result in its use at the 
right time and for the right reasons. However, the major 
problem with learning to be courageous is that it cannot be 
learned by memorising some key facts. In other words, as 
courage is a disposition it cannot be taught and learned as 
a pure skill. Consequently, providing the right kinds of 
examples and guidance for thinking within the educational 
context is by no means easy. 
In suggesting contexts for developing thoughtfulness 
Schrag(1988) concludes that the conventional classroom is 
not conducive and therefore new settings must be devised 
based on pupil participation (in small groups) in various 
projects such as producing a newspaper, building a car or 
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an aeroplane, conducting an oral history of the local 
community etc. Leaders of these projects, according to 
Schrag, would be considered educators but qualifications 
would not have to include teaching credentials. Schrag's 
sole purpose in proposing this new setting is to encourage 
the virtue of thoughtfulness in the young. 
It is not clear how Schrag's proposal can provide the 
very broad knowledge that is offered within the 
conventional school setting in spite of its shortcomings. 
It is possible that in learning how to build a car pupils 
might learn a lot about engines, transportation in general 
and wider issues including pollution, but it is debatable 
whether the focus on building a car will allow for further 
consideration beyond the project at hand. Furthermore it is 
not clear why Schrag insists that qualifications of the 
leaders of these projects need not include teaching 
credentials. A possible reason is that these projects occur 
outside the context of the school and therefore the adults 
involved will not necessarily be qualified teachers. But 
there is a danger in playing down the knowledge and skills 
that go into teaching and motivating pupils since these are 
generally acquired through supervision. The importance of 
teachers in encouraging thinking will be discussed later. 
What makes effective thinking difficult to engage in 
(and hence difficult to encourage within the educational 
context) is that it cannot be simply switched on whenever 
it is needed. If it occurs at all it involves hard work, 
perseverance, patience, etc. in the application of the 
different types of thinking mentioned above. For example, 
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in our earlier discussion in section 11.2.1.1, we saw how 
Poincare strove for fifteen days without much progress in 
his attempt to prove that there could not be any functions 
like those that he called Fuchsian functions. It was not 
until one evening lying on his bed unable to sleep, 
presumably troubled by the unyielding mathematical problem 
facing him, that he began to have vivid ideas about 
possible solutions to his problem. As a result Poincare was 
able to work on how the different ideas fit together to 
produce possible solutions, which then led to the solution 
of his problem. What is highly significant in Poincare's 
description of the process by which he came to solve his 
problem is his imaginativeness. Having used imagination to 
generate different perspectives, it was then possible for 
him to apply his reasoning to check and confirm his 
results. What this suggests is that fostering pupils' 
imaginativeness offers a promising route by which the 
factors that help to promote several kinds of thinking can 
be addressed. It also offers the means by which different 
perspectives can be generated on a situation under 
consideration. However, these points about fostering 
imaginativeness do not imply that the other types of 
thinking are less significant. 
The ability to think effectively can be directed 
towards good or evil ends, so one of the key challenges for 
teachers is to find appropriate ways to work on the pupils' 
moral sensitivities. Teachers are in a position to provide 
favourable settings. The role of teachers in guiding pupils 
not only to gain confidence in thinking but also to develop 
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their moral sensitivities highlights the importance of the 
sort of training that teachers need to undergo. 
13.7. The importance of teacher preparation. 
As indicated in the previous section the importance of the 
teacher in enhancing pupils' thinking cannot be over-
emphasised. In fact all the general thinking skills 
programmes discussed in the thesis acknowledge the 
importance of the teacher and make various provisions for 
training teachers in the use of their programmes. However, 
in spite of their high regard for teacher development and 
claims of various positive effects, they have not fully 
succeeded in becoming established in mainstream education. 
Leat(1999) considered some of the reasons why 
thinking skills programmes fail to thrive in the classroom. 
Leat's work was based on interviews with numerous teachers 
who have used or experienced these programmes. In his 
analysis Leat explains the nature of the various forces 
operating on teachers, pupils and schools to prevent 
Thinking Skills programmes from making any lasting impact 
as follows: 
1) Teacher socialisation is a powerful force, and this can 
operate negatively in influencing how teachers perform 
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their work, for example, through staff room conversation 
when teachers discuss pupils, curriculum or educational 
issues. 
2) Teachers' existing classroom knowledge that helps them 
with particular topics and classes becomes threatened as 
they struggle to implement new learning environments based 
largely on co-operative groupwork. 
3) A considerable tension is created since the intentions 
of Thinking Skills programmes run counter to the usual 
subject intentions of classroom teachers. Classroom 
teachers' subject knowledge is geared towards their 
particular subject purpose and this is in sharp opposition 
to the content free nature of Thinking Skills programmes. 
4) The view that teachers have of themselves in the 
classroom and of what teaching is about plays an important 
part in accepting or rejecting the struggle and difficulty 
that accompanies the implementation of the programmes. For 
many teachers such change is either impossible or too 
costly. 
5) Not all teachers are prepared to accommodate the 
emotional turmoil inherent in the change that accompanies 
the implementation of Thinking Skills programmes. 
Leat concluded that these forces present individual 
teachers with some difficult challenges in introducing 
these. If the drag effects of these forces are to be 
overturned in any curriculum innovation, in-service teacher 
education and support need to include networks of teachers, 
peer support and a detailed exploration of evidence in 
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support of children's learning. 
Leat's work provides an important starting point in 
two ways: firstly, by highlighting the importance of 
teachers in any curriculum innovation and secondly, by 
recommending possible approaches to in-service training. 
However, the key issue that Leat's work failed to explore 
is the kind of training that teachers initially undergo for 
their professional qualification. The investigation of this 
issue is important in illuminating why the forces 
identified by Leat are so powerful. 
In England and Wales, for example, there are two main 
entry routes into the teaching profession. The first route 
is by gaining a Bachelor of Education (BEd) degree. The 
course structure of the BEd degree varies among 
institutions, ranging from two-year courses for mature 
students to four-year courses covering two years study of a 
main subject e.g Mathematics, English, Science etc, then a 
further two years study of educational issues. The second 
route is by completing a one-year course leading to the 
Post Graduate Certificate in Education (PGCE). The PGCE 
course provides a one-year professional preparation for 
teaching for those with a degree or graduate equivalent 
qualification. After obtaining their academic 
qualifications newly qualified teachers are granted a 
'qualified teacher status' after successfully completing 
their first year of teaching. What is evident from the kind 
of training given to trainee teachers prior to their 
qualified teacher status is that not enough time and 
opportunity is provided for any sustained reflection on the 
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practical and theoretical issues regarding teaching and 
learning. As a result, teaching is treated as a "second-
choice profession" by many graduate students and 
attracting young talented students into it is proving very 
difficult for various reasons including the apparent low 
status of the profession in spite of its vital role in the 
education of the population. Far from the popular notion 
that teaching is easy, it is in fact a very difficult job 
to perform well and this requires that reasonable time is 
spent in training to become a teacher. 
One of the key arguments in this thesis is that 
knowledge and courage among other considerations form the 
bedrock of effective thinking, and therefore in order to 
begin to support pupils in learning to think effectively it 
is necessary that teachers not only have a substantive body 
of worthwhile knowledge and thorough understanding but also 
know how to communicate these in ways that encourage 
effective thinking. 
The question that remains to be answered is: what kind 
of training must the trainee teacher undergo in order to 
support pupils in learning to think effectively? To begin 
with, the requirement that all student teachers have a 
substantive body of worthwhile knowledge and understanding 
Implies that all trainee students initially study to 
graduate level a subject of their choice. At present this 
is only true for those who take the PGCE route into the 
profession. Finally, to qualify as a teacher the trainee 
student must then undergo a number of years training 
covering in detail all aspects of teaching and learning. It 
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is essential that much time is spent on the cycle of 
theory, practice and reflection in order to train 
confident, well-informed and well-trained teachers. 
Let us consider the case in the field of medicine. 
Just as medicine generally deals with the affairs of the 
body so education deals with the affairs of the mind. In 
the medical field it would be considered unacceptable and 
indeed highly dangerous for a person to attempt to perform 
a heart surgery after only one or two years training in 
medicine. In fact no mentally alert heart patient would be 
willing to undergo this. However, in education a one or two 
year training is considered sufficient to become an expert 
in matters of the mind and learning. The overtness of 
medical problems and their solutions naturally places 
importance on how doctors are trained, whereas the 
covertness of the difficulties in education obscures the 
importance of an extensive and thorough period of training 
for teachers. Education possibly stands to gain by 
adopting the medical model of training for teachers. 
Adopting an extensive period of training will provide 
the opportunity to integrate the topic of teaching and 
learning to think into teacher training programmes. But in 
addition to thorough teacher preparation improvement in 
teacher support is equally important. Teacher support 
programmes could be improved by firstly, disseminating 
relevant educational research findings to all teachers, and 
secondly, providing assessable and ongoing refresher 
courses, seminars and conferences for the discussion of 
curriculum and general educational issues among teachers. 
SUMMARY OF PART THREE 
In Part Three of the thesis the discussion focused on two 
of the important factors that aid thinking. These factors 
were considered important because of our interest in not 
merely thinking but thinking well. 
In Chapter 11 the discussion focused on the importance 
of knowledge in thinking. It tried to demonstrate the need 
for relevant knowledge in thinking well. The complex 
relationship between thinking and knowledge was 
highlighted. In Chapter 12 the importance of courage in 
thinking well was discussed. This discussion was based on 
the notion that having knowledge does not necessarily lead 
to its application; hence courage among other things is 
required. In Chapter 13 the role of the various types of 
thinking and considerations for their promotion in formal 
education were discussed. Finally the importance of teacher 
preparation was highlighted, since the fact that possession 
of knowledge and courage can be used for evil ends requires 
competent and well-motivated teachers to work on the moral 
sensitivities of the pupil. 
350 
351 
CONCLUS ION 
In this thesis it has been argued that thinking is central 
to our existence and doing it well is necessary if we are 
to live much fuller lives. Consequently the development of 
thinking must form an important part of education and 
children must be supported in the enhancement of their 
thinking. 
In very recent times the growing interest in the 
promotion of thinking in education has seen the development 
of a large number of curriculum programmes for teaching 
thinking skills. The thesis has focused particularly on a 
number of the most prominent programmes worldwide. The 
critique of these programmes formed the basis for further 
critical discussion of the notion of teaching general 
thinking skills. The examination of these programmes 
highlighted the programme originators' over-simplification 
of what thinking involves, thus presenting inadequate 
models for teaching thinking. 
The proliferation of thinking skills programmes is in 
a sense an acknowledgement of the importance of teaching 
thinking. The justifications given by the originators of 
the various programmes for seeking to improve pupils' 
thinking skills are very significant. But what remain 
problematic are the means by which the originators seek to 
achieve their objectives. In view of the difficulties 
associated with the various programmes care must be taken 
in efforts to find ways to promote thinking. 
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In order to provide a foundation for the examination 
of the thinking skills programmes, the nature of thinking 
was discussed in Part One of the thesis, which covered the 
work of a variety of writers, with particular attention to 
Dewey and Ryle, as their conceptions of thinking provided 
relevant views for the discussion of thinking in education. 
Thinking was described in the thesis as a complex 
phenomenon that can occur as a mental or physical act 
involving intentionality and attention and requiring 
particular contexts for its full description. The 
complexity of thinking was further discussed by considering 
the various types of thinking and their inter-
relationships. The multi-facetedness of the notion of 
thinking means that viewing it purely in terms of 
reasoning, for example, can only result in a less than 
satisfactory account of what thinking involves. It is in 
such terms that the thinking skills programmes discussed in 
the thesis tend to view the nature of thinking. 
However, viewing thinking in all its multi-facetedness 
as indicated in the thesis raises issues that require 
further investigation beyond its immediate concerns. The 
arguments presented here focused on thinking as an activity 
that requires attention and intentionality. In other words 
some sort of awareness or consciousness is called for. The 
importance of consciousness in providing us with a deeper 
understanding of thinking highlights the need for further 
investigation into its nature. 
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The major difficulty concerning our precise 
understanding of what the nature of consciousness involves 
is due to the lack of objective, scientific definition that 
is able to encapsulate the essence of consciousness 
(Papineau,2000). However, attempts have been made to 
provide explanations for the nature of consciousness and 
these have led to the production of various philosophical 
theories from Descartes's dualism, which supports the 
separateness of mental and physical existence, through to 
the physicalist position which equates mental occurrences 
to brain states, and finally to the 'mysterian' view that 
consciousness is a complete mystery (Papineau,2000). 
If thinking is a form of consciousness, we need to 
establish whether consciousness is physical or non-
physical. If it is non-physical, this means that our 
incomplete knowledge of the nature of thinking will 
continue to persist. On the other hand if it is physical, 
then this may make possible the construction of a thinking 
machine, with far-reaching consequences regarding the 
nature of thinking and our relationship with man-made 
machines. For example will machines be considered equal to 
human beings as a result? While it is not the aim to 
present a detailed explanation of what consciousness 
involves, the thesis regards the philosophical 
investigations of related questions to be highly relevant 
in contributing further to our understanding of thinking. 
The discussion of the nature of thinking in Part One 
of the thesis established the important implication that 
any attempt to promote thinking must take into account its 
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complex nature. It is this comprehensiveness of the concept 
of thinking that the most prominent programmes for teaching 
thinking fail to address. 
In Part Two, the central part of this thesis, a number 
of the leading programmes for teaching thinking were 
considered. These programmes were critically examined 
together with the various empirical studies connected to 
them. The rationale for discussing these programmes is that 
firstly, they are the most well established programmes; 
secondly, they have been tested and their developers have 
made claims about their effectiveness in teaching general 
thinking skills. However, the examination of the programmes 
did not yield any substantial evidence in support of the 
claims which developers make regarding the effectiveness of 
their programmes. The various methods guiding the four 
programmes examined are as follows: 
1. In Philosophy for Children programme Lipman attempts 
to teach children to think by engaging them in 
philosophical discussions based wholly on stories 
written by him. In using such a method Lipman assumes 
that children's thinking can be improved by simply 
engaging them in his novels. In supporting his claim 
about the effectiveness of his programme, Lipman 
cites a number of quantitative studies. Two of these 
studies were evaluated and it was argued that they do 
not provide conclusive evidence in support of the 
programme. 
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2. In CoRT thinking programme DeBono attempts to teach 
thinking based simply on the use of mnemonics. The 
technique requires learning keywords by rote and then 
applying them to any context whenever the need 
arises. It was argued that DeBono's programme lacked 
a coherent theoretical framework. However, DeBono 
supports the effectiveness of his programme by 
reference to a study by Edwards(1991) and the general 
popularity of his programme. After evaluating 
Edwards's study it was concluded that the study does 
not provide a clear evidence of the effectiveness of 
the programme. 
3. Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment programme was 
developed as a strategy for assisting retarded 
performers but has since been considered as a 
thinking skills programme for all. It was argued that 
it is not appropriate to simply extend the programme 
to normal school children. Furthermore two studies by 
Weller and Craft(1980) and Blagg(1991) were examined 
and the indication was that there is no substantial 
evidence for the effectiveness of the programme in 
mainstream education. 
4. CASE is a thinking skills programme developed and 
evaluated by the originators. The evaluation of the 
programme was examined and there was no clear 
evidence to suggest that the programme is as 
successful as the programme developers claim. It was 
argued that the successes claimed for the programme 
by the developers were due more to the basic good 
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quality of teaching expected in the provision of any 
substantial education rather than to the teaching of 
thinking skills. 
The examination of these programmes highlighted the 
simplistic way by which they attempt to teach thinking. 
The comprehensive examination of these programmes in 
this thesis is a significant contribution to our knowledge 
of teaching thinking. Although other writers such as 
McPeck(1981) and Schrag(1988) have considered issues 
concerning the teaching of thinking, their discussions do 
not provide such a comprehensive account. McPeck's critique 
of teaching thinking highlights some of these programmes 
with particular attention to Edward DeBono's programme. 
Although McPeck provides a detailed analysis of the 
programme, he focuses mainly on the weaknesses in the 
arguments that DeBono uses to advance the reliability of 
his programme in promoting effective thinking skills. 
McPeck does not provide any comments on the empirical 
evaluations of the programme. In discussing his proposals 
for teaching thinking, Schrag also comments on the 
programmes and in particular highlights DeBono's and 
Feuerstein's programmes. However, his analysis also does 
not provide any comments on the various empirical studies 
associated with the programmes. 
Having provided a critical assessment of thinking 
skills, the argument was generalised to consider the 
existence of general thinking skills. It was argued that 
the term 'general thinking skills' is a source of confusion 
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since developers (and supporters) of thinking skills 
programmes are often not clear about what they mean. 
If writers supporting general thinking skills refer to 
them as skills that are only applicable across closely 
related contexts, this provides an acceptable definition of 
what we should take such skills to mean. It was argued that 
empirically there is evidence to support the transfer of 
thinking skills between closely related contexts. However, 
discussions of thinking skills by such writers as 
Sternberg(1986) and DeBono(1976) suggest that they can be 
applied across any learning or problem solving situation 
without regard for knowledge specific to any context. 
The notion of general thinking skills that can be 
applied in any context is very problematic. What supporters 
of such skills need to provide but persistently fail to 
provide is substantial evidence in support of the existence 
of such skills. However, supporters of general thinking 
skills such as Higgins and Baumfield(1998) for example, 
hold the view that because it is possible to conceptualise 
general thinking skills then such skills must exist and 
therefore every effort must be made to find appropriate 
methods of teaching them. It was argued that general 
thinking skills are not theoretically impossible but what 
remains problematic is that there is no conclusive evidence 
to support their existence. The objection, therefore, to 
the existence of such general thinking skills is based on 
empirical grounds. It was argued further that to provide a 
sensible basis upon which the encouragement of thinking can 
be undertaken we must do so from a context-specific 
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perspective since such context(s) are required in thinking. 
The fact that skills are important in specific contexts 
means that the promotion of thinking must pay attention to 
the acquisition of knowledge within specific contexts 
together with the appropriate dispositions. 
In Part Three, the thesis offered a different 
perspective on how thinking can be promoted. This was 
considered initially from the point of view that to think 
well requires relevant knowledge. The necessity of 
knowledge in thinking was indicated by its role in the 
various types of thinking. However, it was argued that 
although knowledge is crucial in thinking well this does 
not guarantee its application by the possessor in instances 
where knowledge is to be applied. In such instances courage 
also plays an important role in thinking well. But there 
may be limits to the analysis of this presented earlier in 
the thesis. 
Is courage always important in thinking? For example, 
is it vital in making a decision on the choice of shoes 
that one purchases? Clearly in this case it is not. 
Similarly, the thinking that a car mechanic applies in 
carrying out a quick and successful diagnosis and repair of 
a faulty vehicle may not necessarily involve courage where 
the fault is very straightforward, but where the problem is 
not so simple and straightforward this may require some 
courage from the mechanic in tracking the fault since there 
may be some element of risk in failing to make the correct 
diagnosis. This element of risk becomes much clearer in the 
classroom where pupils, for example, are called upon to 
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produce the correct answer or comment in the presences of 
their classmates. In such cases courage is required to 
overcome the fear of failure and ridicule by their 
classmates. In thinking well courage plays some part but it 
may not be necessary on every occasion. Clearly the kind of 
courage that is envisaged is not that of the warrior facing 
physical hardships and death in battle, but it is the 
courage that one requires in facing situations where one is 
exposed to ridicule or disgrace for example. 
Courage is needed in thinking through or providing 
solutions to unfamiliar and difficult problems. For 
instance, in thinking that leads to imaginative result(s) 
having courage is important due to the risk of failure 
attached to such thinking. The courage to endure such risks 
involves, for example, patience, perseverance, effort and 
care. These are dispositional qualities. The involvement of 
courage in thinking further establishes the complex nature 
of thinking, as dispositions cannot be taught in the same 
way as writing the alphabet. 
Considering the arguments presented above, is there a 
difference between thinking well and being a good thinker? 
Thinking well could be considered as involving skills and 
the ability to use those skills, but this tells us nothing 
about one's readiness to apply such skills. For example, 
one may be able to think well in manipulating mathematical 
equations involving algebra, but this does not give any 
indication of one's inclination to apply the skill whenever 
the need arises. Being a good thinker, on the other hand, 
points to this inclination. In other words it involves 
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one's disposition to think well. A good example to 
illustrate the distinction being made can be drawn from 
school examinations. It is not too difficult to find pupils 
who perform well in their final school examination in 
mathematics, say, but not too long afterwards forget much 
of what they learnt through complete lack of use of their 
knowledge. In education we clearly do not want pupils to be 
equipped with skills that they fail to use in their 
everyday life when the need arises. Preferably we want them 
to use their skills in thinking in a habitual way. This 
means that the inculcation of the appropriate dispositions 
must be considered an important element in the enhancement 
of pupils' thinking. This raises questions about whether 
the approach of teaching thinking skills is sufficient for 
the development of pupils into habitual thinkers. 
The role of teachers in the development of pupils' 
thinking cannot be overemphasised as they can provide 
valuable examples to guide pupils in becoming habitual 
thinkers. It was also argued that being able to think 
effectively can be directed towards good or evil ends, so 
the teacher's role is crucial in working on the moral 
sensitivities of his or her pupils. These considerations 
highlight the importance of the grounding that teachers 
receive. 
Overall, the thesis has highlighted three major claims 
as follows: 
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1) The various thinking skills programmes fail to produce 
substantial evidence in support of their 
effectiveness. 
2) Thinking is a very complex notion, and this must be 
taken into account when considering its promotion. 
3) Knowledge is necessary, and courage as a disposition 
is important in thinking well and being a good 
thinker. 
An important question to be answered is why do general 
thinking skills programmes fail to provide reliable 
evidence to support their programmes? The answer can be 
located in the simplistic ways in which the nature of 
thinking is presented in the various programmes. McGuinness 
(1999), for instance, in her report on teaching thinking, 
treats general thinking skills programmes as a package that 
can deliver these skills without any specific context. The 
approach is attractive for various reasons to various 
agencies. For example, programme developers may be 
attracted to this approach because it appears to promise a 
straightforward way of becoming an effective thinker across 
domains without the need to acquire specific skills or 
knowledge. Policy-makers may also be attracted to the 
approach as a result of their desire and eagerness to raise 
educational standards nationwide. In England thinking 
skills have become part of the curriculum. It is stated in 
the new National Curriculum (1999) handbook for teachers 
that the following thinking skills are embedded in the 
National Curriculum: 
Information-processing skills 
These enable pupils to locate and collect relevant information, to sort, 
classify, sequence, compare and contrast, and to analyse part/whole 
relationships. 
Reasoning skills 
These enable pupils to give reasons for opinions and actions, to draw 
inferences and make deductions, to use precise language to explain what 
they think, and to make judgments and decisions informed by reasons or 
evidence. 
Enquiry skills 
These enable pupils to ask relevant questions, to pose and define problems, 
to plan what to do and how to research, to predict outcomes and anticipate 
consequences, and to test conclusions and improve ideas. 
Creative thinking skills 
These enable pupils to generate and extend ideas, to suggest hypotheses, to 
apply imagination, and to look for alternative innovative outcomes. 
Evaluation skills 
These enable pupils to evaluate information, to judge the value of what 
they read, hear and do, to develop criteria for judging the value of their 
own and others' work or ideas, and to have confidence in their judgments 
(p.23-24). 
A close observation of the above listed thinking skills in 
the National Curriculum touches on issues already raised in 
the thesis. There is no indication here that these are 
anything but general skills. Also, the framing of the above 
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skills largely in terms of problem solving suggests that 
contemplative thinking for example, is of a lesser value. 
The practice of defining thinking skills simply in 
terms of problem solving crosses international boundaries. 
For instance in the Chinese special region of Hong Kong the 
promotion of thinking skills has taken centre stage in the 
development of their new curriculum framework. In 
identifying the various types of generic skills in the 
framework The Curriculum Development Council (Consultation 
document, Nov.2000) stated that: 
Creativity is the ability to produce original ideas and solve problems 
appropriate to the contexts. 
Critical thinking skills help students to draw out meaning from given data 
or statements, generate and evaluate arguments, and make their own 
judgments. 
Problem solving skills help students to use thinking skills to resolve a 
difficulty and determine the best course of action (p36-37). 
The desire to enhance the thinking skills of pupils is a 
worldwide phenomenon. For that reason we must not approach 
their promotion from a simplistic position. We must not 
merely seek to produce a list of skills or promote one type 
of thinking to the exclusion of others. The various types 
of thinking are not mutually exclusive. However, if it is 
the intention to focus on the promotion of a particular 
type of thinking then care must be taken to clarify the 
sort that is being aimed at and to acknowledge the 
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limitations of doing so. The view presented does not claim 
to offer a complete system for teaching thinking but a 
critical analysis of some of the most influential 
programmes and recommends that in any attempt to promote 
and enhance thinking it is important that knowledge and 
courage are taken into consideration. 
In promoting thinking from a non-simplistic 
perspective the development of the various types of 
thinking may well offer the best possible opportunities of 
supporting pupils to learn to think well in the diverse 
situations in which they may find themselves. However, 
making decisions on which types of thinking we choose to 
promote and how we prioritise them cannot be determined by 
the nature of thinking but only by references to the aims 
of education. These are concerned with the items that we 
want to form the cornerstone of education and the values 
that we attach to them. Priorities are in the main ethical 
questions and in order to properly discuss priorities we 
have to go into issues of human wellbeing and other ethical 
matters that lie behind it. 
The aims of education in the new National Curriculum 
for England (QCA,1999) embody the values underpinning 
compulsory education and these values bring with them a 
political framework which assumes a liberal democratic 
society. The values underpinning the new National 
Curriculum are described as follows: 
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Foremost is a belief in education as a route to: the wellbeing and 
development of the individual; equality of opportunity for all; a healthy 
democracy; a productive economy; and a sustainable environment. Education 
should reflect the enduring values that contribute to these ends. These 
include valuing ourselves, our families, our relationships and the wider 
groups to which we belong, together with virtues such as justice, 
truthfulness and a sense of duty (p.4). 
The values support two main categories of aims as follows: 
i) To provide opportunities for all pupils to learn 
and achieve. In order to achieve this it should 
develop pupils' enjoyment of, and commitment to, 
learning to encourage and stimulate the best 
possible progress and the highest attainment for 
all pupils. It should build on pupils' strengths, 
interests and experiences and develop their 
confidence in their capacity to learn and work 
independently and collaboratively. 
ii) The school curriculum should aim to prepare all 
pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and 
experiences of life. To realise this aim it should 
pass on the enduring values of society, develop 
pupils' integrity and autonomy and help them to be 
responsible and caring citizens capable of 
contributing to the development of a just society. 
The fact that the underpinning values and aims of the new 
National Curriculum place the wellbeing, autonomy and 
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responsibilities of the individual at the center of the 
curriculum clearly highlights the importance of the 
promotion of the various thinking skills, among other 
things. We cannot aim to prepare all pupils for the 
opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of life 
without considering how the various thinking skills come 
into it. For example, if we want pupils to develop a love 
of works of art as part of their spiritual wellbeing then 
there is the need for the promotion of contemplative 
thinking in this area. Similarly, if we are going to 
prepare pupils to become independent and caring adults, we 
may need to promote such areas of thinking as reasoning and 
imagining in the appropriate domains. What is crucial is 
that since we do not know what kinds of thinking pupils 
might use in their lives, we must aim to develop all the 
various types of thinking in order to provide the 
opportunities for all to learn and to achieve. Our ability 
to think well as already indicated is crucial and this in 
many ways is also suggested by the new National Curriculum, 
but how we promote it depends on our conception of it. 
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